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An investigation into the social learning of cooperation in children: individual, social, and
cultural comparisons
Natalia Bezerra Dutra
Abstract
Humans' unique cooperative and social learning skills have contributed to the evolution of human 
cumulative culture, fostering the creation and transmission of knowledge and the formation of 
social institutions. This thesis aimed to understand how children learn from others to collaborate in 
coordinated interactions with different roles and outcomes, and the influence of cultural, social, and 
individual factors on children's cooperative behaviour. It is organised in four experimental studies. 
The first study investigated how different collaborative actions are copied and transmitted between 
three- and four-year-old children. The second study investigated the adoption of different types of 
social information by six- and seven-year-old children in a collective social dilemma. The third 
study investigated the effects of age (four- and five-year-olds versus eight- and nine-year-olds), 
gender, social class and culture (Brazil versus England) on the cooperation and sharing of resources 
between children, in a task with unequal outcomes. The fourth study investigated whether the 
mothers’ social preferences and the children’s individual characteristics affect the cooperation and 
sharing of resources among children in the same task from the previous study. These studies yielded
important findings regarding the diverse effects of contextual factors on the development of 
children’s collaborative skills. It has been shown that young children can copy peers by observing 
them in collaborative tasks, and are willing to collaborate with each other across different situations.
However, when the tasks present potential conflicts of interest, children will rely on contextual cues
to decide whether cooperate or not between themselves. Finally, older children showed better skills 
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towards negotiation and coordination involving sharing of resources, across different sociocultural 
groups. This thesis contribute to the discussion of the role of contextual variables on the 
development and learning of cooperative behaviours from an evolutionary perspective.
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Chapter I
General Introduction
The two overarching questions within this thesis ask whether, and, if so, how children 
learn to cooperate with peers. Thus, this thesis primarily addresses these questions by 
examining the development of cooperative strategies across the early and middle childhood. 
The development of cooperation has been explored across a variety of fields (e.g. 
developmental psychology: Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006; cognitive psychology: Piaget,
1932; cross-cultural psychology: Rogoff, 2003; Tudge & Rogoff, 1989; educational 
psychology: Slavin et al., 1985; comparative psychology: Tomasello, 2018). By taking a 
developmental perspective, I attempt to understand how children adopt cooperative actions to 
solve problems that require coordination and negotiation of interests, and as a result learn 
from each other how to solve these problems.
Cooperation makes human societies work, and ultimately is considered one of the core
features by which humans succeeded in habiting regions across the Earth (Burkart et al., 
2014; Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012). It is linked to the origins of 
social norms, institutions, and cultural practices, such as education, technology and science 
(Chudek & Henrich, 2011); and it is also considered by some authors as the basis for human 
morality (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Turiel, 2006). Cooperation is a blanket term that refers to 
a variety of phenomena, and it has many synonyms such as: prosociality, altruism, helping, 
sharing, bargaining, coordination, mutualism, reciprocity, inequity aversion, fairness, justice, 
and morality. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the definition of different forms of 
cooperation across the studies presented in this thesis.
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Defining Cooperation
Cooperation is often used interchangeably with terms such as altruism and prosociality
in both developmental (Eisenberg et al., 2006) and evolutionary theories (Nowak, 2006). 
However, altruism usually refers to costly behaviour intended to benefit others (Boyd & 
Richerson, 2009), while cooperation may refer to acts (costly or not) of an individual or a 
group of individuals that benefit other people, as well as joint actions performed by partners 
(Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). In addition, prosociality refers to any 
behaviour intended to benefit others, thus including both altruism and cooperation (Eisenberg 
et al., 2006). Therefore, the adoption of prosociality, cooperation and altruism as 
interchangeable terms might be confusing because in many situations it is either clear that 
both the actor and the recipient benefit from the interactions, or it is difficult to assess whether
the actor’s benefits are only delayed.
In this thesis, cooperation is defined as either joint and mutually beneficial actions, or 
costly decisions to benefit others. Hence, two types of cooperative interactions were 
considered. The first type is collaboration, which is defined as mutual interactions between 
two or more partners that require the collaborators to establish common goals and coordinate 
their actions (Tomasello et al., 2005) and is synonymous to mutualism and coordination in the
acquisition of resources. The second type is sharing, which refers to any situation where an 
individual who is in possession of resource must decide to give part of these resources to 
other people (Wu & Su, 2014), and its definition is drawn from the literature on distributive 
justice, sense of fairness, and inequity aversion (McAuliffe, Blake, Steinbeis, & Warneken, 
2017). Both concepts are discussed in more detail in chapters II and V. The next section gives 
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an overview of the contextual variables that were investigated across the studies presented in 
this thesis.
The role of context on children’s collaborative decisions
Recent findings on young children’s early cooperative skills have supported the 
argument that humans have a universal propensity to help, cooperate and share with others 
(Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Warneken, 2018). In addition, children grow up in groups that 
share similar cultural practices, and acquire information from their interaction with others, 
through various processes, such as tutoring, observation, collaboration and conflict (Flynn & 
Whiten, 2012). Furthermore, humans' unique social learning and cooperation skills have 
contributed to the development of human culture as a cumulative phenomenon, fostering the 
construction and transmission of knowledge and the formation of social institutions (Boyd & 
Richerson, 2009; Tomasello et al., 2005). However, it remains unclear how this natural 
propensity to cooperate interacts with social learning processes, and further studies are 
necessary to understand the effects of contextual factors on children's learning of cooperative 
behaviour.
Evolutionary and developmental theories are often concerned with the emergence of 
general patterns of behaviour, that can be observed across a variety of social groups and 
cultures. This focus has been criticised both in developmental (Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & 
Legare, 2017) and cultural psychology (Kline, Shamsudheen, & Broesch, 2018), for two 
reasons. First, these theories are often drawn from limited samples, mostly children and 
families from middle and upper middle classes, from United States, Canada and European 
countries, hence obscuring which characteristics are universally similar or subjected to local 
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variations. Second, human cooperative skills might have evolved in response to changing 
physical environments and increasingly demanding social contexts (Richerson, Boyd, & 
Henrich, 2003), therefore leading to the evolution of flexible behaviour, which are quickly 
adaptable to local influences. Thus, the development of cooperative behaviours should be 
investigated in relation to environmental (i.e. contextual) influences, in tandem with the 
investigation of more general patterns across different social and cultural groups.
Although cooperation can be defined as the joint action of two or more individuals to 
achieve a common goal, it can be also seen as a type of strategy to obtain resources at one end
of a continuum with competition at the opposite end (Green & Rechis, 2006). Individuals in 
interaction adopt strategies according to a number of factors, such as the requirements of the 
situation, the relationship between the participants, individual goals or interests, and the 
sociocultural background (Green & Rechis, 2006; House et al., 2013). In social activities, the 
partners' interests can be aligned or not, which means that the partners in a joint activity can 
achieve their goals at the same time or not. Cooperation is fairly simple when the partners’ 
goals are aligned, because cheating is unlikely to happen in this scenario. However, when the 
partners' goals are not aligned, cooperation is riskier, since there is a chance that the partner 
will defect after being rewarded.
Regarding the management of partner's interests, evidence points towards an early 
understanding of commitment to joint actions in humans and a sensitivity to proportional 
sharing after collaboration (Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 2011; Warneken, 
Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011). Three-year-old children help partners or share their 
rewards with them more often when they are committed to a joint activity. For instance, 
Warneken et al. (2011) investigated young children’s sharing after collaboration and they have
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showed that children share even when the rewards are clumped together and can be 
monopolized by one of the partners. In Hamann et al., (2011), children had to work together 
in pairs to retrieve individual rewards; however, the experiment was set up to make one of the 
children always receive their reward first than the other. It was found that three-year-old 
children kept collaborating until their partners achieved their rewards, which means that 
children understand their commitment to a joint task and are not only using the other as a 
“social tool”. These and other findings were interpreted as evidence for the early emergence 
of children’s comprehension of the normative dimensions of collaborative tasks, which is in 
part responsible for humans' success in cooperating and sharing resources. 
The transmission and enforcement of social norms within groups regulate and promote
cooperative behaviours, especially when there is potential conflict of interests, and these 
norms may differ from one culture to another (Guzmán, Rodríguez-Sickert, & Rowthorn, 
2007; Henrich, 2004). Thus, there might be differences in cooperative and competitive 
behaviour of children across cultures, especially during middle childhood (Carlo, Koller, 
Eisenberg, Da Silva, & Frohlich, 1996; Carlo, Roesch, Knight, & Koller, 2001; Haidt, Koller, 
& Dias, 1993; House et al., 2013; Kagan & Madsen, 1972; Knight & Kagan, 1981; Madsen, 
1967, 1971). For instance, children from more collectivistic cultures, such as those from 
Mexico and China, are predicted to be more cooperative than children from more 
individualistic cultures, such as those from United States. Furthermore, there is an indication 
that observed differences in children’s behaviour are not limited to the differences between 
urban and rural settings (House, 2017).
According to Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov (2010), culture is the set of thoughts and 
collective practices that differentiate one group from the other and affect the meaning people 
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attach to different aspects of their lives, and that are reflected in the institutions of society. 
These authors proposed six cultural dimensions that characterize different societies: power 
distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, pragmatism and indulgence. 
Although similar in dimensions of masculinity, pragmatism and indulgence, Brazil and 
England differ from each other in the dimensions of power distance, individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance. Brazil has higher scores on power distance and uncertainty avoidance; 
hence, Brazilians tend to respect social hierarchies, to accept social inequality and to value 
signals of status and power. Conversely, the country has lower individualism scores; people 
are integrated early to strongly cohesive groups, whether in family or in the workplace, and 
they tend to build strong bonds of loyalty and exchange of favours. Britain has the opposite 
scores to each of these dimensions, indicating that it is a more individualistic society, focusing
on individual independence and pursuit of personal goals, but also flexible for the future and 
with few but effective laws. Such dimensions may significantly affect how people cooperate 
and follow rules in these societies (Gächter & Herrmann, 2009). Therefore, cooperative 
behaviour has been predicted to differ between children from these two cultures. 
In addition to culture, this thesis investigated the effects of two other variables: the 
families’ socio-economic status, and the social preferences of children’s mothers in social 
dilemmas. Regarding the participants’ socio-economic status, the information was collected 
across all studies, and tested in three of them (Chapters IV, VI, and VII). The first reason to 
collect this information was to characterise the sample’s demographics. The second reason 
was to test for possible interaction between the effects of socio-economic status and culture. 
In this thesis, socio-economic status was assessed in two ways: indirectly, by sampling 
children from different types of schools; and more directly, by asking the children’s mothers 
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to fill questionnaires about their socio-economic status. These methods are described in more 
detail within the empirical chapters (more specifically, Chapters IV and VI).
The social preferences of the children’s mothers were assessed in both countries, 
across three hypothetical social dilemmas, which are experimental economic games that 
simulate real potential conflicts of interest in the distribution of resources. The evidence on 
the relationship between parents’ and their children’s prosocial behaviour is mixed (Bauer, 
Chytilová, & Pertold-Gebicka, 2013; Bryan & London, 1970; Bryant & Crockenberg, 1980; 
Carlo, Koller, Raffaelli, & Guzman, 2007; Evans, 2004; Hoffman, 1975; NICHD Early Child 
Care Research Network, 2003), in part because it is difficult to parse out the multiple factors 
that can explain this relationship, such as genetic factors, educational level, environmental 
scarcity, among others (Bugental & Grusec, 2007; Eisenberg et al., 2006; Pepper & Nettle, 
2017). This work attempted to indirectly assess the relationship between mothers’ propensity 
to adopt cooperative behaviours and their children’s collaborative actions towards peers. 
Contributions and limitations of this method are discussed in more detail in Chapter VI.
Other variables that can moderate the development of cooperative strategies are 
individual characteristics, such as temperament and social skills. Individuals vary from an 
early age across the dimensions of those characteristics (Rothbart, 2007), which are 
considered predictive of children’s performance in cooperative interactions (Eisenberg, Van 
Schyndel, & Spinrad, 2016; Endedijk, Cillessen, Cox, Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2015). 
However, most of the evidence on the relationship between these characteristics and 
children’s prosocial behaviour in general were built upon reported measures or observations 
of children’s free play (Endedjik et al, 2015). Experimental research that has investigated the 
relation between children’s disposition towards cooperation in interactive settings, based on 
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their temperament and social skills, are rare. Thus, it is relevant to consider the relations 
between culture (between-group variable) and individual factors (within-group variables), 
which is rarely done in cross-cultural studies (Carlo et al., 2001). Given the influence of the 
contextual variables illustrated above, this thesis sought to understand how cultural and social 
factors mediated children’s decisions in collaborative interactions.
Summary of Experiments
Three experimental approaches were chosen to study the mechanisms of cultural 
transmission of cooperative interactions in children. The first approach was adopted to test 
children’s sensitivity to other peers as models and the impact of different collaborative 
contexts on cultural transmission of cooperation between peers (Chapter III). It is a recent 
empirical paradigm called diffusion or cultural transmission studies, which has contributed to 
a better understanding of social learning by investigating behaviour spread across groups 
(Flynn & Whiten, 2008, 2012; Hopper, Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 2010; Horner, Whiten, 
Flynn, & Waal, 2006; Mesoudi, 2007; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012). These studies can take 
many forms; for the study presented in Chapter III, the diffusion chains paradigm was chosen,
which examine spread of behaviour (or not) along a linear chain of children, A to B to C to D, 
etc. Children spend many hours in the company of their peers, and learn a great deal from 
those interactions. A task that explicitly requires collaboration can help us to understand better
the processes of social learning among peers and the development of cooperation and cultural 
transmission in humans.
The second approach involved the application of an economic game to the 
investigation of how children choose social information from their peers (Chapter IV). 
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Economic games simulate social dilemmas, situations where two or more players interact and 
have to make decisions that may end up in a conflict of interests. Hence, one can apply an 
economic game as a method to measure cooperative interactions where people are tempted to 
cheat and to increase their rewards at the expense of others. The public goods game is 
particularly useful since it involves coordination between players and the dilemma between 
cooperating to maximise the gains of the group versus not cooperating and maximising the 
individual gain (Kollock, 1998). This design makes it possible to investigate both 
collaboration and sharing in a context where rewards are contingent on people’s decisions. 
Economic games have been applied successfully with children to the study of development of 
cooperation, trust, fairness and moral behaviour (Gummerum, Hanoch, & Keller, 2008). 
However, to my knowledge, the use of these models to study cultural transmission processes 
among children has never been undertaken. In Chapter IV, children had to decide whether to 
copy or not social information from peers in a game that entails conflicts of interest.
The third approach aimed to understand the effect of a number of factors on children's 
cooperation and sharing, in a collaborative task with unequal outcomes (Chapters VI and VII).
It has focused on the influence of culture, age, and social class and the interaction of these 
variables with children's temperament and social skills, and their mothers' social preferences 
regarding sharing of resources. In support for this approach, the literature on children’s 
sharing decisions in collaborative contexts is reviewed in Chapter V, with focus on the effects 
of contextual variables on those decisions.
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Structure of the Thesis
The main purposes of this thesis are to investigate whether children copy collaborative
actions and transmit between them in different conditions, and how children from different 
sociocultural groups cooperate and share when their goals are not aligned. To accomplish 
these goals, this thesis presents a critical overview of the state of art in experimental 
approaches to the development of collaboration and sharing. It also proposes, across four 
studies, a combined approach involving a variety of methods, to address specific gaps 
identified in the literature. More specifically, this work attempts to integrate evolutionary, 
developmental and experimental paradigms to explain the influence of contextual variables on
children’s collaboration and sharing decisions.
This thesis is organised into two reviews (Chapters II, and V) and four empirical 
studies (Chapters III, IV, VI, and VII), which are summarised below. Chapter II provides a 
review of the theory and evidence on cultural transmission of collaboration between children. 
It shows that direct tests of mechanisms related to this phenomenon are rare, although 
evidence from naturalistic and experimental studies in developmental and educational 
psychology indicate that early skills probably support the cultural transmission of 
collaborative actions between children. Chapter III introduces a study that investigated how 
different collaborative actions are copied and transmitted between young children (three- and 
four-year-olds). In Chapter IV, a second study is described, which investigated the adoption of
different types of social information in a public goods game by six- and seven-year-old 
children. Chapter V presents a review of the contextual variables that moderate the 
relationship between collaboration and sharing in children across early and middle childhood. 
In Chapters VI and VII, two related studies are described, which investigated how cultural, 
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social and individual factors affect children’s cooperative and sharing behaviour in a situation 
where the resources cannot easily be divided into equal parts. The goal of the study presented 
in Chapter VI was to investigate the effects of age (four- and five-year-olds versus eight- and 
nine-year-olds), social class and culture (Brazil versus England) on cooperation and sharing of
resources among children in a task with unequal rewards. In Chapter VII, I investigated 
whether mothers’ social preferences and children’s individual characteristics affect children’s 
cooperative and sharing behaviour in the same task, and whether and how these factors 
interact with culture and social class. The thesis is concluded with a general discussion in 
Chapter VIII, discussing the theoretical and methodological contributions of the four studies 
and the two reviews introduced above.
This thesis contributes to the current developmental theories of human cooperation 
and increasing evidence on the early emergence of children’s collaborative skills. It addresses 
a number of gaps identified in the literature regarding the effect of contextual variables 
(characteristics of the task, number of resources available, conflict of interests, social and 
cultural environments, social interaction, and individual characteristics). Therefore, it 
provides a better understanding of the role of interaction (mutual influence) in the cultural 
transmission and maintenance of cooperation between children, and whether the quality of the
interaction is moderated by contextual and individual factors, with partners of similar level of 
skill.
21
Chapter II
Investigating the cultural transmission of collaboration between
children
This chapter focuses on reviewing the experimental literature on how children learn to 
collaborate with peers, and proposing new approaches to investigate questions related to this 
type of learning. This chapter will not be submitted for publication.
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Introduction
Humans are adapted to live in unique collaborative cultural environments (Rogoff, 
2003; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). The ability and motivation of humans for 
cooperation with others is one of the factors that makes human culture possible, and allow 
humans to possess unique skills for cultural creation and transmission (Tomasello, 1999, 
2009). Conversely, once the ability of humans to create and enforce cultural institutions has 
evolved, it also has reinforced humans’ original propensity to cooperate, thus boosting the 
evolution of human cooperation (Richerson et al., 2003). Therefore, the evolution of 
cooperation is strongly connected to the evolution of human culture, making both unique 
when compared to other species (Burkart et al., 2014). 
The relationship between human cooperation and culture can be seen across human 
development (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Rogoff, 1990; Tomasello, 
2009; Vygotsky, 1978). Although comparative psychology between children and other 
primates has allowed researchers to come to certain conclusions about the evolution of 
cooperation (Tomasello, 2018; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013), only recently evolutionary 
developmental studies have started to address the processes of cultural learning of 
collaboration between peers, beyond the level of dyadic interactions and across different 
social and cultural groups (Nielsen & Haun, 2016). This sort of investigation is difficult 
because it requires more intricate experimental designs, greater sample sizes, and more 
complex analyses involving the interaction between participants. 
This review focuses on the acquisition of cooperative behaviours that involve 
coordination between peers. Particularly, it addresses how evolutionary theories of human 
culture and cooperation can inform the investigation of the development of collaborative 
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skills in children. It discusses the progress of experimental research on the development of 
peer collaboration from infancy until the middle childhood in the psychological literature, and
it attempts to show that these experiments have failed to address hypotheses regarding cultural
processes and cooperative skills because the paradigms adopted often do not take in account 
particularities of either phenomena. In addition, three experimental approaches to the study of 
cultural creation and transmission of cooperative behaviour between children will be 
presented and discussed: economic games, cultural transmission, and cross-cultural 
comparisons. Particularities and difficulties related to the application of these methods to 
reciprocal interactions among children will be addressed. Finally, I argue in favour of 
experimental paradigms with greater complexity to tackle hypotheses on the social learning of
collaborative interactions between children.
How social learning and cultural transmission affect collaborative behaviour
Culture can be defined as information acquired by learning from other individuals, 
through mechanisms such as imitation or teaching, which is usually transmitted across 
generations and leads to different behavioural patterns among genetically similar groups 
(Danchin, Giraldeau, Valone, & Wagner, 2004; Richerson et al., 2003). That is, culture is 
anything that accounts for differences between groups of the same species that cannot be 
explained only by genetic variation, demography or the physical environment. According to 
this definition, a variety of animals have culture, such as many species of songbirds, cetaceans
and non-human primates (Danchin et al., 2004). However, although relying on social 
mechanisms, this definition of culture does not necessarily require any cooperative skills. 
Moreover, although animal culture can change across generations (Tomasello, 1999), they do 
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not tend to accumulate modifications over time, as happens in human technology. In this 
sense, human culture is unique because of humans’ abilities to accumulate information and 
transmit across generations and to create social norms and institutions through cooperation 
(Tomasello, 2009). 
Based on the assumption that human culture is, in part, the product of collaborative 
efforts between members of social groups, theorists have addressed both cultural evolution 
and the evolution of cooperative behaviour as intertwined phenomenon. For instance, 
Richerson et al. (2003) argued that social institutions and social preferences evolved at the 
same time as human culture. Once culture turned into an evolutionary process, social 
institutions and preferences changed over time as products of cultural change. Tomasello and 
colleagues (Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013) added that the evolution of human 
culture was only possible due to the evolution of social cognition that underlies humans' 
ability to cooperate and share resources with others. Thus, human children have special skills 
and motivations regarding collaboration with partners, which they call ‘shared intentionality’. 
Human’s unique cooperation skills led to the emergence of cumulative cultural evolution 
(Moll & Tomasello, 2007), while the ability of humans to create and enforce cultural 
institutions also reinforced humans propensity to cooperate, and may have contributed also to 
the evolution of human cooperation (Boyd & Richerson, 2009).
Cultural transmission is “the process of acquisition of behaviours, attitudes, or 
technologies through imprinting, conditioning, imitation, active teaching and learning, or 
combinations of these” (Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, Chen, & Dornbusch, 1982, p. 19). 
Therefore, social learning processes are the mechanisms by which cultural transmission 
occurs. This transmission can occur either vertically (from parents to the offspring), 
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horizontally (among peers), or obliquely (from older generations to the younger ones without 
direct relatedness). Human cultural transmission relies on the combination of two 
mechanisms: faithful imitation and innovation (Tennie et al., 2009). Faithful imitation allows 
people to reproduce the exact actions a model performed to achieve some result, allowing the 
spread and maintenance of a cultural trait within a group. An innovation is a change 
introduced in the current behaviour, which, if successful, can replace the previous behaviour 
and, subsequently, spread across the group. This system allows cultural traits to accumulate 
modifications over time and across generations. 
Cooperation in the context of cultural transmission is an important behaviour to make 
people conform and behave to favour their groups, therefore improving the mechanism of 
faithful transmission (Tennie et al., 2009). Cooperative norms are embedded in social 
institutions and preferences, which determine how somebody must behave. Both cultural 
practices and cooperative norms can be kept stable in human groups by forms of social 
control and mechanisms of social learning (Guzmán et al., 2007). For instance, social rules 
can be established and followed by means of communication, modelling and application of 
rewards and sanctions. Therefore, cooperative behaviours, once stabilised, can be transmitted 
more or less faithfully within and across generations. In addition, by means of cultural 
evolution, humans (even those in the same area) could have developed different cultural 
institutions and norms, evolving independently over time. This process led to variation in 
institutions across human cultures, with different societies having different social control 
strategies and different sets of beliefs, values, preferences, and practices, acquired through 
participation in the adoption of social norms and institutions (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & 
Norenzayan, 2001; Richerson et al., 2003).
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The development of reciprocal interactions among children
One of the ways children learn to collaborate with others must be through witnessing 
and taking part in reciprocal interactions often. These reciprocal interactions start between 
children and their caregivers (Trevarthen, 2011), and have an important role in the 
development of prosocial behaviours (Cortes Barragan & Dweck, 2014). Furthermore, 
interactions between children and their caregivers in family routines and rituals are 
mechanisms by which children acquire social norms from their group (Rossano, 2012). Given 
that parents and other adults are the primary source of socialization for children, the literature 
on social learning of cooperation tend to have adults as models (Eisenberg et al., 2006). 
Typically, adults have more knowledge and power than children and organise activities
in order to help children to perform tasks and learn progressively (Rogoff, 1998). However, 
Piaget (1932) argued that children’s moral behaviour emerges from reciprocal interactions 
between peers. The reason for this would be that, by interacting with people of relatively 
equal status, children would be able to develop notions of equality and fairness. In addition to 
this, Vygotsky (1978) argued that cognitive skills in humans develop through interactions with
more knowledgeable others (such as adults or older children), within specific social and 
cultural backgrounds; that is, these social and cultural factors shape the development of 
human social and cognitive skills (Rogoff, 1990). Children learn a great deal from 
coordinated activities with adults and older peers, but they also develop the necessary skills to
create and maintain coordinated actions with others, such as games, conversations, problem 
solving and the resolution of conflicts early in their lives (Eckerman & Peterman, 2004). 
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Children are able to coordinate with a peer from the second year of age in simple tasks
(Brownell & Carriger, 1990, 1991; Brownell, Ramani, & Zerwas, 2006), without any adult 
scaffolding. The sustained coordinated episodes that characterise children’s cooperation in 
their third year develop from changes in perspective taking abilities that take place during the 
second year, when they learn to differentiate their own perspectives from that of others. 
Three-year-old children are able to coordinate and reverse complementary roles in more 
complex tasks, where both have specific roles at the task (e.g. one child pulls the handle while
the other moves the lever; Ashley & Tomasello, 1998). They also start to appreciate the 
normative dimensions of collaborative problem-solving activities and commit with a partner 
even when they achieve their individual goal first (Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012). 
In a broad sense, the development of cognitive skills that underlie the ability to coordinate 
actions with others is a cornerstone of children’s socialization into their cultural groups. The 
creation and transmission of language or symbolic communication, technology, knowledge 
and institutions are possible because humans can coordinate their actions and understand each
individual’s role in social interactions (Tomasello et al., 2005).
In summary, children can learn by interacting with peers and the learning children 
undertake with peers is probably different from what they have with adults or more 
experienced partners (Piaget, 1932; Rogoff, 2003). Moreover, cooperation between peers can 
lead to the development of new interactions and the creation of new cultural practices (Behne 
et al., 2008; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). However, outside specific literature 
restricted to educational contexts (e.g. collaborative learning: Slavin et al., 1985), the 
information on this ability is limited to the psychological mechanisms that underlie this 
assumption (Behne et al., 2008). In other words, there is not much experimental evidence on 
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how children create new cultural practices themselves, through collaboration. Nevertheless, 
ethnographic evidence points towards the existence and horizontal transmission of games 
between children from different age groups (Morin, 2015). Whether and how this 
transmission is independent from adult influence remains to be tested. Thus, a combination of 
imitation and collaborative tasks involving different motivations and instructions may help to 
understand how these factors facilitate or hinder the social learning of cooperation among 
children.
Despite the relationship between cooperation and culture in human development, 
experimental research supporting such claims does not focus on specific characteristics of 
cultural transmission and learning, including its accumulation over time and across 
generations. Although a few studies tapped into the subject, either by investigating different 
cultures or social learning in collaborative tasks (e.g. Ashley & Tomasello, 1998; Callaghan et
al., 2011; Göckeritz, Schmidt, & Tomasello, 2014), to my knowledge there is no experimental
research on how cultural transmission of collaborative actions occur from adults to children or
between children themselves. 
Learning to collaborate with peers: an overview of the experimental literature
Here, I present and discuss evidence regarding cooperation as specific types of social 
behaviour that require the interaction between two or more people; that is, mutual 
collaboration between partners (Richerson et al., 2003). The traditional literature on the social
learning of collaboration developed two different, but complementary, approaches to the study
of human reciprocal interactions: one focused on cognitive development and another focused 
on social and moral development. However, the effects of any social learning mechanisms 
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between peers was often limited to imitation and instruction. I present and discuss both 
approaches below.
Collaborative interactions between children have been addressed often in the context 
of cognitive skills, such as memorization, logic, mathematical and writing skills (for reviews: 
Rogoff, 1998, 2003; Tudge & Rogoff, 1989), often through the replication or adaption of 
Piaget’s tasks. This literature provides evidence that observational learning and instruction 
improves young children's performance in these tasks when compared to discussion and 
conflict (Ashley & Tomasello, 1998; Azmitia, 1988; Azmitia & Perlmutter, 1989; Johnson-
Pynn & Nisbet, 2002; Verba, 1998). For instance, Ashley and Tomasello (1998) aimed to 
understand the developmental origins of coordination and teaching in young children. They 
investigated whether children from two to four years of age would be able to learn 
complementary roles in a collaborative task, and teach a novice partner the same task. The 
youngest children had difficulty in performing the task, while the older children were 
progressively better at coordinating both roles. Moreover, only four-year-olds were able to 
teach the novice. However, the authors did not investigate how teaching could affect the 
children’s ability to coordinate in the task.
Older children also benefit from collaboration with peers in different intellectual tasks 
developed in educational contexts (Gauvain, 2001), with some researchers developing 
methods to foster learning in schools by teaching collaborative techniques to children 
(Pepitone, 1985). Hence, there are many situations where children in pairs are able to solve 
new cognitive problems in better ways than children alone, whilst their individual 
performance also improves after the interaction (Pepitone, 1985; Rogoff, 1990; Tudge & 
30
Rogoff, 1989). Nevertheless, research in collaborative learning involving children in 
preschool years is still rare (Milward & Sebanz, 2018; Ramani & Brownell, 2013).
The influence of social learning on children’s collaboration has been also examined in 
research assessing the development of cooperation versus competitions among children (Cook
& Stingle, 1974; Green & Rechis, 2006). The immense majority of this literature, however, 
looked into the effects of social cues and reward structure on the development of children’s 
collaborative skills. Another segment focused on the effects of socialization by parents and 
school, and even led to the creation of educational programmes to improve children’s social 
skills (Slavin et al., 1985). For example, Kagan & Madsen (1971) looked into the differences 
between cooperative and competitive behaviours of four- and five-year-olds in comparison to 
seven- and nine-year-olds, while under two different instructional sets: one of those sets 
emphasised individualism (“I” orientation), while the other emphasised collectivism (“we” 
orientation). The “I” orientation, consisted of the experimenter giving instructions in the 
singular form of the first person during the practice trials, while the “we” orientation had 
instructions in the plural form of the first person. Another two conditions had neutral 
instructions, without reference to “I” or “we”, and instructions with a combination of both 
pronouns. Older children were more cooperative under the “we” orientation than the “I” 
orientation, but younger children were more cooperative in general. There remains to be 
tested whether, and if so, how collaborative versus competitive models would affect children’s
collaboration with peers.
Complementary to the literature on cognitive and social development described above,
there is another field that investigated the development of collaborative behaviour in young 
children: social and pretence play or collaborative problem-solving (Brownell et al., 2006; 
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Cooper, 1980; Corsaro, 2009; Eckerman & Didow, 1996; Gräfenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2009; Hamann et al., 2012; Ross & Lollis, 1987; Warneken, Gräfenhain, & 
Tomasello, 2012; Warneken et al., 2011; Warneken, Steinwender, Hamann, & Tomasello, 
2014). This field has addressed when children start to perform similar and complementary 
roles in coordinated activities, both with peers and adult partners. The development of 
reciprocal imitation and collaboration are linked, with imitation having an important role in 
generating coordination between young children and their social partners.
To summarise, the current evidence is that children start reciprocally imitating and 
coordinating around their first year and are able to establish and understand commitment to 
joint activities by their third year. Although in the beginning the amount of reciprocal 
imitation between children and their social partners was correlated with the emergence of 
coordinated activities, these interactions were not controlled to allow causal inferences; 
neither was there any focus on how previous experiences with adults and other children 
affected the learning of coordinative collaboration. One could ask whether children will be 
biased towards learning from peers in collaborative situations across different system of 
rewards. If children observe peers collaborating in a difficult task with uncertain rewards, 
would then copy those, or search for other strategies? And finally, the role that social learning 
biases (Laland, 2004), such as prestige, pay-off, conformity and so on, affect children’s 
collaboration remains to be investigated including how these interact with characteristics of 
the immediate and extended social and cultural background of the children. 
Social learning of collaborative behaviours may or may not operationally differ from 
the social learning of other types of behaviours. Consistent and knowledgeable models, 
combined with a supportive and structured environment that gives opportunities to children to
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perform prosocial actions may contribute to the development of collaborative actions. 
Moreover, such an environment may have been important for the evolution of cooperation, 
providing a context that would foster and select, by means of the socializing strategies, 
specific generous behaviours towards others in a group (Castro, Castro-Nogueira, Castro-
Nogueira, & Toro, 2010; O’Brien, 2014; Tomasello, 1999). Social learning processes are 
affected by the social behaviour of the models and the learners, and may be part of the social 
interaction, and a way of acquiring social behaviour towards others (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 
2013a).
Therefore, collaboration can be investigated as both a product and a mechanism of 
social learning (Tomasello et al., 1993). Collaboration as a mechanism of social learning has 
been widely explored in educational settings, with strong experimental evidence that 
cooperative learning leads to the acquisition of new social and cognitive skills, compared to 
individual learning. Collaboration as a product of social learning, however, is scarcely studied
in experimental settings. Although it is clear that at the age of five years children are able to 
coordinate with partners to achieve joint goals, how the influence of peers modulates the 
development of these skills remain relatively under-explored in experimental settings.
Three experimental paradigms to study the social learning of collaboration between
children
In this section, I present and discuss how three different experimental approaches may
bring new insights into the investigation of social learning of collaborative actions.
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Collaboration in economic games
Economic games have been widely adopted to study cooperative behaviour, including 
in the field of child development (Gummerum et al., 2008). These games consist of a 
simulation of economic decisions involving some level of conflict of interest between the 
participants (also known as social dilemmas; Kollock, 1998). They allow researchers to 
investigate decision making in controlled settings and provide a standard model that can be 
applied to different populations (Henrich et al., 2005; House et al., 2013). Finally, economic 
games are particularly suitable to assess how people interpret and copy social information.
The literature on economic games with adults offer a variety of tools to be applied to 
the investigation of social learning among children. Lamba (2014) investigated the influence 
of social information (the past decision of both the player with the highest pay-off and the 
majority) on adults’ decisions in a public goods game. The same paradigm could be applied to
children in school age, since it is already established that they understand and even behave the
same way to adults in similar games (Alencar, Siqueira, & Yamamoto, 2008; Harbaugh & 
Krause, 2000). For instance, preschoolers tend to donate less than older peers and adults in 
economic games (Benenson, Pascoe, & Radmore, 2007; Fan, 2000; Keil et al., 2017; 
Vogelsang, Jensen, Kirschner, Tennie, & Tomasello, 2014), as children’s donations tend to 
increase with age, along with the influence of social norms of giving (Dutra et al., 2018; 
McAuliffe, Raihani, & Dunham, 2017). However, research on the effects of social learning 
mechanisms on children’s decisions is rather incipient, with particular focus on past 
experience and norm psychology, that is how children follow social norms (Dutra et al., 2018;
Fan, 2000; McAuliffe, Raihani, et al., 2017; Zarbatany, Hartmann, & Gelfand, 1985).
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To conclude, it has been shown that a relevant feature of these experimental games is 
that the participants’ decisions rely on social information, especially in repeated interactions. 
Combining social learning methods and economic games brings new insights into the 
investigation of the development of collaborative behaviour, which are relevant because they 
offer an opportunity to test the effects of social learning in the context of social interactions, 
when differing interests might be at odds with each other. 
Cultural transmission of collaboration
The paradigm of cultural transmission has received much attention recently (Baum, 
Richerson, Efferson, & Paciotti, 2004; Caldwell & Eve, 2014; Caldwell & Millen, 2009, 
2010; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). Cultural transmission experiments investigate the spread of 
behaviour between people in a variety of designs: model A demonstrates a sequence of actions
to an observer B, who in turn will demonstrate the sequence to another observer C, and then 
from C to D, and so on. This transmission may happen from individual to individual 
(diffusion chains) or within a group (open diffusion), with or without substitution of 
participants, therefore simulating different situations of cultural transmission. 
Cultural transmission studies have provided evidence for theories of cultural evolution
(Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008), demonstrating the biases and social cues to which people respond
when they copy other people's behaviour. Cultural transmission has been investigated between
children, without direct instruction or scaffolding of adults (Flynn & Whiten, 2008, 2010; 
McGuigan & Graham, 2010). However, despite the claims that cultural evolution and the 
evolution of cooperation are closely linked, evidence on cultural transmission of cooperation 
is limited.
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In terms of cultural transmission between children, it remains to be seen how children 
learn from, and transmit to, peers collaborative behaviours. In open diffusion experiments, 
Whiten & Flynn (2010) and Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland (2012) observed 
instances of collaboration and prosocial behaviours in children attempting to open puzzle 
boxes. There is evidence on children’s transmission of social norms as well: Göckeritz et al. 
(2014) showed that five-year-old children created norms regarding how to perform on a 
collaborative task, and transmitted those norms to new participants, consequently leading to 
the transmission of the collaboration established between the initial participants. Therefore, it 
seems that horizontal cultural transmission occurs early between children, and that reciprocal 
interactions may be relevant in the creation and transmission of social norms from an early 
age. Cultural transmission paradigms seem promising in the investigation of hypotheses 
concerning the relationship between the development of cooperative and cultural skills.
Cultural differences in collaboration
Children are usually involved in daily activities in their communities, often 
collaborative activities. However, the manner of the children’s involvement and the kind of 
activities vary across societies (Rogoff, 1998). The manner in which children interact with 
peers is an important subject to investigate across cultures. Culture defines which 
characteristics are valued by a group and therefore affects the development of cooperative 
behaviours. For instance, a greater emphasis on the development of academic skills in schools
and individualistic goals is generally correlated with greater autonomy and less cooperation 
towards the group, whilst societies with communal activities and greater emphasis on group 
dependency is generally correlated with the opposite (Chen & French, 2008). Consequently, 
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children from cultures where cooperation is valued in social relationships rather than 
individualism or competitiveness are predicted to be more cooperative.
As far as cross-cultural comparisons helped us to understand the dynamics of social 
learning and social interactions that underlie vertical (between generations) and horizontal 
(within the same generation) cultural transmission, there is still a need to develop and apply 
methods to investigate specific aspects of the cultural transmission process of collaborative 
behaviour between children; for example the manner in which peer culture among children is 
modulated by their social and cultural environments (Corsaro, 2009; Corsaro & Eder, 1990). 
The combination of economic games, cultural transmission experiments and cross-cultural 
comparisons will help to test hypotheses within this topic.
Conclusion
The creation and transmission of culture in humans is an interactive process, which 
requires collaborative skills. Nevertheless, much of what has been propounded and tested in 
the literature of culture and cooperation has addressed phenomena separately or focused on 
individual performance. In addition, traditional developmental and learning psychological 
theories have been studying the development of children’s collaborative skills, without 
exploring further the influence of different social learning mechanisms, cultural transmission 
processes and the effects of social interaction itself. Therefore, I have shown that basic 
assumptions of the relationship between culture and cooperation in humans remain untested, 
including how this relationship manifests across child development. 
Cultural learning differs from other types of social learning and at some point children
must be able to imitate others and to create and transmit behaviours (Tomasello et al., 1993). 
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This seems to be particularly important in collaboration, where learning occurs with others. 
Cultural creation and transmission among children may take place early in humans, when peer
pressure and conformity to norms appear (Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2014; Haun & 
Tomasello, 2011). Cooperative strategies, thus, interact with social learning so that children 
are able to navigate their social world and make decisions regarding their participation in 
social interactions. Future studies can investigate how collaboration may spread, or not, 
among children by using one or more of the methods presented above. Furthermore, it can 
contribute to understand which roles the mechanisms of social learning play in the 
development of collaborative skills. With this, the role of collaboration on social development
might be more directly tested. Even further, research on collaboration and cultural learning 
may even help us to understand just the opposite: how social inequality can emerge, spread 
and persist within cooperative groups, from childhood.
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Chapter III
Is cooperation among children “infectious”?
This chapter is an empirical study investigating how four different types of collaborative tasks
affect children’s imitation and transmission of actions between peers, by means of 
observation. This chapter will be submitted for publication. 
The authorship will be as follows: 
Natalia B. Dutra1
Roles: conceptualization, data curation, formal analysis, funding acquisition, investigation, 
methodology, project administration, validation, visualization, writing – original draft, writing
– review and editing
Harriet Rosenthal-Stoot1
Roles: supervision, writing – review and editing
Lynda Boothroyd1
Roles: writing – review and editing
Emma Flynn2
Roles: conceptualization, funding acquisition, supervision, writing – review and editing
1Departmenty of Psychology, Durham University
2School of Education, Durham University
39
Introduction
Humans show early collaborative skills, that later develop into increasing 
sophisticated forms of collective cooperation, such as the creation and enforcement of social 
norms, and moral institutions (Tomasello & Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2017; Tomasello et al., 2012). 
Thus, collaboration, or the ability to coordinate actions with others to achieve joint goals, 
underlie the human capacity for unique forms of social learning, communication, cooperation,
and culture (Eckerman & Peterman, 2004; Tomasello et al., 2012; Warneken, 2018). In 
support to this hypothesis, coordination has been found to emerge quite early in human 
development, with the propensities to coordinate rhythmically with someone else emerging 
from birth (Eckerman & Peterman, 2004; Trevarthen, 2011), and being a distinguishable 
feature in humans compared to other primates (Tomasello et al., 2012, Warneken, 2018). 
These early cooperative skills help children to assimilate and transmit culture (Dean et al., 
2012; Rogoff, 2003; Tomasello, 2016; Tomasello et al., 2005), while also having important 
implications for children’s social relationships and cultural learning (Clegg & Legare, 2016; 
Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 2013). 
From two years of age, children accommodate their behaviour to coordinate actions 
with a peer or an adult partner to achieve a common goal, when it requires that they perform 
similar actions (e.g., pulling a lever simultaneously; Brownell et al., 2006; Warneken, Chen, 
& Tomasello, 2006) or simple complementary actions (e.g., manipulating a handle to provide 
access in another location to a toy; Brownell & Carriger, 1990; Warneken et al., 2006). For 
instance, in simple joint tasks young children are capable of planning joint actions (Warneken 
et al., 2014), taking other people’s perspectives (Fletcher, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012), 
reversing roles (Carpenter, Tomasello, & Striano, 2005), and even using cues to coordinate 
with others without using language (Grueneisen, Wyman, & Tomasello, 2015). However, 
40
when children need to perform different actions at the same time or in sequence with peers on 
more complex tasks (e.g., one child pulling a lever while a peer lifts a handle), even older 
preschool children have problems adapting their actions to those of a partner, without an 
adult's assistance (three-year-olds: Ashley & Tomasello, 1998; Fletcher et al., 2012; five year-
olds: Meyer, Wel, & Hunnius, 2016).
Cultural transmission relies on social learning mechanisms. Preschoolers tend to 
overimitate models, that is, to copy irrelevant actions in problem-solving tasks (Nielsen, 
Moore, & Mohamedally, 2012), especially when they are modelled intentionally (as opposed 
to accidentally, Gardiner, Greif, & Bjorklund, 2011), and they spontaneously tend to interpret 
social interactions as normative, even in the absence of cures of pedagogy or normative 
language (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). However, when copying other peers, children imitate 
irrelevant actions with less fidelity (Wood et al., 2012), unless they are modelled in a playful 
manner (Nielsen, Cucchiaro, & Mohamedally, 2012), which supports the hypothesis that 
imitation serves a social function and underlie the process of collaborative cultural creation in 
humans.
Young children, therefore, are capable of learning how to cooperate with a partner on 
simple tasks from peers. However, regarding the development of cooperation between peers, 
there has been rare attempts to test the relation between cooperative skills and cultural 
transmission processes across development beyond the level of dyadic interactions. Moreover,
most research on the relationship between social learning and peer cooperation addresses the 
interaction between models and observers (Ramani & Brownell, 2013; Rogoff, 1990; Tudge 
& Rogoff, 1989), by focusing on the cooperative relationship between the model and the 
observer (Ashley & Tomasello, 1998; Azmitia, 1988; Dean et al., 2012; Johnson-Pynn & 
Nisbet, 2002). Based on research that outlines young children’s propensity for cooperation 
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and social learning (Ashley & Tomasello, 1998; Azmitia, 1988; Eckerman & Peterman, 2004; 
Flynn, Turner, & Giraldeau, 2016; Johnson-Pynn & Nisbet, 2002), we hypothesise that, 
through observing peers as models in a cooperative task, young children (three- and four-year-
olds) will be able to imitate the actions and establish coordination. Observation of peers in 
this context might enhance children's adaptation to other people's perspectives in social 
interactions with equally naïve partners, and improve their joint performance (Matheson, 
Moore, & Akhtar, 2013; Milward & Sebanz, 2018; Ramani & Brownell, 2013).
To accurately copy the actions of a model, the observer must interpret the model's 
actions and intentions from his or her own perspective, and re-enact the actions (Carpenter, 
2006; Carpenter & Call, 2007). Young children attend to imitation tasks in flexible ways, 
choosing to copy the actions (means), the outcomes (ends), or both. One interpretation is that 
there is a hierarchy of goals to which an observer attends; for example, whether the goal is to 
achieve an outcome or to perform a sequence of actions in a specific order (Carpenter, Call, &
Tomasello, 2005). In either case, children can copy other people’s actions to establish social 
contact and form social bonds (a “social” goal; Over & Carpenter, 2013) or to learn something
about an object or action (an “instrumental” goal; Carpenter, 2006). 
Cooperative actions can provide different cues as they can have social and 
instrumental goals (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Warneken et al., 2006). Cooperative games are an
example of cooperation with social goals, where the children take turns, repeat sequences of 
actions, and act jointly for the enjoyment of the game. Though repetitive, games are also 
characterised by variations on a theme and creation of new actions (Eckerman & Peterman, 
2004; Ross, 1982). Cooperative problem solving tasks involve cooperative actions with 
instrumental goals, where children must coordinate to reach a practical goal, such as 
retrieving a toy or solving a puzzle. These tasks may involve the creation of new actions or 
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not, depending on the demands of the task (Ramani & Brownell, 2013). This study 
investigated whether, and if so when, children choose to copy peers in cooperative tasks with 
instrumental and social goals, in the absence of direct instructions.
Additionally, this study aimed to investigate whether cooperative actions, if copied, 
would be faithfully transmitted between children, or whether they would eventually collapse, 
due to their higher complexity when compared to actions in simple individual imitation tasks. 
To do this, we adopted a cultural diffusion chain design, which is part of a relatively new set 
of experimental paradigms that have pioneered methods to assess the transmission of 
information along multiple individuals with experimental rigour and, at the same time, in 
more naturalistic settings (Caldwell & Millen, 2010; Flynn & Whiten, 2010). Diffusion 
studies with young children have investigated the cumulative effect of consecutive 
transmission of actions from child to child and within groups of children. More specifically, 
they have investigated the transmission of behaviour (or not) along a linear chain of children, 
from child A to child B, from B to C, from C to D, etc. These studies have found that children 
between two and five years can transmit actions with high fidelity from child to child, with 
fidelity in transmission increasing with age (Flynn & Whiten, 2008; Horner et al., 2006). But 
children also emulate the methods taught to them by parsing out irrelevant actions to solve a 
task along the chains (Flynn, 2008; McGuigan & Graham, 2010). Thus, we were interested in 
assessing whether children learn from each other with enough accuracy for cooperative 
behaviour to be consistently transmitted across pairs of children.
In addition, we were interested in exploring whether, and if so how, different types of 
cooperative tasks affect the imitation and transmission of cooperative actions between 
children. Drawing on Warneken et al. (2006), in this study three- and four-year-old children 
were tested across four tasks: two cooperative games and two cooperative problem-solving 
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tasks that could not be solved by one child alone. One of each of these task types could be 
played by partners in similar roles, that is, completing the same actions, and the other two 
required complementary roles, that is, complementary actions. These tasks were chosen 
because they provided a range of possible coordinated interactions, goals, and roles, giving us 
the opportunity to assess potential different patterns of imitation and transmission. Thus, we 
investigated whether there were differences in transmission of cooperative actions along 
diffusion chains according to the types of tasks with regards to their goals (social games 
versus problem-solving tasks) and roles (similar versus complementary).
It was predicted that children would copy and transmit actions across all tasks with 
high fidelity because coordination increase children’s social affiliation, stimulate their 
perspective taking skills, and increase the tasks’ conventional aspects. Although previous 
literature indicates that children will copy others faithfully in social games because they infer 
social conventions from simple joint activities (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008), 
there is also evidence that in social games children can spontaneously create other goals and 
actions (Ross, 1982). Hence, it was predicted that the social games could entail more variation
in the transmission along chains. Moreover, it was predicted that the tasks with similar roles 
would be transmitted more faithfully (i.e., children would demonstrate and imitate with more 
accuracy) than those with complementary roles, because they require less coordination and 
have partners using the same actions that one can observe as one attempts the task.
Thus, the present study focuses on the effect of different cooperative contexts (tasks 
with goals that are social versus instrumental) on children's copying of peers' coordinated 
actions through observation alone. Moreover, it addresses how these contexts affect the 
fidelity of imitation of cooperation in groups by examining its transmission over multiple 
pairs of children.
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Method
Participants
Sixty-four children (Mage = 47.92 months, SD = 5.10; 36 girls) from four nurseries in 
the North of England were tested across four tasks. Fourteen mixed-sex and 18 same-sex pairs
were recruited (11 pairs of girls). Forty-eight children were randomly allocated to the 
experimental condition and 16 children to the control condition. Most children were white 
(97%) and came from lower middle and working class families, according to the information 
provided by the schools. To form pairs, the experimenter asked the nursery staff to choose 
pairs of children who would work well together. Informed consent was provided by parents or
guardians, and the nursery staff. Children also only participated after confirming verbally that 
they would “like to play a game”. This study was approved by the ethics committee from the 
University of Durham (project title: “Is cooperation among children ‘infectious’?”; reference 
number: 13/35).
Apparatus
Four tasks adapted from Warneken et al. (2006), which fitted our needs for specific 
action types and specific goal types, were used. Each task had a specific goal, and the rewards
to be retrieved in the cooperative problem-solving tasks were familiar toys, such plastic 
miniature cars and animals, and wooden bells (see Figure 1).
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 Figure 1. Picture of toys (middle) and tasks used. Top left: double tube; top right: elevator; 
bottom left: trampoline; bottom right: tube with handles.
The double tube task (cooperative game with complementary roles) consisted of two 
tubes (75cm long, 10cm in diameter) mounted on a box in parallel, at a 20º inclination. The 
goal in this task was to catch in a tin can, a wooden block put into one of the tubes. For this, 
one child needed to put a wooden block into one tube from the upper end (role A), and 
another child needed to catch it with a tin can at the lower end (role B).
The elevator task (problem-solving task with complementary roles) consisted of a 
small table (45cmx65cmx45cm) with a cylinder attached to it (10cm in diameter). The goal in
this task was to retrieve a toy from inside the cylinder. For this, one child needed to lift the 
cylinder and hold it in place, from one side of the table (role A), while another child had 
access to the object from a hole in the cylinder, on the other side of the table (role B). 
Transparent screens prevented a person from performing both roles by him- or herself.
The tube-with-handles task (problem-solving task with similar roles) consisted of a 
tube (110cm long, 10cm in diameter) with one handle on both ends. The goal in this task was 
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to retrieve a toy that was inside the tube. For this, two children needed to pull the ends 
simultaneously, as the tube was too long to be opened individually.
The trampoline task (cooperative game with similar roles) consisted of a ring (67cm 
diameter) made of two hoses connected by flexible joints and covered with cloth. The goal for
this task was to make a wooden block bounce three times above the trampoline. For this, two 
children needed to hold the ring at opposite sides and make the block jump by shaking the 
trampoline up and down. The flexible joints prevented individual attempts to lift the 
trampoline as it collapsed in the middle.
Design
To investigate the transmission of actions between children, a diffusion chain design 
was adopted. A diffusion chain is similar to the game “Broken Telephone”, in the sense that 
participants pass information along a chain of other participants. Hence, person A “seeds” the 
information within the chain, by starting the transmission and passing information to person 
B, who in turn passes the information to person C, and so on. 
Procedure
Testing took place in a quiet room away from the other children in the nursery. Eight 
diffusion chains were run for each of the four tasks described above, yielding a total of 32 
chains (with each pair taking part in four chains, one for each task). Diffusion chains were 
made up of three pairs in which consecutive pairs witnessed two attempts on a cooperative 
task by the previous pair in the chain (as in Flynn, 2008; see Figure 2). Pairs were allocated to
a specific position in each chain before a testing session began, and each chain contained a 
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similar proportion of boys and girls. The pairs within the same chain were presented with the 
four tasks in succession, and the tasks were counterbalanced for order.
Pair Chain
P1 D
P2 O A D
P3 O A
Figure 2. The first column represents the position of each pair of children in the diffusion 
chain. Pair 1 (P1) acted as models for pair 2 (P2), and P2 acted as models for pair 3 (P3). P2 
and P3 observed the previous pair (O) and had two attempts at the task (A). P1 and P2 had 
two demonstrations to the next pair (D). P3 did not demonstrate to anybody, thus ending the 
chain.
Training of models. A pair of children (P1) were trained to act as models to a second 
pair of children (P2). The experimenter trained this “model” pair to perform the task, until 
they coordinated successfully. Training contained instructions, demonstrations and 
coordinated actions, as necessary, by the experimenter with each of the children. The pair 
were considered proficient in the task after five successful attempts at the task in sequence. 
On tasks that required similar actions (tube-with-handles and trampoline), both children were 
trained to use the same actions in coordination, whereas on tasks that required complementary
actions (elevator and double tube) both children were trained to use both actions, irrespective 
of which child took which action position.
Experimental condition. Each session began with the experimenter inviting a second 
pair of children (P2) to play a game. Children in P2 were told to wait while children in P1 had
two ‘goes’, after which it would be their turn. The experimenter did not tell children explicitly
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to observe the models. The children in P1, who were previously trained, provided two 
demonstrations of the task in the presence of P2. After the second attempt of P1, the children 
on P1 returned to the nursery. Then, P2 were told that it was their turn, and had two attempts 
at the task. After the end of the second attempt, the experimenter invited a third pair of 
children (P3) to play the game. They were told to wait for their turn, whilst P2 had two 
demonstrations at the task. Then P3 had two attempts, thus finishing the chain. The same 
chain (the same pairs of children in the same positions) was repeated three more times, with 
the other tasks.
A demonstration or an attempt began with both children engaging in the task (e.g. one 
is looking at the apparatus, when the partner starts manipulating it) and ended when children 
reached the goal for the task or after 2 minutes manipulating the apparatus without success. If 
one child or both children did not engage in the task after the initial 60s, the experimenter 
used a prompt, saying for example: “you can touch it as much as you like, you can't break it”, 
and gave the pair one more minute. Regardless of children's engagement with the apparatus 
after the prompt, a second turn of 2 minutes would start after the first 2 minutes. If children 
did not engage with the apparatus at all, even after the prompt, or refused to participate, their 
turn would end after 4 minutes from the beginning of the session. If the pair achieved two 
successful attempts before the 4 minutes, then the turn was finished. The chain always 
continued irrespective of children's successful reproduction of the actions seeded within 
chains.
No model control condition. The no model control condition allowed us to assess if 
the transmission along the diffusion chains was due to individual learning only and assessed 
the degree of conformity to the methods seeded within the chains. In this condition, a pair of 
children were brought into the room and presented with one of the four tasks, being told: “lots
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of boys and girls have had a go, and now it’s your turn”. Then, they had a maximum of two 
attempts at the task, each comprising of a maximum of 2 minutes, following the same criteria 
for completion as within the chains. 
All children in both conditions, irrespective of success, received a sticker as a reward 
at the end of the testing sessions.
Coding 
All the testing sessions were videotaped. Coding of the videotapes discriminated 
children's performance and communicative attempts at the tasks. Each child’s performance 
within pairs was scored according to three categories: coordination of actions, reproduction of
the observed models' actions and outcomes, and the transmission of actions and outcomes 
seeded in the chains by the first pairs (see Table 1 for details).
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Table 1
Discrimination of coding variables.
Variable Score Description
Coordination 1
2
3
4
No approach
The child did not try to coordinate with the partner
The child coordinated with the partner, but did not 
achieve the outcome
The child coordinated with the partner and 
achieved the outcome
Reproduction of actions 1
2
3
4
No approach
The child did not reproduce the models' actions
The child partially reproduced the models' actions
The child fully reproduced the models' actions
Reproduction of outcomes 0
1
The child did not reproduce the outcome (regard-
less of coordination or reproduction of actions)
The child reproduced the outcome (regardless of 
coordination or reproduction of actions)
Production / transmission 
of actions or outcomes
0
1
The child did not produce/transmit the trained ac-
tions or outcomes
The child produced/transmitted the trained actions 
or outcomes
The scores for coordination of actions addressed whether children attempted to 
coordinate with their partner and whether or not they were successful in the task. The scores 
for reproduction of actions addressed whether children copied the models' actions faithfully, 
that is, used similar gestures and manipulated the same parts of the apparatus. Hence, if 
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children manipulated parts of the task other than those manipulated by the models, and used 
other parts of the body than their hands to manipulate the task, their actions were not 
considered a faithful reproduction of the models’ actions. Additionally, the scores for 
reproduction of outcomes were coded separately in case children found ways of achieving the 
outcomes without reproducing the models' actions.
In addition, the actions and outcomes demonstrated and reproduced by children could 
have been different from those initially trained in the first pairs by the experimenter (hereafter
called “seeded” actions and outcomes). To account for the transmission of actions and the 
transmission of outcomes across the chains, a score of 1 was given for each seeded action and
for each seeded result that was faithfully transmitted by the pairs, and 0 for each one that was 
different. The no-model control condition received scores regarding the production of actions 
and outcomes similar to those originally seeded within the diffusion chains, and this gave a 
measure of the level of individual learning children displayed at the tasks regarding the 
actions seeded within the chains.
Finally, five categories of communicative attempts were coded for each individual 
within pairs, to measure their level of engagement and coordination with their partners: 
engagement attempts (the child actively shows a partner how to do something, gives 
directives, tries to direct the partner’s attention, e.g. “hold it”); responsiveness (the child 
responds to the partner’s engagement attempts, e.g. “this one?”); experimenter (the child tries 
to communicate with the experimenter; e.g. “what's that?”); task (the child makes comments 
about the task, e.g. “this is heavy!”); and others (the child makes comments about something 
unrelated to the task, e.g. “I've got a new wristlet”). 
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Data preparation and statistical analysis
The first author scored all data, and two independent raters scored a random sample of
25% of the data each, for each type of score. The raters had 73% of agreement or above 
between themselves and the first author, with most categories having an agreement above 
80%. Eleven categories had an agreement of 100%, rendering any statistical comparison 
unnecessary. For the other categories, Cohen’s kappa tests were performed, and they revealed 
a fair to strong agreement between the raters for each type of score and task (p < .044 or 
below; see Supplementary Table 4 for κ critical values).
This study used a within-group design to compare the transmission of collaborative 
(coordinated) actions in relation to the type of task. The tasks were compared individually, 
rather than by category (social versus problem-solving, and similar versus complementary 
actions), to include all the combinations and to assess whether children would rather copy the 
models in each particular task.
Preliminary analyses revealed that there was a high correlation between the 
reproductions of actions and outcomes (τ = 0.703, Z = 14.537, p < .001), and the transmission 
of actions and outcomes (τ = 0.771, Z = 15.085, p < .001). For this reason, we decided to 
combine each pair of actions scores and outcomes scores into a single score, representing 
whether children were successful in reproducing the models’ solutions to the tasks or not (yes 
= 1, no = 0), and whether they transmitted (or spontaneously produced, in the no-model 
control condition) the seeded actions (yes = 1, no = 0). Given the high frequency of successes 
in coordination scores, we also converted them into a binomial response variable, meaning 
whether children successfully coordinated in the task or not (yes = 1, no = 0). 
Only the individual scores for the pairs’ attempts were considered as dependent 
variables for the analyses, with the scores for demonstrations being added as independent 
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variables. The total number of observed events was 384 (48 children, multiplied by two 
attempts for each task, and the four tasks). Logistic binomial mixed models were used for the 
analysis. We followed the “ten events for each predictor” rule (Vittinghoff & McCulloch, 
2007). Given that our models have a range of two to six predictors, the number of events for 
each predictor fits the criteria (64-192 events for each predictor, depending on the model).
Results
All analyses were carried out with R software (version 3.4.0, R Development Core 
Team, 2017). The logistic binomial mixed models were fitted with lme4 package glmer 
function (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), and were compared using the likelihood 
ratio tests provided by the analysis of variance method (stats package anova function, R 
Development Core Team, 2017). When appropriate, post hoc analyses were performed with 
Tukey HSD multiple comparisons test (multicomp package glht function, Hothorn, Bretz, & 
Westfall, 2008). 
Three statistical analyses were carried out, one for each category of action scores as 
response variables: coordination, reproduction, and transmission. A full model was initially 
fitted for each one of these categories, having the following variables added as fixed effects: 
task (double tube, elevator, handles, and trampoline), task order (1 to 4), trial (the order of 
attempts at each task: 1 or 2), model position (which model the pair witnessed: no model, pair 
in P1 or pair in P2), and the participants’ age and gender. In addition, the pair and group 
affiliations were included as random effects to account for the influence of repeated measures 
(as all pairs had two attempts in each of the four tasks). The analyses for each category of 
actions’ scores are described separately below.
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Did children reproduce the specific actions they observed?
Initially, we tested whether the pairs were reproducing the actions demonstrated by the
models. The full and the reduced models were fitted, with the reproduction of actions and 
outcomes (yes = 1, no = 0) as the response variable. The control condition was not included. 
The children’s gender and age, the order of the children’s attempts (trial), the demonstration 
witnessed by the children (model position), and the group did not contribute to explain the 
observed data in the full model; hence they were removed in the reduced model. This model, 
with the variables task, task order, and pair, had a slightly better fit to the data than the full 
model but the difference was not statistically significant (χ2 =  .223, df = 5; p = .999).
Thus, the children’s overall reproduction of the models’ actions and outcomes were 
significantly predicted by the intercept (the combination of the first categories of each 
covariate in the model), the task, and the order in which each task was presented while 
controlled for the effects of the pair (see Supplementary Table 1 for model estimates, and 
Figure 3 for predicted probabilities). Post hoc analyses were performed to assess these effects 
in detail, revealing that the trampoline task had significantly different reproduction scores 
from all the other tasks, and the handles task had significantly different scores from the 
elevator task (double tube vs. elevator: Z = 1.557, p = .397; double tube vs. handles: Z = 
-2.179, p = .126; double tube vs. trampoline: Z = -4.629, p = .001; elevator vs. handles: Z = 
-3.287, p = .005; elevator vs. trampoline: Z = -5.124, p = .001; handles vs. trampoline: Z = 
-3.019, p = .013). Additionally, it was revealed the tasks presented first had significantly 
different reproduction scores from the tasks presented in the subsequent orders (1 vs. 2: Z = 
3.099, p = .010; 1 vs. 3: Z = 2.801, p = .023; 1 vs. 4: Z = 2.635, p = .041; 2 vs. 3: Z = -.184, p 
= .998; 2 vs. 4: Z = -.404, p = .978; 3 vs. 4: Z = -.187, p = .998).
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Figure 3. Predicted probabilities for the following children’s actions: reproduction (copying), 
transmission and coordination, for each task and task order.
Did children transmit the actions and outcomes that were originally seeded in the 
chains? And were those different from pairs who have not seen demonstrations?
The actions and outcomes originally seeded within chains were faithfully transmitted 
through at least one of the attempts or demonstrations, for all the chains in the double tube 
and elevator tasks, six chains in the handles task, and five chains in the trampoline task (see 
Table 2). Faithful transmission in all demonstrations or attempts occurred in the double tube 
and elevator tasks, up until the second pair. Comparatively, children in the no-model control 
did not engage in the tasks on four occasions (two pairs in the double tube, and one pair in the
handles and trampoline tasks), while they touched the apparatus but did not try to play a game
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or retrieve the toy on 18 occasions (three pairs in the double tube, seven pairs in the elevator, 
and four pairs in the handles and trampoline each).
Table 2
Number of chains whose pairs reproduced the actions/outcomes seeded within chains in at 
least one of the attempts or demonstrations. 
Pair Double tube Elevator Handles Trampoline
Pair 1 demo 8(8) 8(8) 8(5) 7(5)
Pair 2 demo 8(8) 8(8) 7(2) 5(2)
Pair 3 attempt 8(7) 8(5) 6(1) 5(1)
Note. Numbers in brackets represent the number of pairs who reproduced the trained (Pair 1) 
or observed (Pair 2 and Pair 3) actions/outcomes in all demonstration and attempts. Attempts 
of pairs in the second position were omitted because the actions/outcomes could only be 
transmitted if they reproduced the actions/outcomes during the demonstrations.
To test whether the children’s actions were also faithful to the actions originally 
seeded in the chains, a full model was fitted with the same variables as fixed and random 
effects as before, but with the transmission of actions and outcomes (yes = 1, no = 0) as the 
response variable, and with the control condition included. Since the children’s gender and 
age, and the order of the children’s attempts (trial) did not contribute to explain the observed 
data, they were removed in the reduced model. This model, with the variables task, task order,
model position, pair, and group, had a slightly better fit to the data than the full model but the 
difference was not statistically significant (χ2 = .171, df = 3; p = .9821).
 Thus, children’s overall transmission of the models’ actions and outcomes were 
significantly predicted by the intercept, the task, the order in which each task was presented, 
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and the model’s position, that is, the demonstration witnessed by the children (see 
Supplementary Table 2 for model estimates, and Figures 3 and 4 for predicted probabilities), 
while controlled for the effects of the pair and the group. Post hoc analyses were performed to
assess these effects in detail, revealing that all the tasks had significantly different 
transmission scores from each other, except for the double tube and elevator tasks (double 
tube vs. elevator: Z = -1.847, p = .247; double tube vs. handles: Z = -4.934, p < .001; double 
tube vs. trampoline: Z = -6.111, p < .001; elevator vs. handles: Z = -3.483, p = .002; elevator 
vs. trampoline: Z = -5.451, p < .001; handles vs. trampoline: Z = -2.904, p = .019). 
Additionally, it was revealed the tasks presented first had significantly different transmission 
scores from the tasks presented in the third and fourth orders (1 vs. 2: Z = 1.818, p = .263; 1 
vs. 3: Z = 3.636, p = .002; 1 vs. 4: Z = 3.886, p < .001; 2 vs. 3: Z = 1.899, p = .228; 2 vs. 4: Z 
= 2.476, p = .063; 3 vs. 4: Z = .529, p = .952). And finally, children who witnessed no 
demonstrations had significantly different scores from those who did (no model vs. P1: Z = 
5.198, p < .001; no model vs. P2: Z = 4.602, p < .001; P1 vs. P2: Z = -1.322, p = .373).
Figure 4. Predicted probabilities for the following children’s actions scores: transmission 
(left) and coordination (right), by task and model position (0: no models, 1: pairs in P1 as 
models, 2: pairs in P2 as models).
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Did children interpret the task as a cooperative engagement?
To test whether children coordinated their actions differently across tasks, and whether
witnessing a pair as models influenced their level of coordination, a full model was fitted with
the same variables as fixed and random effects as before, but with coordination (yes = 1, no = 
0) as the response variable, and with the control condition included. Since the children’s 
gender and age, the order of the children’s attempts (trial) and their group affiliation did not 
contribute to explain the observed data, they were removed in the reduced model. This model,
with the variables task, task order, model position, and pair had a slightly better fit to the data 
than the full model but the difference was not statistically significant (χ2 = 1.174, df = 4; p = .
882).
 Thus, children’s coordination scores were significantly predicted by the intercept of 
the model, the task, the order in which the task was presented, and the model’s position, while
controlled for the effect of the pair (see Supplementary Table 3 for model estimates, and 
Figures 3 and 4 for predicted probabilities). The Figures 3 and 4 present the predicted values 
for the coordination of actions by task and task order, and by task and demonstration. Post hoc
analyses were performed to assess these effects in detail, revealing that the trampoline task 
had significantly different coordination scores from all the tasks, and that the handles task had
significantly different scores from the double tube task (double tube vs. elevator: Z = -1.070, 
p = .704; double tube vs. handles: Z = -3.125, p = .009; double tube vs. trampoline: Z = 
-5.697, p < .001; elevator vs. handles: Z = -2.060, p = .163; elevator vs. trampoline: Z = 
-4.807, p < .001; handles vs. trampoline: Z = -3.667, p = .001). Additionally, it was revealed 
the tasks presented first had significantly different coordination scores from the tasks 
presented in the subsequent orders (1 vs. 2: Z = 3.479, p = .003; 1 vs. 3: Z = 3.906, p < .001; 1
vs. 4: Z = 4.422, p < .001; 2 vs. 3: Z = .369, p = .983; 2 vs. 4: Z = 1.556, p = .401; 3 vs. 4: Z = 
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1.137, p = .664). And finally, children who witnessed no demonstrations had significantly 
different scores from those who did (no model vs. P1: Z = 4.266, p < .001; no model vs. P2: Z 
= 4.662, p < .001; P1 vs. P2: Z = 1.093, p = .516).
In addition to these results, we recorded 483 utterances and gestures, a mean of 7.55 
communicative attempts per child; 19 children performed the task silently, while the others 
made at least one comment (see Table 3). Sixty-six percent of all communicative attempts 
were made by children in the no-model control condition, with 88% of the children making at 
least one attempt at communication in the no-model control condition compared with 65% of 
the children within chains. Among those, around half (51%) of the communication between 
children within chains consisted of attempts to engage their partner (e.g. double tube task: a 
child pointed to the one of the tubes; "I do this and…let's do, let's do this one”), while 27% 
were comments about the task (e.g. handles task: “it's not opening”), compared to 34% and 
32% respectively, in the no-model control conditions.
Table 3
Number of children who communicated and who did not communicate with partners or the 
experimenter (number of communicative attempts in brackets).
Pair None Engagement Responsiveness Experimenter Task Other
P1 8 6(16) 2(2) 1(1) 4(7) 2(3)
P2 6 9(31) 0(0) 0(0) 6(11) 1(6)
P3 3 11(36) 2(4) 7(10) 11(27) 4(10)
C 2 6(108) 0(0) 6(12) 12(102) 13(97)
Total 19 32(191) 4(6) 14(23) 33(147) 20(116)
Note. Pairs within chains: P1 (first position); P2 (second position); P3 (third position). Pairs in
the no model control condition: C.
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Discussion
Young children struggle to coordinate spontaneously with peers in more complex joint
tasks (Ashley & Tomasello 1998; Fletcher et al., 2012; Meyer et al., 2016). Here we showed 
that third-party observation of peers (that is, in the absence of social interaction between the 
models and the observers) improve children’s performance in collaborative tasks, regardless 
of its instrumental or social goals. In addition, it was predicted that children would have better
performances in tasks with similar roles. However, children’s scores across all categories of 
actions (reproduction, transmission, and coordination) were lower in tasks with similar roles 
than tasks with complementary roles. We explore the reasons for these findings below.
First, with regard to the coordination of actions, it is clear that witnessing 
coordinating models increased children's propensity to coordinate in the same task and at the 
same level as their models, while in contrast children without models or training only 
occasionally tried to coordinate by themselves. Social interaction affects social learning in a 
number of ways; it provides cues of social affiliation, and it indicates that people must follow 
certain norms, often established by convention. Children are sensitive to cues of affiliation 
(Over & Carpenter, 2013), and are capable of inferring social norms in the absence of explicit 
instructions from early on (Rakoczy et al., 2008). Hence, children’s faithful imitation across 
tasks might reflect their early skills in interpreting observed collaborative interactions as the 
expected norm in a given situation. In addition, observation of social interactions between 
peers can improve children’s global interpretation of the situation, providing a bird’s-eye view
of the roles in the task (see related evidence for this with adult models: Milward & Sebanz, 
2018).
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While previous research has found that children tend to imitate other peers less than 
adult models (Wood et al., 2012), our study found that young children copied same-aged peers
with great fidelity across a variety of tasks, in the absence of direct instruction or teaching by 
either the experimenter or the models. Most of these previous studies have focused on 
individual actions or interactions between models and observers (e.g. teaching) without prior 
observation of similar interactions. The simple fact of witnessing peer collaboration can 
therefore increase coordination at a period where children have difficulty in achieving it 
spontaneously (at least in experimental settings and Western middle-class samples; see 
Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2016 for a comparison between westernised and 
indigenous Australian children).
Regardless of the models’ influence children were less able to coordinate their actions
in the trampoline and handles tasks (which involved performing similar roles), compared to 
the double tube and elevator tasks (which involved performing complementary roles). A 
potential reason for these findings is that the children executed their actions simultaneously in
the tasks with similar roles, as opposed to executing them in sequence in the tasks with 
complementary roles. Brownell et al. (2006) found that 2-year-olds had difficulty in 
coordinating pulling a handle simultaneously. Our findings show that 3- and 4- year old 
children may still have difficulty in coordinating simultaneously with peers to reproduce the 
actions observed, perhaps because they required a greater level of motor coordination than 
actions in the other two tasks. Hence, imitation could have been hindered by the children's 
motor skills.
Equally, children may not have been concerned by a lack of fidelity in copying tasks 
that had similar roles. In such a task, the trampoline task, the children kept laughing and 
playing, as opposed to the other tasks where they stopped playing or tried to adjust their 
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behaviours after failing to achieve the observed goal. For instance, two pairs who were able to
shake the trampoline multiple times changed the goal of the game in the following attempts, 
and even expressed this by instructing their partners to do so. Therefore, both the trampoline 
and handles tasks induced more variation in children's actions compared to the other tasks, 
seemingly to make it more “fun”. This finding contradicts recent evidence on increased 
fidelity in imitation when tasks are modelled in a playful manner (Nielsen, Cucchiaro, et al., 
2012), albeit with an adult model. Future studies can explore further the interaction between 
characteristics of the tasks and the models in collaborative settings.
An additional contribution of our study was the adoption of cultural diffusion chains 
to assess children’s skills to faithfully transmit collaborative behaviours among themselves. 
This is relevant because the transmission scores of pairs in the second position (who observed 
the first pair then demonstrated to the third pair) provides the evidence that children were able
to repeat in their demonstrations the actions they observed, that is, beyond their own attempts 
at the tasks. Hence, their imitation of coordinated actions was likely not casual. We thus found
that children transmitted the seeded actions with high fidelity across the tasks, though with 
more fidelity in the double tube and the elevator tasks than in the handles and the trampoline 
tasks. 
The chains also provided a test of whether the children were in fact copying the 
actions demonstrated or only spontaneously reconstructing them. In the majority of cases, the 
demonstrated and reproduced actions matched those that were seeded in the chains. 
Alternatively, in the very few instances where the models had not performed the seeded 
actions, the observers could have transmitted the actions by means of spontaneous 
reconstruction; however, this was not observed. Finally, children's performance within chains 
was very different from children who did not witness models in most cases. The fact that three
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pairs in the no-model control condition were able to reproduce similar behaviours in the 
double tube task may indicate that the design of the task could have induced a specific 
combination of actions. However, the other pairs who engaged with the tasks in the same 
condition were not successful.
An interesting additional finding was the effect of tasks’ presentation order on 
children’s performance. All the tasks had lower scores in all categories (reproduction, 
transmission, and coordination) when presented first to the pairs, but the scores increased 
when they were presented in the subsequent orders. Hence, children improved their 
performance over time across all tasks, regardless of which type of task. Hence, this 
“cumulative” effect of performing cooperative tasks in sequence provide indirect evidence 
that engaging children in previous potentially collaborative interactions, even without models 
and without instructing them to cooperate, can induce them to be more cooperative in 
subsequent interactions (Cortes Barragan & Dweck, 2014).
The majority of communicative attempts were made by children in the no-model 
control condition, which is interesting given the prominent role of communication in both 
human social learning and coordinated cooperation (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Eckerman & 
Peterman, 2004). However, this might be explained by the fact that when children jointly 
observe a model, they may establish common ground in their understanding of the task, 
reducing the need for explanation (Bohn & Köymen, 2018). When there is no model, it 
requires greater communication between the children in the dyad to establish the goals and 
procedures of the task. Nevertheless, although children within chains communicated less than 
children who did not witness models, around half of the communicative attempts between the 
former involved engaging their partners.
64
There were only a few instances that indicated that some children did not understand 
or were not concerned with the role of their partners. In these situations, the children either 
failed to help their partners to complete the task or attempted to perform the task alone. 
Sometimes, after having one or two unsuccessful attempts at the task, a pair would stop 
performing or would change the game. In one pair, one child resumed or continued the 
activity in two of the games (double tube and handles task) without trying to re-engage the 
partner. The variations reported above may be an indication that these children were more 
interested in the outcomes of the task, rather than the actions, which may be related to 
children’s perception of their partners’ role and their coordination skills. Future studies could 
investigate this relationship further and its impact on children's cultural learning by adopting 
the experimental paradigm proposed in the present study.
This study has a few limitations. First, the sample size is small in terms of number of 
participants, and the sample is restricted to English children from one small region. However, 
the number of observations provided enough data for the analysis with regards to our sample, 
albeit providing limiting generalization to other groups of children. Second, the study lacks 
additional control conditions that could provide additional evidence for the claim that children
are effectively imitating cooperative actions. For instance, a two-action design (McGuigan, 
Whiten, Flynn, and Horner, 2007) could have helped disentangle the influence of the models 
actions versus the tasks’ outcomes on children’s copying. We thus regards this evidence as 
preliminary and encourage other researchers to try to replicate it with bigger and more diverse
samples, and including other experimental controls and treatments.
This study has relevant implications for the experimental study of the social learning 
of cooperation in humans. By comparing different types of tasks, we were able to investigate 
whether the tasks' goals or actions would affect children's reproduction of cooperative actions 
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with an equally naïve partner. By adopting diffusion chains of collaborative actions, we aimed
to partially replicate how children learn in their natural social environment such as nurseries 
or schools. However, most of this research, this study included, has been done with children 
from Western middle-class families (Nielsen et al., 2017). Alternatively, research with 
children from rural and traditional populations have found that they engage more often in 
collaborative tasks with other children and adults (Clegg & Legare, 2016; Nielsen et al., 2016;
Rogoff, 2003). Future studies can address whether children from other cultures and socio-
economic groups will behave similar to the children tested in similar settings. Nevertheless, 
we speculate that children from other cultures might show an even higher level of fidelity in 
the imitation of collaborative tasks.
It has been argued that the ability to copy actions with a high level of fidelity and to 
keep them preserved across generations within groups is an essential component of human 
cultural evolution (Tomasello, 2014), together with the cumulative changes brought by 
innovations. Less has been said and tested about the spread of traditions within the same 
generation, especially regarding children's development and learning of essential cooperative 
skills to keep traditions in place, although conformity has recently received much attention in 
the study of children’s imitation of peers and its relationship to cultural transmission 
(Claidière & Whiten, 2012; Coultas & van Leeuwen, 2015; Tomasello, 2016). To our 
knowledge this study is the first to combine different elements of cultural transmission-
focused and cooperation-focused experimental paradigms, in an effort to understand how 
these processes are connected and their role in child development.
In conclusion, this study suggests that cooperation between young children may be 
“infectious”, in the sense that it only requires a couple of observations for children to copy 
peers in several collaborative tasks, and in that this greatly increases children’s success in 
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coordinating actions when compared to children who do not witness models. It thus provides 
experimental evidence that directly links children's early peer imitation and coordinating 
skills to the transmission of coordinated actions, through the process of observation. 
Moreover, it shows that faithful imitation is predominant regardless of whether these actions 
aim to solve joint problems or to play a social game, and whether children are performing 
similar or complementary actions.
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Supplementary Information
Table 1
Model comparison for reproduction (imitation) scores
Full model Reduced model
Odds Ratio CI p Odds Ratio CI p
Fixed Parts
(Intercept) 4.40 0.70–27.86 .115 4.46 1.31–15.20 .017*
Task (elevator) 3.06 0.74–12.62 .122 3.08 0.75–12.68 .120
Task (handles) 0.28 0.09–0.88 .029* 0.28 0.09–0.88 .029*
Task (trampoline) 0.06 0.02–0.20 <.001* 0.06 0.02–0.20 <.001*
Task order (2) 6.33 1.97–20.33 .002* 6.29 1.97–20.11 .002*
Task order (3) 5.63 1.68–18.83 .005* 5.61 1.68–18.75 .005*
Task order (4) 5.06 1.52–16.80 .008* 5.00 1.51–16.57 .008*
Model position (2) 1.23 0.21–7.27 .820
Trial (2) 0.87 0.41–1.82 .705
Age (4 years-old) 1.04 0.17–6.54 .967
Gender (female) 0.92 0.32–2.66 .882
Random Parts
τ00, Pair 2.370 2.423
τ00, Group 0.000
NPair 16 16
NGroup 8
ICCPair 0.419 0.424
ICCGroup 0.000
Observations 256 256
AIC 227.625 217.848
Note. Groups in the no model control condition were excluded from this analysis.
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Table 2
Model comparison for transmission scores
Full model Reduced model
Odds Ratio CI p Odds Ratio CI p
Fixed Parts
(Intercept) 0.05 0.01–0.36 .003* 0.04 0.01–0.27 <.001*
Task (elevator) 0.38 0.14–1.06 .064 0.39 0.14–1.06 .065
Task (handles) 0.06 0.02–0.18 <.001* 0.06 0.02–0.18 <.001*
Task (trampoline) 0.01 0.00–0.05 <.001* 0.01 0.00–0.05 <.001*
Task order (2) 2.76 0.93–8.20 .068 2.75 0.92–8.18 .069
Task order (3) 7.71 2.56–23.23 <.001* 7.75 2.57–23.39 <.001*
Task order (4) 10.11 3.15–32.45 <.001* 10.14 3.15–32.61 <.001*
Model position (1) 491.84 47.04–5142.18 <.001* 518.81 49.12–5479.97 <.001*
Model position (2) 195.36 20.09–1899.93 <.001* 206.40 21.32–1998.11 <.001*
Trial (2) 0.95 0.49–1.81 .868
Age (4 years old) 1.06 0.23–4.85 .938
Gender (female) 0.84 0.35–2.07 .712
Random Parts
τ00, Pair 1.102 1.213
τ00, Group 1.945 1.931
NPair 24 24
NGroup 16 16
ICCPair 0.174 0.188
ICCGroup 0.307 0.300
Observations 384 384
AIC 295.576 289.747
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Table 3
Model comparison for coordination scores
Full model Reduced model
Odds Ratio CI p Odds Ratio CI p
Fixed Parts
(Intercept) 0.01 0.00–0.14 <.001* 0.01 0.00–0.12 <.001*
Task (elevator) 0.54 0.18–1.60 .267 0.55 0.19–1.64 .285
Task (handles) 0.16 0.05–0.50 .002* 0.16 0.05–0.51 .002*
Task (trampoline) 0.02 0.00–0.07 <.001* 0.02 0.00–0.07 <.001*
Task order (2) 10.45 2.81–38.81 <.001* 10.31 2.77–38.39 <.001*
Task order (3) 12.55 3.52–44.76 <.001* 12.71 3.55–45.51 <.001*
Task order (4) 24.30 5.91–99.95 <.001* 24.61 5.95–101.80 <.001*
Model position (1) 498.18 29.62–8379.86 <.001* 602.75 31.83–11413.93 <.001*
Model position (2) 2098.64 86.10–51152.13 <.001* 2576.87 94.85–70007.37 <.001*
Action order (2) 1.22 0.60–2.47 .588
Age (4 years-old) 1.54 0.28–8.64 .621
Gender (female) 0.67 0.25–1.81 .430
Random Parts
τ00, Pair 4.691 5.293
τ00, Group 0.000
NPair 24 24
NGroup 16
ICCPair 0.588 0.617
ICCGroup 0.000
Observations 384 384
AIC 265.888 259.062
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Table 4
Cohen’s kappa test results for inter-rater agreement
Type of scores/Task Rater 1 – Rater 2 Rater 1 – Rater 3κ p % of ag. κ p % of ag.
Coordination scores
Double tube .731 .000* 94% .669 .000* 93%
Elevator .864 .000* 97% .448 .000* 73%
Handles .597 .000* 92%% .474 .000* 80%
Trampoline .b .b 100% .924 .000* 95%
Reproduction of actions
Double tube .b .b 100% ..a .a 92%
Elevator .a .a 96% -.034 000* 79%
Handles .a .a 89% .a .a 79%
Trampoline .571 .002* 79% .750 .001* 92%
Reproduction of outcomes
Double tube .b .b 100% .a .a 94%
Elevator .b .b 100% .a .a 94%
Handles .b .b 100% .a .a 97%
Trampoline .b .b 100% .613 .001* 81%
Transmission of actions
Double tube .636 .014* 94% .630 .002* 93%
Elevator .b .b 100% .754 .000* 93%
Handles .341 .044* 83% .545 .000* 80%
Trampoline .620 .000* 83% .900 .000* 95%
Transmission of outcomes
Double tube .b .b 100% .625 .004* 93%
Elevator .b .b 100% .692 .000* 90%
Handles .b .b 100% .925 .000* 98%
Trampoline .b .b 100% .700 .000* 85%
Note. Exact p-values. % of ag.: Percentage of agreement between raters.
aNo statistics were computed because one or both variables were constant.
bNo statistics were computed because there was 100% agreement between the raters.
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Chapter IV
Do children copy others in a collective social dilemma?
This chapter is an empirical study investigating whether children copy social information 
from peers in a collective social dilemma, and whether they prefer payoff- or majority-biased 
information. This chapter will be submitted for publication. 
The authorship will be as follows: 
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– review and editing
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Maria Emilia Yamamoto2
Roles: resources, writing – review and editing
Lynda Boothroyd1
Roles: writing – review and editing
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Introduction
Cultural transmission and cooperation are considered to be two of the most relevant factors 
influencing human’s successful adaptation to a wide range of environments (Richerson et al., 
2003). Cultural group selection theory has proposed that similar levels of cooperation within 
groups are supposed to be maintained by the cultural transmission of social norms (Guzmán et
al., 2007; Henrich, 2004). Therefore, while human groups remain genetically similar, they 
exhibit remarkable cultural and social differences across the world, even when inhabiting the 
same territory (Richerson & Boyd, 2008). Moreover, groups with more cooperative members 
will tend to outcompete other groups, with less cooperative members.
The cultural transmission of norms is mediated by selective social learning (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1988; Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Laland, 2004). For social learning to be 
effective, people need to know whom they should copy to be successful (Wood, Kendal, & 
Flynn, 2013b; also when to copy: see Laland, 2004). Conformity bias is one of the proposed 
social learning biases that may have stabilised cooperation within human groups while 
keeping differences between groups (Henrich & Boyd, 2001). It is defined as a 
disproportionate individual propensity to acquire the most frequent behaviour in a group 
(Coultas & van Leeuwen, 2015). By copying the majority, the individual has greater chance of
indirectly adopting a successful behaviour, especially in the absence of any other reliable 
information about the environment. 
The evidence for conformity bias has been observed in children as young as two years 
(Haun & Tomasello, 2011). From three years, children conform to peers and adults in a 
variety of situations; for example, children tend to follow the majority's judgement against a 
dissenter when labelling unfamiliar objects (Corriveau, Fusaro, & Harris, 2009; Fusaro & 
Harris, 2008). They also follow the majority when copying instrumental and conventional 
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actions (Burdett et al., 2016; DiYanni, Corriveau, Kurkul, Nasrini, & Nini, 2015; Flynn & 
Whiten, 2012; Haun et al., 2014; Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013; McGuigan 
& Burgess, 2017; McGuigan & Robertson, 2015; Turner, Nielsen, & Collier-Baker, 2014; 
Whiten & Flynn, 2010; Wilks, Collier-Baker, & Nielsen, 2015). Even in the presence of 
unambiguous stimuli (e.g. lines of different sizes), roughly a third to a half of children will 
tend to eschew their own judgement and follow the majority's statements (Bond & Smith, 
1996; Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Haun et al., 2014; Haun & Tomasello, 2011; Walker & 
Andrade, 1996).
Children can conform to the majority as a form of social coordination or shared 
experience (Grueneisen et al., 2015; Nielsen & Blank, 2011), and due to social pressure (Haun
& Tomasello, 2011; Haun et al., 2014). For instance, McGuigan and collaborators (McGuigan
& Burgess, 2017; McGuigan & Robertson, 2015) asked children to witness a model 
performing an efficient method to open a puzzle box and a majority of four models 
performing unnecessary (thus, inefficient) actions to achieve the same goal. Children copied 
the inefficient actions displayed by the majority even when they had performed the efficient 
actions previously. However, children stopped copying the unnecessary actions once the 
models were absent, indicating that there is a social motivation behind children's conformist 
strategies (Over & Carpenter, 2013; Uzgiris, 1981).
Another type of bias that affects children’s social learning is the payoff bias, that is, a 
tendency to copy successful individuals. Children prefer to copy more competent, reliable or 
proficient models, which are all indications of success (Brody & Stoneman, 1985; Burdett et 
al., 2016; Koenig & Harris, 2005; McGuigan & Robertson, 2015; Wood et al., 2013b; Zmyj, 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010). Successful, prestigious or high-status individuals 
provide indirect information regarding which strategies are more effective (McGuigan, 2013; 
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Mesoudi, 2011; Wood et al., 2013b). Biases towards copying these individuals also could 
have facilitated the evolution of cooperation in certain circumstances, when combined with 
altruistic punishment and conformist learning (Guzmán et al., 2007; Henrich & Boyd, 2001). 
Burdett et al. (2016) and Wilks et al. (2015) compared children's performance in 
different tasks after witnessing successful individual models versus a majority. Burdett et al. 
(2016) tested whether 4- to 7-year-old would copy an expert or a consensual majority in tasks 
across instrumental and normative contexts. Instrumental contexts provide information about 
what works best in a situation; for example, what is the best tool to solve a problem. While 
normative contexts provide information that facilitate social relationships; for example, what 
rituals are followed in a specific group. Children trusted either a more competent model or a 
majority consistently across both contexts. However, they did not explicitly compare a 
successful model to an unsuccessful majority. In Wilks et al. (2015), 4- and 5-year-olds 
watched a model or a group demonstrate how to open novel puzzle boxes, and found that the 
children copied both the majority and a successful individual in opening the boxes, but they 
preferred to copy the successful individual over a clearly unsuccessful majority.
The early emergence of both payoff and conformity biases show that children are very 
sensitive to social influences that affect the transmission of culture (Chudek, Brosseau-Liard, 
Birch, & Henrich, 2013). In this study we compared the influence of both biases on children’s 
cooperative behaviour in an experimental economic game, the public goods game. Our study 
contributes to a growing literature about children’s early cooperative tendencies (see 
Tomasello, 2014, for an overview), with a focus on sharing behaviour and the development of
a sense of fairness (McAuliffe, Blake, et al., 2017). Understanding how these cooperative 
tendencies are mediated by social learning mechanisms can help us decipher how children’s 
actions vary in cooperative contexts.
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The public goods game is a simulation of a social dilemma in which people are asked 
to decide whether and how much they would like to invest in a common-pool resource, with 
the prospect of increasing their rewards if everyone collaborates (Kollock, 1998). The players 
commonly have access to some information about the other players’ strategies, but not 
necessarily their identities. In fact, a relevant aspect of these experiments, either with adults or
children, is that the decisions are anonymous. Moreover, it is often not possible to exclude or 
punish those who do not contribute to the pool and end up with more rewards than the others, 
hence the dilemma. Thus, relevant variables that affect public behaviour are completely or 
partially removed in these experiments, such as reputation concern, reciprocity, social 
pressure and other potential sources of model bias (e.g. familiarity, dominance, popularity, 
and age).
When people play this game multiple times, the donations tend to decline over time. 
The initial cooperation of some of the players was explained as a cooperative strategy: when 
faced with other players’ defection, the cooperators withdraw their donations to punish the 
other and keep their rewards. Recently, Burton-Chellew, Nax, & West (2015) argued that this 
typical trend of decline is due to learning factors and payoff biased learning rather than any 
cooperative preferences. Thus, people generally start by making greater donations at the 
beginning as a strategy to obtain more rewards, and reduce them gradually as it becomes clear
that successful individuals cooperate less (Burton-Chellew, El Mouden, & West, 2017).
Lamba (2014) proposed a way to test whether the players in a public goods game are 
using the information from other players to adjust their cooperative strategies or to increase 
their payoffs. Based on the assumption that people acquire cooperative strategies through 
social learning, Lamba (2014) tested whether adults from a forager-horticulturist society, the 
Pahari Korwa of India, would adopt different types of social information to make decisions in 
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a public goods game. She predicted that, if models of cultural group selection were correct, 
the participants from the same village would employ similar cooperative strategies. By 
adopting social learning strategies, anonymous individuals would be able to adopt similar 
norms of cooperation. She tested groups of 14 villages from the same ethnic group but 
subjected to different demographic conditions. The behaviour of the participants in the game 
was determined mostly by the circumstances in which they lived and she did not find any 
significant tendency to copy the behaviour of the majority or towards copying the most 
successful players.
Experimental economic games have been successfully adopted with children 
(Gummerum et al., 2008), but there are only a few studies that focused on children playing 
public goods games (Alencar et al., 2008; Blázquez & Chaverri, 2014b, 2014a; Dutra et al., 
2018; Harbaugh & Krause, 2000; Silva et al., 2016; Vogelsang et al., 2014). Moreover, only 
one study addressed social learning indirectly in a public goods game, with negative results. 
Cipriani, Giuliano, and Jeanne (2013) tested whether African and Hispanic American parents 
transmitted prosocial actions to their children, by assessing whether the parents’ and the 
children’s separate decisions in the game were correlated. The children, however, had no 
access to the parents’ decisions. To our knowledge, no study explored the social learning of 
cooperation in public goods games between children.
In our study, we aimed to investigate the adoption of different types of social 
information by children in a public goods game. Six- and 7-year-olds were tested because this
is the earliest age at which children clearly understand the rules and structure of a public 
goods game (Dutra et al., 2018; although see Vogelsang et al., 2014 for a variation with 4-
year-olds). Around this period, children had already developed a reputation concern and group
affiliations, but they will progress to more sophisticated social strategies only after 8 years 
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(Engelmann & Rapp, 2018; Sparks, Schinkel, & Moore, 2017). Hence, at the age of 6 and 7 
years children might behave differently from older children and adults in a similar 
experimental setting.
We were also interested in comparing the decisions of children from different social 
backgrounds. Socio-economic status (SES) affects humans’ social and cognitive development 
across a variety of domains. People of lower SES seem to be “more impulsive, less future-
oriented, and more pessimistic about their futures” than people of higher SES (Pepper & 
Nettle, 2017, p. 3). However, while children from lower SES backgrounds recently have been 
shown to donate less than children from higher SES backgrounds across experimental social 
dilemmas or windfall sharing tasks (Benenson et al., 2007; Rochat et al., 2009), earlier studies
found no consistent influence of SES (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). 
In our study, the children had to decide how much to donate to their group as an 
investment, risking losing their rewards in the short term. Children received the information 
about others' performance from a third party (an experimenter) and were required to make 
their decisions anonymously. If the evolutionary theories of social conformism are correct 
(e.g. Coultas & van Leeuwen, 2015), we would predict that children would show greater 
conformism, given it would provide social information about the behaviour of the group, and 
children could use it to collaborate with their peers in the game. Conversely, if alternative 
theories of self-interest and payoff learning are true (e.g. Burton-Chellew et al., 2017), then 
children would prefer to copy the information of the most successful players. We had no 
specific predictions regarding the effects of SES on children’s copying of the social 
information. However, we predicted that children of lower SES would choose to donate lower
initial amounts than children from higher SES.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 53 Brazilian children between six and seven years (M =  6.71±SD = 
0.65; 27 girls), recruited in two primary schools, in the city of Natal. The parents were 
provided with information about the study and asked to sign an informed consent form if they 
agreed to participate, and their children were verbally asked whether they would like to play a
game. The children were also told they could stop participating at any time. This study was 
approved by the ethics committee from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte 
(project title in Portuguese: “Aprendizagem social entre crianças em um jogo de tomada de 
decisão”; CAAE: 51046015.7.0000.5537).
Children came from families of lower to upper-middle socio-economic status. We 
recruited samples from one public and one private school. In Brazil, private schools enrol 
39.2% of children from families of the top 20% of the income distribution, while the public 
schools enrol 39.5% of the bottom 20% of the same distribution (Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística, 2014). The schools were therefore used as an indirect measure for 
socio-economic status.
The Public Goods Game (PGG)
Each child received five paper pretend notes of five Reais (the Brazilian currency) and
s/he was asked to decide anonymously how many notes s/he would donate to a group of 
which s/he was a member. The amount donated by the children in the same group was then 
multiplied by two and distributed equally among the group members, regardless of the 
amount donated individually. These values were decided based on previous studies of public 
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goods games with children and adults (e.g. Harbaugh & Krause, 2000; Lamba, 2014). The 
game is designed to make cooperation profitable if everyone contributes, but there is also the 
temptation to cheat (i.e. invest less than others) and increase one’s individual payoff. 
Conversely, if everyone decides to donate nothing, all the players are worse off.
Experimental Procedure
The experimenter initially addressed the children collectively and invited them to play 
a game. Once the children accepted, they received instructions about the game. The children 
were told that they would play a game with other five children, in which they could win 
points. Then, the children were told that they would receive two envelopes, one white and 
another orange, and five pretend notes. They were instructed to choose how many of their 
notes (zero to five) they would like to donate to their group of six players, then to put the 
chosen amount inside the white envelope (or leave it empty), to close the envelope, and to 
deposit it inside a sealed plastic box with an opening on the top of it. The children were also 
told that the box was “magic”, and that they could win more or less notes back, depending on 
how much they and their group donated. They were told that the box would be opened after 
the game, and that for each note they gave to their group, the group would get one additional 
note. Then, they were told that the notes would be counted and distributed evenly among the 
group members. Finally, they were instructed to put the notes they kept for themselves in the 
orange envelope, and to keep their donation a secret from other children, otherwise the game 
would not work. Children were repeatedly told their decisions were anonymous to everyone, 
including the experimenters. 
Then, each child was called separately to another room, where another experimenter 
instructed the children again, this time individually, and asked them to explain the rules to the 
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experimenter as a measure of understanding. If the child had not understood the rules, the 
experimenter repeated the instructions and asked the child to explain them again. A child was 
only allowed to participate if s/he understood the rules; one participant was excluded because 
he failed to explain the instructions back to the experimenter. The helper then gave the notes 
and envelopes to the child, and asked the child to go behind a cardboard panel and make a 
decision (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Diagram depicting: the experimenter providing the instructions and materials to the 
child (A); and the child inserting her donation in a blue box behind a blue panel (B).
In the second round (PGG2), the instructions were repeated, both collectively and 
individually. The groups in PGG2 were reconstituted, so children were told that they would 
play the game with a different group (this was done to prevent any effects from reciprocity). 
Additionally, they were informed individually that they would have access to two types of 
information from PGG1, before making their decision: the contribution of the majority of the 
group (modal contribution, MC), and the contribution of the players with the best payoffs 
(highest earner's contribution, HEC). The experimenter also showed the number of notes 
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corresponding to each contribution (MC and HEC), and provided the information regarding 
the MC and HEC in counterbalanced order across participants. 
For each group within both rounds, the children’s donations were counted, multiplied 
by two, and divided among the participants. The children only received their rewards from 
both rounds after the experimental session was finished, to avoid children’s inference about 
the other player’s strategies (other than the MC and HEC) by, for example, comparing their 
rewards at the interval between the sessions.
Due to the number of children recruited, they could not always be split in groups of 
six. Thus, children were split in anonymous groups of three to six, although they were led to 
believe they would always play with other five players. Because the decisions were individual
and separated, they could not possibly know how many children were in their group. If the 
individual amount donated by the majority, the MC, was equivalent to the amount donated by 
the player with the highest payoff, the HEC, then the MC was replaced by the most frequent 
amount donated among the groups tested. And finally, when there was more than one MC, the
highest amount was chosen as information. 
Coding, data preparation and analysis
The coding and analysis were adapted from Alencar et al. (2008) and Lamba (2014). 
Individual donations were counted for both rounds. Donations were purportedly anonymous 
to the participants, but the experimenters put a discreet code inside each envelope to identify 
individual donations, after removing the envelopes from the box (as in Alencar et al., 2008). 
The envelopes were open, and each amount donated was assigned to the identified code of 
each player in a spreadsheet. After counting the donations for each group, the experimenters 
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separated the amount donated by the majority (MC) and by the most successful player (HEC),
providing this information to the players in the second round.
For each group, the HEC and the MC were calculated (and the MC value was adjusted
whenever applicable, as explained above). To investigate whether children chose to copy the 
HEC or the MC, the players were grouped in three sets, according to whether they donated the
same amount as the MC, the same as the HEC, or a different amount from both the MC and 
the HEC, in PGG1. Then, for each set of players, children's decisions were further categorized
regarding: a) whether they changed their donations from the first to the second round (PGG2),
and b) whether they were biased towards the HEC (payoff biased), the MC (conformist) or 
none of them (see Table 1). 
Table 1
Groups of players for analyses.
Round Criteria for selection Group
PGG 1
Donated the smallest amount (Highest 
Earner Contribution, HEC)
Coordination with HEC
Donated the same as the majority's (Modal
Contribution, MC)
Coordination with MC
Donated differently from HEC and MC
Coordination with neither HEC or 
MC
PGG 2
Changed donations in direction to HEC Payoff biased
Changed donations in direction to MC Conformist
No trend in donations towards either HEC 
or MC
None (no bias)
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To establish whether children were biased towards either social information (HEC or 
MC) or neither, we calculated the absolute difference between the children’s donations in each
round and the HEC, and subsequently calculated the difference in these values between both 
rounds (|PGG1 – HEC| - |PGG2 – HEC|). The same was done to calculate the bias towards the
MC (|PGG1 – MC| - |PGG2 – MC|), and each group of scores were calculated for each set of 
players as specified in the previous paragraph. This equation provided the number of players 
who were biased or not towards the HEC or the MC (adapted from Lamba, 2014). Positive 
numbers indicated children’s bias towards the HEC or the MC, and negative numbers 
indicated no particular bias towards the HEC or the MC. The number zero in the calculations 
indicated no change in children’s decisions across both rounds. When there was no change in 
children’s decisions, but they donated the same as the HEC or the MC in both rounds, they 
were considered biased towards the HEC or the MC in the PGG2, respectively. When there 
was no change in children’s decisions, but they donated differently from the HEC and MC in 
both rounds, they were considered without any particular bias.
Results
Did the social information provided affect children’s contributions in PGG2?
The variances of children’s contributions in both rounds were similar, although the 
donations decreased over time (from M = 9.34, SD = ±6.65 in PGG1 to M = 8.49, SD = ±6.76 
in PGG2). The children’s contributions did not differ significantly between rounds (Z = -.559, 
p = .576, r = -.077). 
Given that the HEC and the MC were presented simultaneously, stepwise backwards 
multinomial logistic regression models were fitted to assess whether either information 
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provided affected children’s decisions from one round to the other. The full model was fitted 
with the following variables: MC, HEC, whether children donated the same as the HEC or 
MC (i.e. coordination with HEC or MC), and the children’s sex. The response variable was 
the difference between the donations in both rounds, categorised by whether children 
decreased, increased or did not change their donations. For this model (the full model), the 
variables sex and children’s coordination with HEC or MC significantly predicted the 
children’s decisions. 
A second model was fitted with both variables (sex and coordination), and only the 
coordination with HEC or MC remained significant. A third model was then fitted, only with 
the coordination variable, which also showed that this variable significantly predict children’s 
decisions (coordination: χ2(4) = 15.475, p = .004; sex: χ2(2) = 5.790, p = .055). The full model
and the second reduced model were not significantly different from each other (χ2(10) = 
12.844, p = .233), as well as the second and the third (χ2(2) = 5.7890, p = .055). However, the 
AIC was smaller for the second reduced model, compared to the others and, therefore, it was 
chosen as the best model to predict the response variable (full mode AIC: 117.1304; second 
model AIC: 109.9744; third model AIC: 111.7639).
Least-squares means (Lenth, 2016) were calculated to assess the influence of the 
coordination with the HEC, MC or none of them, on the children’s change in their decisions 
in PGG2. For children who were coordinated with HEC, there was a significant difference 
between children who decreased their donations and children who increased their donations (t 
(8) = -3.984, p = .011), and children who did not change their donations (t (8) = 3.527, p = .
019; see Figure 3). That is, children were either likely to stay with their original choice or 
increase their donations in PGG2 if they had donated in line with the HEC in PGG1. The 
modal response of children in other categories in PGG1 was to reduce donations in PGG2.
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Figure 3. Probability of change in children’s decisions regarding how much to donate in 
PGG2 (whether they decreased, increased or did not change their decisions), grouped by their 
coordination with the social information in PGG1 (whether they donated the same as the 
HEC, the same as the MC, or different from either of them).
Were children biased towards the payoff or the majority in PGG2?
A full multinomial logistic regression model was fitted with the same predictors as 
above (HEC, MC, coordination with HEC or MC, sex, and school), but with a different 
response variable: whether children were biased towards the HEC or the MC, or showed no 
bias. Coordination with either HEC or MC and the MC of the groups significantly predicted 
the response variable. A second model (reduced model) was fitted, with both coordination and
the MC, but only coordination had a significant effect. Then a third model, only with 
coordination as the predictor variable was fitted, and again it had a significant effect (χ2(4) = 
11.367, p = .023). All models were not significantly different from each other (full model 
versus second model: χ2(6) = 6.322, p = .388; second model versus third model: χ2(6) = 
10.747, p = .097). Therefore, the third and simplest model was chosen, which also had the 
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smallest AIC (full model AIC: 120.457; second model AIC: 114.7791; third model AIC: 
113.5257).
Least-squares means were calculated to assess the influence of the coordination with 
the HEC, MC or none of them, on the children’s bias in PGG2. For children who were 
coordinated with the HEC, there was a significant difference between children who showed 
no bias and children who were payoff biased (t(6) = -3.337, p = .036) and children who were 
conformists (t(6) = 3.893, p = .019, see Figure 4). That is, children who had the greatest 
payoff in PGG1 were inclined to be biased towards either the majority (MC) or the HEC, in 
comparison to the other categories that showed no significant bias.
Figure 4. Probability of bias towards the payoff, the majority (conformity) or no particular 
bias (none) in PGG2, grouped by their coordination with the social information in PGG1 
(whether they donated the same as the HEC, the same as the MC, or different from either of 
them).
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Discussion
This study provided no evidence of either an effect of conformity in promoting co-
operation or an effect of payoff bias in a public goods game (PGG) with children, nor any ef-
fects of socio-economic status on children’s decisions. Although children made smaller contri-
butions over time, the variances of the contributions were very similar between both rounds. 
Furthermore, although some children decreased their donations, there seems to be no particu-
lar trend towards copying the highest earner’s payoff.
To assess whether children were effectively copying the information provided, we 
looked into whether there were any differences between children who were the highest 
earners or part of the majority in the first round (as in Lamba, 2014). A greater number of 
children who donated the same as the majority decreased their donations and showed a greater
payoff bias. However, they did not differ significantly from the children who donated the 
same as the majority but subsequently increased or did not change their donations in PGG2. 
Interestingly, almost half of the children who were the highest earners in the first round in-
creased their donations in the second. Thus, they showed some bias towards either the payoff 
or the majority, while none of the other categories (those who donated the same as the major-
ity, and those who donated different amounts from the highest earners and the majority) did. 
Previous studies have shown that children's imitation of others can have social 
motivation (Uzgiris, 1981; Over & Carpenter, 2013). Children's responses in public are more 
likely to match those of the majority than their private responses, or when the majority is 
absent (Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Haun & Tomasello, 2011; McGuigan & Burgess, 2017; 
McGuigan & Roberston, 2015; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Other model biases can affect the 
children's behaviour when the models are present, such as the model’s social status in the 
group and the relationship between the models and the observers (Haun et al., 2012; Wood et 
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al. 2013b). Children can also choose to follow others to maintain or improve their reputation 
in their groups (Engelmann, Over, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2013). Hence, since the presence 
and identity of the models could affect children's decisions in such ways, we attempted to 
avoid these biases in this study by ensuring anonymity of the participants’ and models' 
decisions. Thus, our findings show that children in these circumstances are not inclined, at 
least at first, to copy the majority.
Additionally, recently it has been argued that the typical trend of decline in donations 
in public goods games is due to learning factors and payoff biased learning rather than co-
operative preferences (Burton-Chellew et. al, 2015). Thus, people start by making greater 
donations at the beginning as a strategy to obtain more rewards, and reduce them gradually as 
it becomes clear that they are better off by donating small or no amounts. Burton-Chellew et 
al. (2015) argued that people will vary their decisions in a public goods game until choosing 
what they considered as the best strategy. Future work could ask children for their reasoning 
supporting their decisions.
We predicted that the children could attempt to use the majority's information to co-
ordinate with their partners, since communication between them was impossible. It seems 
likely, however, that children focused on individual strategies in the game, even though they 
were told that the outcomes would depend on the groups' performance. Anonymity, as well as 
the group’s reconstitution between rounds and the short number of rounds, might have pre-
vented any sort of group identification among the players.
It must be born in mind that studies with the public goods games usually have a 
greater number of rounds (ten on average). However, increasing the number of rounds could 
have led to confounding effects of children’s daily contact with their peers (Dutra et al., 
2018); that is, children would be able to exchange information about the games between 
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experimental sessions, and this factor would have made any conclusions regarding the lack of 
social information difficult to interpret. Moreover, Lamba (2014) used the same approach, 
with adult participants, to avoid the same potential problem: communication between rounds.
An important concern regarding decision-making studies with children is whether they
are able to understand and remember the information provided to them. As explained in the 
Method section, we had manipulation checks in place for the public goods game, by asking 
the children questions about the rules of the game, and we followed Lamba (2014)’s protocol 
in presenting the amount donated by both the majority and the highest earner at the same time,
while also illustrating the amounts with the fantasy notes. However, we could have added a 
memory check with regards to the social information (that is, the amount donated by the 
majority and the highest earner) presented. Thus, we cannot be entirely sure whether children 
were able to understand or accurately remember both options, and make their decisions in the 
second round based on that.
It would have been interesting to test whether the access to the social information 
available would affect the participants' behaviour differently over time. Also, evolutionary 
models of conformity, payoff bias, and cooperation in humans have proposed that conformity 
is effective when altruistic punishment is present (Guzmán et al., 2007; Henrich & Boyd, 
2001). Conformist learning and punishment stabilize cooperation within groups, and 
conformists tend to be more successful in these groups than payoff biased imitators. 
Anonymity, while critical to avoid the effects of social pressure, reputation, and reciprocity in 
our study, obviously hinder the potential effects and consequences of conformity that are 
present in natural environments. An alternative approach could focus on manipulating 
different levels of information about other participants' identity and also giving the 
participants the option to punish other players (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004).
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An important contribution of this study is the recruitment of a diverse sample, 
Brazilian children from different social classes. There has been a great deal of criticism on 
sample bias in the study of human behaviour (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Nielsen 
et al., 2017). Similarities across cultures and social groups should be tested rather than 
assumed; however, we have not found any differences between children from different social 
classes (having school as an indirect measure). Future studies could explore these questions 
even further. For instance, by comparing groups from different social groups within the same 
country, and controlling for the effect of scarcity of resources, specially in early development 
(Pepper & Nettle, 2017).
 To our knowledge, this study is the first to control for the effects of two types of so-
cial information on children's performance in a collective social dilemma. Moreover, our 
study provides additional evidence that children and adults behave similarly in public goods 
games, by focusing on individual strategies rather than conditional cooperation. It has shown 
that, in a public goods game, children do not increase their cooperation by conforming to their
peers, and do not show any particular trend towards copying the social information available. 
Conformity may have a relevant role in the development of human cooperation and the evolu-
tion of cultural differences, but it does not seem enough to enforce cooperation in an anonym-
ous social dilemma among children.
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Chapter V
The antecedents of sharing: context, individual characteristics,
and sociocultural environment
This chapter focuses on reviewing the literature on collaboration between children and 
discussing the variables that moderate children’s sharing decision in collaborative contexts. 
This chapter will not be submitted for publication.
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Introduction
Cooperation is often addressed as a general skill, across a variety of settings and 
techniques (Warneken, 2018). However, if cooperation is a strategy to obtain resources, it 
must be flexible and moderated by environmental cues. Here we discuss the recent literature 
about sharing between children in the light of Tomasello and collaborators’ interdependency 
hypothesis (Tomasello et al., 2012). We put it in context within the traditional developmental 
psychology literature, and discuss the influence of potential moderating variables sharing after
collaboration. Hence, in this review, we set out to look for the variables that moderate 
children’s sharing decision in collaborative contexts. We argue that experiments with children 
must make sense of the context in which children’s actions take place. Furthermore, we make 
a case for including more of these variables when looking into the development of sharing 
after collaboration. 
Sharing, donation and allocation studies are numerous in developmental psychology 
and involve a variety of experimental methods and theories (Damon, 1977; Eisenberg et al., 
2006; Gummerum et al., 2008). We define sharing as any decisions made by one or more 
individuals concerning the distribution of any items among themselves and others. That is, by 
this definition we exclude any studies involving children’s decisions regarding the division of 
resources between others, in which the child acts as a third party judge. Therefore, we only 
consider sharing decisions where children might benefit directly from it. And finally, sharing 
might refer to common use (e.g. sharing a toy) or a clear division (e.g. allocation or donation 
of stickers).
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The Interdependency Hypothesis
Humans communicate and coordinate to achieve joint goals, often by means of mutual
agreements about how people should collaborate and ultimately share resources (Tomasello et
al., 2005). The interdependency hypothesis states that human sharing skills have evolved in 
the context of obligate collaboration in foraging activities (Tomasello et al., 2012). Hence, 
collaboration was necessary for the acquisition of resources, which leads to the problem of 
how these resources would be shared between partners. This hypothesis argues that among 
early hominids, those who were better than other primates at collaborating with others and 
tolerated others proximity near food, fared better in specific environmental challenges that 
took place about 2 million years ago (Tomasello & Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2017). Tolerance of 
others acquiring a share of relevant resources may have helped to develop social norms to 
regulate the acquisition of resources in the group. In this context, it is predicted that humans 
should be more sensitive to rules of fairness when the resources are acquired in collaboration 
rather than independently. Also, they may show earlier dispositions to share resources 
according to these rules. Three-year-old children are able to share resources equally even 
when they have the opportunity to accumulate them, but only when they work together to get 
the rewards (Hamann et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 2011). Therefore, humans seem to develop
a sense of fairness in tandem with their collaborative skills (Warneken, 2018).
We argue that, given the context in which collaborative skills likely evolved, young 
children will be sensitive to other environmental demands, complementary to social 
interactions, such as the resources available, the costs to obtain those resources, the social and
cultural environment. Additionally, individual differences might also account for children’s 
performance in collaborative interactions, determining who will get more resources, and how 
those will be distributed. We present in the following an overview of the evidence on the 
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influence of moderating variables on children’s sharing decisions, and discuss the contribution
of this evidence to an evolutionary developmental theory of human cooperation.
Children’s sharing after collaboration
Young children take context into account when making decisions regarding the 
distribution of resources between two characters in a story who have worked together 
(Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2012; Chai & He, 2017; Schäfer, Haun, & Tomasello, 
2015). Three-year-olds are able to restore equity between partners and take effort into 
account, by giving more resources to the child who have worked more than the other, 
compared to controls in which children did an equal amount of work or no previous work 
(Baumard et al., 2012; Schäfer et al., 2015). This behaviour, however, seems to be sensitive to
the wealth of the recipients and influenced by cultural norms. Three- and five-year-old 
Chinese children give equal resources to poor and rich children in collaborative tasks, while 
only three-year-olds give more to the poor children in non-collaborative contexts. The fact 
that older children took fairness in to account regardless of prior collaboration or not is at 
odds with previous findings with German children by (Paulus, 2014), in which five-year-old 
children in a similar experimental setting give more resources to the poor children, even in 
collaborative tasks. The authors interpret their findings through the cultural difference 
between China, a collectivistic society, and Germany, an individualistic society. In the latter, 
children might seek to compensate the inequality, while Chinese children understand that 
everyone must receive the same amount according to their contribution, regardless of wealth, 
therefore accepting inequality more often than German and other Western samples.
Three-year-olds share equally about 75% of the time, after pulling a board together to 
obtain the resources. This has been observed when resources were clumped together, and 
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when one child ended up with more resources than the other (Hamann et al., 2011; Melis, 
Altrichter, & Tomasello, 2013; Ulber, Hamann, & Tomasello, 2015; Warneken et al., 2011). It 
happens more often than after parallel work or no work at all. However, there is a remarkable 
lack of studies on sharing after actual collaboration investigating variations in the setup (e.g. 
number of and access to resources available, types of roles) or in children’s characteristics 
(e.g. wealth, social class, culture).
Evidence about sharing behaviour in children usually comes from two groups of 
studies: the first involves third party decisions regarding hypothetical scenarios, in which the 
children act as judges. The second involves first party decisions regarding donation or 
distribution of resources, between the child and others (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). When it 
comes to the role of collaboration prior to sharing, researchers are interested in whether, and if
so, how children will judge merit or effort (Damon, 1977). That is, do children monopolise 
resources, share equally, share according to each one’s contribution, or share according to 
something else?
Damon and Killen (1982) investigated whether group discussion lead to children’s 
moral reasoning improvement. Children were told stories in which a group of peers worked in
parallel on a task (e.g. making beads or paintings) and received a quantity of rewards 
afterwards. Then children were asked a number of questions regarding the distribution of 
these rewards. Children were influenced by the interaction with their peers, but only those 
who engaged with others, accepting others’ opinions or collaborating in the discussion. 
Children who disagreed or refused to engage with others’ opinions had lower rates of 
changing their opinions.
Children’s decisions and interaction with others might differ when they face a real 
situation. Children behave strategically from an early age, in relation to children’s choice of 
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cooperative versus competitive strategies in games, when making decisions regarding limited 
resources (Charlesworth, 1996; Charlesworth & La Freniere, 1983; Kagan & Madsen, 1971, 
1972; Madsen, 1967, 1971; Madsen & Yi, 1975). Charlesworth and LaFreniere (1983) 
presented four-year-old children with a toy called Movie-Viewer, which was basically a hand 
operated camera that allowed children to watch a short movie when looking through an 
entrance at one end of it. They adapted this toy to make it a cooperative game, in which the 
children needed to recruit partners to perform two roles (operate a light switch and crank the 
gears) while one watched the movie. The task also required that one of the children stayed as 
a bystander, waiting for his or her turn; hence the cooperative task was also a competitive one.
They found that some children had more viewing time than others, and the children with the 
most viewing time were more dominant and active in the task, coordinating with the others 
and giving commands. Thus, cooperation may be a strategy to compete for resources, and 
young children have the skills necessary to coordinate their interests and those of the group, 
but with some children dominating their groups. 
Children in of preschool and school age will sometimes compete in cooperative tasks 
when facing a potential conflict of interest, even if competing leads to failure (Kagan & 
Madsen, 1972; Madsen, 1967, 1971; Madsen & Yi, 1975). Consider for example, a task in 
which children are at the opposite sides of a board, and they have to coordinate their moves to
get a marble inside an entrance (Madsen, 1971). However, they both have an entrance close to
their side, and they have to decide to which entrance they will move the marble. If both pull 
the rope, the marble holder will collapse and the marbles will be lost. In general, North 
American children were observed to be more competitive and enjoy conflict more than 
Mexican children, with American-Mexican children showing an intermediate behaviour 
between cooperation and competition. Moreover, this difference increased with age. However,
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there was also evidence from other cultures; children from South Korean, South Africa, India, 
and Malaysia, behaved similarly regarding competition. 
Which variables moderate sharing in collaborative settings?
Moderating variables, such as individual differences, socio-economic status and 
culture, are often deemed secondary in evolutionary explanations of behaviour (Kline et al., 
2018). While the search for general mechanisms and explanations to the evolution and 
development of behaviour is relevant to a general theory of human behaviour, it seems 
problematic to ignore the influence of these other variables, especially when the majority of 
developmental research published in top journals may be biased towards samples from North 
America and Western Europe (Nielsen et al., 2017). I present and discuss evidence regarding 
variables that moderate the development of sharing decisions in collaborative situations, some
of which have been carefully investigated by developmental psychologists, but whose 
evidence are often overlooked or ignored in evolutionary accounts of cooperation between 
children. As it has been said, this choice does not constitute a problem in itself. However, as 
other authors are warning, the influence of these variables must be tested, rather than 
dismissed or assumed (Nielsen et al., 2017).
Children's prosocial behaviours can be affected by moderating variables in a variety of
ways (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989); here we are concerned here with two categories: the 
characteristics of the task, the individual differences and the influence of social and cultural 
environments. We argue that these characteristics must be confounding variables in the 
explanation of children’s behaviour in collaborative settings, and this brings implications to a 
general theory of evolution and ontogeny of human sharing.
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The characteristics of the task: resources and effort
The evidence described above on children’s sharing behaviour after collaboration has 
been promoted as a strong evidence of human’s general tendency towards fairness and equity. 
However, it becomes necessary to test this hypothesis across a range of situations, to detail 
how humans are sensitive to environment demands regarding the distribution of resources. 
This is particularly relevant for an evolutionary perspective because modern humans and our 
close ancestors most likely evolved in changing environments. Hence, children should be 
attuned to physical and social cues from early on.
The first of these cues we would like to discuss is the type of resources involved in 
collaborative interactions. Recent experiments showing children’s remarkable sharing skills in
collaborative contexts usually adopt an even number of resources (e.g. 4), and given a random
imbalance in the resources distribution (e.g. 3 to one child and 1 to another), they test whether
children will restore equity or not. Other studies involving children’s third party distribution 
of the products of collaboration or effort also adopt even numbers. However, despite 
children’s ability to distribute rewards is clearly superior to other apes, there are many other 
situations in which the resources cannot be shared in equal parts by definition. One obvious 
case is when a child has an odd number of resources. A number of studies explored whether 
children choose to drop the “extra” rewards when they have this option. However, it is less 
common to assess what children do when this option is not available to them. Moreover, 
people would hardly drop extra resources in a real environment just for the sake of equality. 
Another case is when the resource is not something that can be easily divided, such as time. 
As explained above, Charlesworth and La Freniere (1983) found that young children will not 
share time in a task equally. However, one can argue that, regardless of time, children could 
have shown similar rates of enjoyment in the task. Another resource that can be shared with 
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relative low costs is knowledge or information. In collaborative settings, children are not only 
good at coordinating, but also share information with their partners (Dean et al., 2012). 
Therefore, it is relevant to test children for their preferences regarding the resources available,
and also reflect upon different types of resources.
The second type of cues is the children’s level of effort in a task. Warneken (2018) 
argues that mutualistic collaboration is likely a factor in originating children’s sharing based 
on a sense of fairness. He bases his argument on the evidence that children are assessing the 
level of effort in a task, and judging merit based on that. Hence, when children restore equity 
in a collaborative task, they do so because they pay attention to the amount of work each 
person did. However, as we showed above, this does not necessarily happen. Thus, it seems 
necessary to consider the role that limited resources have on children’s perception and 
management of effort in joint tasks.
Individual characteristics
In experiments of prosocial behaviour, individual differences are often downplayed in 
favour of explanation of general propensities across individuals and for particular settings. 
Conversely, the investigation of dispositional variables, related to individual characteristics, 
aim to explain general dispositions that emerge across a variety of circumstances (Eisenberg 
et al., 1996). It has been shown that prosocial behaviour is linked to certain personality and 
social traits. However, the relationship between these general dispositions, development, and 
children’s behaviour in particular circumstances needs to be further explored.
Personality is considered the joint product of temperament traits and a person’s 
experiences, while temperament is defined as the set of biologically based “individual 
differences in emotional, motor, and attentional reactivity measured by latency, intensity, and 
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recovery of response, and self-regulation processes such as effortful control that modulate 
reactivity” (Rothbart, 2007, p. 207). There are three main high-order dimensions of 
temperament: surgency or extraversion, effortful control , and negative affect. Surgency refers
to the level of activity and affect. Effortful control refers to the level of self-control and 
attention skills. Negative affect refers to the level of negative feelings. Children with higher 
levels of surgency and effortful control, and lower levels of effortful control are predicted to 
show better prosocial skills. 
Another measure of prosociality is social competence, which can be defined as the 
ability to establish successful social relationships (Chen & French, 2008). Contrary to 
temperament, social skills are expected to be influenced by social and cultural demands. 
Therefore, although it is predicted that children with higher scores in social competence tend 
to be more cooperative, this relationship will likely vary across different cultures and social 
contexts (Chen & French, 2008).
However, little research has investigated the effects of individual differences in 
temperament and social competence on children’s prosocial behaviour in collaborative 
settings, where children must negotiate different perspectives (Endedijk et al., 2015). 
Although theories of the influence of dispositional variables on children’s prosocial behaviour
have generated hypotheses from a variety of measures, it is unclear how children with 
different characteristics will interact to achieve prosocial or collaborative goals together in 
controlled environments.
Socialization and family
Evidence on the influence of social preferences of parents on their children’s prosocial
behaviour is mixed (Bauer et al., 2013; Bryant & Crockenberg, 1980; Eisenberg et al., 2006; 
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Turner & Harris, 1984). Children with parents who practice altruistic acts usually are more 
prosocial, while children whose parents are inconsistent models (by preaching but not 
practising prosocial acts, for instance) tend to be less prosocial (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; 
Eisenberg et al., 2006). However, parents’ influence might be confounded with other 
demographic variables, which makes it difficult to isolate this variable. For instance, children 
and adolescents with low-education parents tend to be more selfish (Bandy & Ottoni-
Wilhelm, 2012; Bauer et al., 2013). This effect held even when age, gender, health, cognitive 
skills, and siblings composition were taken into account. The authors argue that their findings 
represent an evidence of socialization effects, but a more likely explanation is that those 
children are more selfish because they have fewer resources; hence, the resources’ marginal 
utility are higher for them. Nevertheless, Bauer et al. (2013) also found that children with 
low-education parents were also weakly spiteful (that is, these children chose to minimise 
their partner’s payoff in a dictator game, but only if they did not lose resources by doing it), 
which is harder to be explained by scarcity, albeit it does not contradict this explanation.
In the same fashion as research on temperament and social skills, research on parents’ 
influence relies on reported measures, and observational studies. Evidence from controlled 
studies comparing parents and their children’s behaviour in collaborative tasks is rare (e.g. 
Cipriani et al., 2013). Therefore, there is a need to investigate experimental hypotheses 
concerning children’s collaborative skills and the influence of their parents on the former.
Social class
Socio-economic status or social class refers to the economic conditions in which 
people live, and their social status compared to others within their society. Socio-economic 
status is measured in a variety of ways; many developmental studies consider the family 
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income and parents' education, whilst others consider demographic indicators specific to each 
country, and others also infer it indirectly from people’s locations and ways of living. Social 
class is predicted to affect children’s prosocial behaviour. However, the majority of 
developmental research focus on children who are middle class. Children from lower classes 
are expected to accumulate or retain resources due to the context of scarcity in which they 
live; conversely, they can be more cooperative because they are expected to participate in 
domestic chores (Whiting & Whiting, 1975). However, children from upper classes were 
shown to be more prosocial in sharing windfall resources (Benenson et al., 2007; Rochat et 
al., 2009). Nevertheless, social class does not seem to be considered often, and even studies 
that have included social class as a variable describe their sample’s characteristics 
superficially.
Culture
Childhood is a relevant phase in learning cultural norms, which involves much of 
learning how to behave towards other people. Culture also potentially interacts with all the 
factors described above (Eisenberg et al., 2006; Whiting & Whiting, 1975). However, as we 
argued before, much of the research on the development of cooperation between children 
assumed a universal pathway, common to all humans, and downplayed the effects of other 
variables such as culture and the social environment on the evolution and development of 
cooperative behaviours (Nielsen & Haun, 2016; Kline et al., 2018; Warneken, 2018).
Culture is the set of beliefs and practices shared by a group (Hofstede et al., 2010), and
it can mediate the effect of social interaction on human development (Chen & French, 2008). 
For instance, families from individualist cultures emphasise the development of social 
initiative (that is, the ability to start relationships) and greater self-expression. People are also 
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stimulated to pursue personal goals and be more competitive (Knight & Kagan, 1981). 
Conversely, families from collectivistic cultures emphasise the development of self-restraint, 
instead of social initiative, and less self-expression. In this context, conformity to the group is 
highly valued. Nevertheless, cross-cultural comparisons of children’s sharing in collaborative 
contexts are still incipient (Cipriani et al. 2013; Chai & He, 2017).
How to make sense of the effect and inter-relations of these variables?
Recent research on children’s sharing in collaborative contexts laid the groundwork to 
a general theory of the evolution of human cooperation and culture, along with other studies 
on children’s cooperative behaviours (McAuliffe, Blake, et al., 2017; Tomasello, 2018; 
Warneken, 2018). However, there are other potential explanations, and specifics of the theory 
that must be investigated, by considering the complexity of human variation (Kline et al., 
2018). To make sense of other variables of interest, as the ones described in the previous 
sections, in an evolutionary developmental approach to human cooperation, a combination of 
different approaches is necessary (Carlo et al., 2001; Nielsen & Haun, 2016). Experimental 
studies could be performed in tandem with the assessment of other measures by naturalistic 
observations or reported measures from questionnaires. Cross-cultural comparisons could 
include a more thorough assessment of the sample’s characteristics, including demographics 
and other potential confounding variables (see, for example, the samples’ description in 
House et al., 2013’s Supplementary Information). 
Finally, limitations should be addressed regarding other potential explanations that 
could undermine or change specifics of the underlying theory that is being forwarded. For 
example, Lamba and Mace (2013) argued that cultural variation in norms of fairness may not 
necessarily reflect differences in transmission of cultural norms, but rather variations in local 
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demographics. Rochat et al. (2009) compared 3- and 5-year-old’s decisions in donations 
across different social and cultural groups: three groups of Brazilian children (from middle-
class, lower-class and very lower-class) were compared with each other and with children 
across other four countries with different levels of socio-economic status and environment. 
The Brazilian cohort provided a control for these cross-national comparisons. The authors 
found that children from traditional and small-scale rural societies were more inclined to share
resources more equally, while Brazilian children from very lower-classes (children living in 
the streets) hoarded the resources at a similar rate than American middle-class children, and at
higher rates than Brazilian children from the other two groups. Nevertheless, children across 
all the cultures tested showed a trend towards more fairness by 5 years of age, while showing 
differences regarding the magnitude of self-interest. Therefore, a comprehensive theory of 
human cooperation can only be build by recognizing the role of moderating variables and 
variation across human groups.
Conclusion
The distribution of resources is a puzzling subject because humans engage in this 
behaviour often, across different aspects of their lives even when it is costly for the individual 
who performs it. Moreover, human children show remarkable sharing skills from an early age.
Nevertheless, humans are also strategic when making sharing decisions. Hence, to understand 
the development of the sharing behaviours and social norms that regulate those behaviours in 
more detail, it is important to understand how people come to equilibrate cooperative versus 
competitive strategies with peers and how the cultural and social milieu can affect these 
interactions across development. 
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We have argued here that recent studies that include collaborative tasks ignore or 
downplay other relevant variables such as cultural background, social class, social 
relationships, socialization practices, and even situational variables such as temperament and 
social skills. Recently, Kline et al. (2018) made a similar argument, regarding the use of 
culture as an explanatory variable in developmental theories. Quite often, culture and other 
moderating variables are seen as secondary in the explanation of human behaviour. This is 
problematic because the theory that underlies these studies seek to propose a general theory of
human behaviour. Without testing alternative hypotheses regarding variation across different 
contexts, it is difficult to generalise.
To conclude, cooperative behaviours are a complex product of interactions between 
individual predispositions and life history, social influences, and the cultural background. It 
seems important to distinguish the investigation of general abilities, with potential to be 
universal across different environments, and the investigation of flexible strategies, that may 
also be universal or specific, depending on the variables involved.
This review focused on the discussion of the role of moderating variables on the de-
velopment of cooperative behaviour. It attempted to propose a more integrated approach to 
the experimental investigation of the development of cooperative behaviour and the influence 
of these variables on this type of behaviour. On the one hand, experimental studies and the use
of indirect measures, such as questionnaires, might be criticised for their limited external 
validity. On the other hand, the combination of different methods might bring new insights 
into the study of the development of human cooperation from an evolutionary perspective.
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Chapter VI
The effect of unequal outcomes on sharing after collaboration
between children: a cross-cultural comparison
This chapter is an empirical study investigating the effects of age, gender, socio-economic 
status, and culture on children’s collaboration and sharing in a task with unequal outcomes. 
This chapter will be submitted for publication. 
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Introduction
Cooperation can be defined as a strategy for acquisition of resources (Green & Rechis,
2006) that, once acquired, must be shared according to specific norms (Damon, 1977). 
Sharing behaviour in humans probably evolved as a consequence of collaborative foraging 
and increased tolerance of others proximity and sharing of food (Tomasello et al., 2012). 
Hence, to ensure participation in collective actions, social norms were developed to enforce a 
fairly equitable sharing of resources among the group members. When the partners' interests 
are perfectly aligned and the resources can be shared equally, cooperation is easily promoted. 
However, this is often not the case; collaboration between humans can involve a variety of 
conflicts, especially when resources are scarce or when equal division is difficult. 
Three-year-old children show a propensity to cooperate with others and share equally 
after collaborating with each other (Corbit, McAuliffe, Callaghan, Blake, & Warneken, 2017; 
Hamann et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 2011). Moreover, meritocratic sharing (that is, giving to
each partner their share in proportion to their contribution to the work) after collaboration had 
been shown to occur in children as young as three and a half years old (Hamann, Bender, & 
Tomasello, 2014), and earlier than previously thought (Damon, 1977; Hook & Cook, 1979; 
Lerner, 1974). Hence, the equal sharing of items after collaboration may be the first 
expression of distributive justice among young children (Hamann et al., 2011).
Recent studies of sharing after collaboration between children consist of a task with 
unequal rewards (Hamann et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 2011). To restore equity, a child who 
ends up with most rewards may share one with his/her partner, a peer of similar age, after 
finishing the task. In these experiments rewards are placed at the middle of the apparatus, 
clumped or split in equal parts, with children at a similar initial distance from the rewards and 
having to perform similar, mirrored actions. Then, after both children coordinate to retrieve 
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the rewards, one reward slips accidentally towards one of the children, resulting in unequal 
share, that is one unit for a child and three units for the other. In these studies, children shared 
more often with a peer in the collaboration condition than in parallel work and in no-work 
conditions. We hypothesise that such conditions might have made it easier for children to 
restore equity, regardless of actively handing the rewards to the partner or taking it from the 
partner’s dispenser, because the way the marbles are dispensed make it look like there is a 
malfunction in the apparatus. 
The use of the distribution of unequal outcomes in sharing experiments is useful for 
two reasons: it induces a potential conflict of interest and it increases the costs of being 
cooperative. Experiments with unequal outcomes usually split an even amount of resources 
into unequal shares, as explained above. Another option is to provide an odd number of 
resources; when this happens, younger (three-year-old) children tend to keep a greater share 
to themselves, while older (five-year-old) children share the resources equally or keep a lesser
share, regardless of whether children collaborated before to obtain these rewards (Handlon & 
Gross, 1959; Melis, Floedl, & Tomasello, 2015) or not (Rochat et al., 2009; Ugurel-Semin, 
1952). To increase the potential conflict of interest in the experiment, we decided to 
investigate children’s sharing behaviour in a collaborative task with unequal distribution of an
odd number of rewards.
We wanted to test how children would solve cooperation problems when the factors 
described above are altered. Thus, we adopted the “marble run” task (adapted from Göckeritz 
et al., 2014, see description in the Methods section), in which children were asked to perform 
different but complementary roles in a collaborative task to win rewards (in this case, wooden
marbles that could be exchanged for stickers). As in previous studies in the literature, we 
adopted a task in which collaboration was necessary to obtain any rewards, but one child 
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would be in the position of monopolising these rewards by reaching out to them first after 
both children had worked together. Moreover, given that the rewards were released further 
from both children, and by the experimenter, there was no possible indication of ownership or
property prior to the release of them. Finally, this task provided an additional feature: children
could lose the rewards while performing the task. Therefore, in addition to an odd amount of 
rewards, children could win different amounts based on their joint performance in the task.
Children's cooperative behaviours may be constrained by the availability of resources 
(i.e. rewards in a task), as well as by norms of their cultural and social group. 
Disadvantageous inequity aversion, that is the aversion to unequal distributions of resources 
among individuals in which the person receives less than the other, develops early in children,
around five or six years of age (Corbit et al., 2017; Paulus & Moore, 2014). Aversion to 
advantageous inequality, in which the person receives more than the other, develops later, 
from eight years of age (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011). This sensitivity, however, seems to be 
moderated by culture (Blake et al., 2015; Corbit et al., 2017; House et al., 2013), particularly 
when the sharing is costly. Moreover, the emergence of these differences coincides with the 
increase in equal sharing among children, during middle childhood (Smith, Blake, & Harris, 
2013). Hence we chose to investigate two different age groups to assess both the 
developmental path of sharing and the evidence of cultural differences, based on the 
assumption that older children (eight to nine years old) will behave according to the norms of 
their social and cultural groups more than younger children (four to five years old). 
Culture is the set of thoughts and collective practices that differentiate one group from 
the other and affect the meaning people attach to different aspects of their lives and that are 
reflected in the institutions of society (Hofstede et al., 2010). Cultural differences have been 
traditionally explored in the study of the development of cooperative behaviour (Chen & 
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French, 2008; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). But cultures differ as a consequence of many 
factors, such as their economy, history and social structure. In fact, the comparison between 
very different cultures has been criticised for including many potential factors together as 
cultural effects, such as demographic factors (Keller et al., 2006; Lamba & Mace, 2011; 
Lamba & Mace, 2013). Therefore, though evolutionary research is increasingly focusing on 
cross-cultural comparisons, these tend to group socio-economic, demographic and social 
differences in one category, which makes it difficult to determine the effects of different 
elements on cooperative behaviour.
We chose to compare Brazil and England because these countries have relevant 
differences regarding the socio-economic status of their inhabitants, and different social and 
historic backgrounds, even though they do not differ in terms of market integration. Brazil 
and England differ in relevant cultural dimensions (Hofstede et al., 2010); Brazilians tend to 
respect social hierarchies, to accept social inequality and to value signals of status and power. 
People are integrated early to strongly cohesive groups, whether in family or in the 
workplace, and they tend to build strong bonds of loyalty and exchange of favours. England 
has a more individualistic society with effective laws, which focuses on individual 
independence and the pursuit of personal goals. Such dimensions may significantly affect how
people cooperate and follow rules in these societies (see Gächter & Herrmann, 2009, for a 
similar comparison between different countries).
Previous experimental research within and across cultures have found greater sharing 
among children from higher socio-economic status and more affluent environments 
(Benenson et al., 2007; Rochat et al., 2009). To investigate cultural and socio-economic 
differences, we recruited children from two sets of schools, in both countries. We called 
‘public’ schools those schools that are mainly funded by taxes, the state, or charities (e.g. 
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churches). These schools take in children from a variety of social classes. We compared these 
to ‘private’ schools, which are mainly funded by parents or at least charge term fees to accept 
pupils (e.g. independent schools in England). These schools usually have a greater share of 
children from more affluent classes. These cohorts allowed a comparison of children from 
differing social classes within both countries.
In addition, we tested whether boys and girls would differ in their sharing behaviour 
after collaborating with peers of the same gender. Girls are generally seen as more prosocial 
than boys, and this is supported by many studies (Eisenberg et al., 2006, 2016). However, 
when other variables are controlled, such as the type of prosocial behaviour, the recipient of 
children's actions, and the research method these differences vary in effect or even disappear. 
For instance, the effects are smaller in sharing and experimental studies. Regarding sharing 
after collaboration, the effect of gender was either not tested (Hamann et al., 2011; Warneken 
et al., 2011) or no differences were found (Handlon & Gross, 1959). 
In summary, we aimed to investigate developmental changes and sociocultural 
differences in the effects of unequal outcomes on collaboration and sharing with peers. 
Therefore we compared different age groups and types of schools in an attempt to address the 
influence of culture and social class, if any, on children’s behaviour, while also controlling for
the influence of sex. We predicted that Brazilian children would share more than English 
children, given that Brazilians seem to be more reliant on social bonds and hierarchies than 
institutions to solve collective problems. Conversely, given that Brazilians seem to tolerate 
more rigid social hierarchies and inequalities than the English, Brazilian children might share 
less than the English children. To test the effect of culture on development, we predicted that 
eight- and nine-year-old children would show a stronger cultural difference than four- and 
five-year-old children, and that there would be no sex differences. Finally based on the 
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findings described above (albeit with windfall resources; Benenson et al., 2007, Rochat et al., 
2009), we predicted that children from public schools (lower SES) would share less than 
children from private schools (higher SES).
Method
Participants
Participants were 136 4- and 5-year-olds (M = 4.99, SD = .50, 86 from Brazil and 50 
from England), and 148 8- and 9-year-olds (M = 8.71, SD = .72, 88 from Brazil and 60 from 
England) children. One additional pair was removed due to a mistake by the experimenter, 
and four additional pairs were removed because a data check revealed that one child or both 
children in the pairs had ages outside the age group of interest. The children’s parents signed 
an informed consent form, and all children were informally asked whether they would like to 
play a game. In addition, Brazilian older children were asked to sign an informed consent 
adapted to their age, according with the country’s ethics regulations. The children were tested 
in public and private nurseries and primary schools from Natal, RN (Brazil), and County 
Durham (England). The majority of English children were white, and the majority of 
Brazilian children were of mixed ethnicity.
This study was approved by the ethics committees from the University of Durham, 
England (project title: “Investigating the effects of unequal outcomes on collaboration and 
sharing with peers in different cultures, social classes and generations”; reference number: 
13/57), and the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil (project title: “Uma 
investigação sobre a aprendizagem social da cooperação em crianças: diferenças individuais, 
sociais e culturais”; CAAE: 46203715.5.0000.5537).
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Table 1.
Sample details by age group, sex, school type and country.
Brazil England
Total
Public Private Public Private
4- to 5-year-olds
Girls 23 22 17 8 70
Boys 23 18 15 10 66
8- to 9-year-olds
Girls 30 21 22 9 82
Boys 20 17 24 5 66
Total 96 78 78 32 284
Task
The task was a “marble run” (adapted from Göckeritz et al., 2014, see Figure 1), and
consisted of interconnected PVC tubes, in which marbles could travel from an entrance hole
to an exit hole. There were two significant task locations: a hole in the middle and a hole in
the end of the tube, in which a child could insert their fingers to prevent the marbles from
falling into inaccessible containers. Thus, children had to perform complementary roles and
could win a number of marbles out of a total of three in each trial.
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Figure 1.  The “marble run”, a tube with an entrance on the left,  where the marbles were
inserted by the experimenter and released, two holes attached to inaccessible containers (one
in the middle and one on the right end), and an exit, where marbles could be released into a
can. Beside the tube, there were two tubes (“marble towers”), where children could put their
marbles and use the marks to measure their gains.
Experimental procedure
Children  were tested in pairs in a separate room or hall within the nurseries/schools
premises. The pairs were randomly selected, but teachers were asked to match the pairs based
on whether children would work well together, but were not best friends, since that would
increase the chances of children sharing equally based on their friendship and not on their
collaboration in the task (Paulus & Moore, 2014). The majority of children were divided in
same gender pairs (6 pairs were mixed gender, due to children’s availability).
Each pair of children was introduced to the marble run. The experimenter showed the
task to the children, explaining how it worked and how many trials they would have. They
were told that they could win marbles by manipulating the apparatus, but were not instructed
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to assume specific roles or told to work together. Each task location was shown to them, and
children were encouraged to insert their hands and fingers inside the holes; then the tube was
filled with marbles. Children needed to coordinate actions/roles to win marbles in the task;
otherwise the marbles would drop into the inaccessible containers.
Practice  trials. Before  the  testing  began,  the  experimenter  gave  the  children  the
opportunity to  practice with the task.  They had a minimum of three practice attempts,  in
which if they retrieved all the three marbles in a row, they moved on to the testing trials;
otherwise, they had two additional practice trials until completing the requirement of three
successful practice trials. During these trials the three marbles were not shared between them,
being left  inside the  can.  All  children completed the  practice trials  and were  included in
testing trials.
Testing trials. Children were told that they would have four more trials and that they
could exchange the marbles in the end for stickers (four marbles for one sticker). They each
received a vertical tube, called a “marble tower”, and were instructed to collect marbles and
put them inside their towers after each trial; children were not instructed to share the marbles.
The towers had marks with tape, so that children could win a sticker for each height reached
by the piled marbles (one sticker for the first mark, two stickers for the second, and three
stickers for the third).
The experimenter released the marbles in each trial. This was done to prevent children
from releasing more than three marbles. The experimenter tried to intervene in the task as
little as possible. When children asked about how they should play the game or share the
marbles, the experimenter asked them to decide by themselves. Once children finished the
session,  the experimenter counted the number of marbles inside each tower and gave the
appropriate number of stickers to the children.
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Prompts during testing. If children lost marbles within containers, the experimenter
prompted the children to keep playing and to ignore the lost marbles. If the children waited
for  the  release  of  more  marbles  before  putting  them  inside  the  marble  towers,  the
experimenter reminded children that they should play with only three marbles at a time and
that the can should be emptied after each trial. 
Conflicts. The experimenter was prepared to intervene in situations of conflict,  by
calming children down or interrupting the session, to prevent any further distress. There was
just one potential conflict that was resolved after the experimenter told the children to calm
down, and no session was interrupted.
Coding and analysis
Data was coded by the first author. Children could win zero to three marbles within 
each trial and zero to 12 marbles across all four trials. To account for sharing within trials, the 
following variables were coded for each child and trial: the number of marbles they won, their
position in the task (middle or end of the tube), whether they shared the marbles with the 
partner or not (only one child in each pair made the sharing decision, the ones who were at the
end of the tube), and the type of sharing (also with regards to the children who made the 
sharing decision). There were three types of sharing: active, in which the child actively shared
the marbles with their partner (e.g. by handing a partner the marbles or the can); passive, in 
which the partner asked for the marbles or took them from the child (e.g. by taking the 
marbles out of the child’s hand or the can); and none, when there was no sharing. 
Additionally, to account for sharing across trials, the total number of marbles the pair won and
the number of times the child chose the end position in the tube (thus closer and with access 
to the rewards) across trials were also scored.
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All analyses were performed with R software (version 3.4.0, R Development Core 
Team 2017). The logistic binomial mixed models were fitted with lme4 package glmer 
function (Bates et al., 2015). Comparison between models were performed with the likelihood
ratio tests provided by the analysis of variance method (stats package anova function, R 
Development Core Team, 2017). Post hoc analysis were performed with Tukey HSD multiple 
comparisons test (multicomp package glht function, (Hothorn et al., 2008).
Results
Sharing within trials
To assess which variables affected children’s sharing behaviour within trials, a 
binomial model was fitted with the following independent variables as fixed effects: sex, age 
group, school type, number of marbles won by the pair, position in the task (middle or end of 
the tube), and trial. Children’s individual, pair, and school identifications were added as 
random effects. The dependent variable was a binary variable representing whether children 
shared marbles or not with the partner, which varied within trials depending on whether the 
children were at the end of the tube or not in each trial. All the independent variables were 
added at once as main effects (full model), and removed individually. Also, second order 
interactions between the following variables were assessed: age, gender, country, and school 
type. The model that fitted the data best, according to the AIC (full model: 731.089 ; reduced 
model: 719.733), was the reduced model that included the number of marbles won by the pair,
the age group, the trial, and the pair identification (see Figure 1 and Supplementary Table 1).
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Tukey contrasts revealed that there was a significant difference between all the three 
categories representing the number of marbles the pair won (1 marble vs. 2 marbles: Z = 
6.741, p < .001; 1 marble vs. 3 marbles: Z = 8.702, p < .001; 2 vs. 3 marbles: Z = 5.699, p < .
001). Moreover, only the first trial was significantly different from the others (1 vs 2: Z = 
4.013, p < .001; 1 vs 3: Z = 3.082, p = .011; 1 vs 4: Z = 3.788, p < .001; 2 vs 3: Z = -.876, p = .
817; 2 vs 4: Z = -.114, p = .999; 3 vs 4: Z = .782, p = .862). Thus, eight- and nine-year-old 
children shared more often than four- and five-year-old children, but for both age groups 
children shared significantly more often as the number of retrieved marbles increased, and in 
all subsequent trials compared to the first one.
Figure 1. Predicted probability of sharing marbles for each age group, the number of marbles 
the pair won, and the trial.
Type of sharing
To assess the type of sharing in which children were engaging, a binomial model was 
fitted with the following independent variables as fixed effects: sex, age, school type, number 
of marbles won by the pair, and trial. Children’s individual, pair, and school identifications 
were added as random effects. The dependent variable was a binary variable representing 
whether children shared marbles actively or not with the partner, which varied within trials 
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depending on whether the children were at the end of the tube or not in each trial. All the 
independent variables were added at once as main effects (full model), and removed 
individually. Also, second order interactions between the following variables: age, gender, 
country, and school type were assessed. The model that fitted the data better, according to the 
AIC (full model: 550.212; reduced model: 539.031), was the reduced model that included the 
number of marbles won by the pair, the country, and the children’s individual and pair 
identifications (see Figure 2 and Supplementary Table 2).
Tukey contrasts revealed that there was a significant difference between pairs who 
won 1 marble, and the pairs who won 2 or 3 marbles within trials (1 marble vs. 2 marbles: Z =
3.409, p = .002; 1 marble vs. 3 marbles: Z = 4.435, p < .001 ; 2 vs. 3 marbles: Z = 1.597, p = .
242). Thus, English children actively shared the marbles more often than Brazilian children, 
and regardless of nationality children shared more actively as the number of retrieved marbles
increased.
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of active sharing for each country and the number of marbles
the pair won.
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Sharing across trials
The previous analyses assessed sharing within trials. To investigate whether children 
shared equally across trials, a binomial logistic regression model was fitted. The following 
independent variables were added as fixed effects: sex, age, school type, position in the task, 
and trial. The dependent variable was the proportion of marbles won by each child divided by 
the total of marbles won by the pair. Also, second order interactions between all the variables 
were assessed. The model that fitted the data better, according to the AIC (full model: 
959.845; reduced model: 935.018), was the reduced model that included the children’s age 
group, their position in the task, and the interaction between both variables (see Figure 3 and 
Supplementary Table 3). Hence, the number of marbles four- and five-year-old children won, 
in relation to the number won by their partners, increased with the number of times they had 
easier access to the marbles (by being close to the exit, at the end of the tube).
Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of the proportion of marbles each child won over the total 
won by the pair, grouped by age group and the number of times the child stayed at the end of 
the tube (hence closer to the marble’s exit).
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Distribution of marbles and sharing of stickers
In addition to the analyses, the histograms below show the density of the distribution 
of the proportion of sharing for each age group (amount of marbles the child won over the 
amount of marbles the pair won, see Figure 4). In both histograms, extreme values such as 0 
and 1 represent complete monopoly of the marbles by one of the children within pairs; that is, 
where children either won zero or all the marbles across trials. Values around 0.4 and 0.6 
represent equal or almost equal sharing; that is, where children within pairs shared about half 
of their marbles between themselves. While the younger children had great variation in the 
proportion of sharing across pairs, with higher density in the extremes and in the middle, the 
older children clearly had the majority of sharing decisions concentrated in the middle. The 
histograms thus show that 4- and 5-year-old and 8- and 9-year-old children had clearly 
different patterns, with older children sharing more equally between themselves more often 
than younger children.
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Figure 4. Density histogram of children’s proportion of sharing (amount won by the 
individual over the amount won by the pair).
On two occasions (one from each age group), children asked the experimenter if they 
could remove the marbles that were already in the towers, to redistribute them equally 
between themselves and their partners. We did not account for those redistributions in the 
analyses because they were extremely rare, and concentrated on sharing decisions.
We also recorded the moment when children exchanged their marbles for stickers, to 
assess whether they would share the stickers with the partner, even if one of them 
monopolised the marbles during the game. This happened twice with eight- and nine-year-old 
children, who negotiated beforehand, so they could maximise the rewards (by accumulating 
all the marbles in one tower, instead of splitting them up in two). Nevertheless, one child 
always ended up with an additional sticker.
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Discussion
This  study  contributes  to  the  growing  literature  on  children’s  sharing  after
collaboration by showing that four-  and five-year-old children’s sharing is  constrained by
children’s access to the rewards, as opposed to more equal sharing among eight- and nine-
year-old children. Though culture, social class and gender have not affected children’s amount
of sharing, this study also provides evidence that children from different, but economically
similar, cultures may differ in the way they share the resources. 
Across the two cultures, eight- and nine-year-old children consistently shared more 
than four- and five-year-old children across trials, and regardless of the number of marbles 
won by the pairs. We have shown that, even though humans have prosocial tendencies from 
an early age, young children struggle to understand a collaborative task as a reason for sharing
equally if the rewards are in an unequal number, and children are not, ostensibly or implicitly, 
prompted to cooperate or be generous. Hence, for the two cultures investigated, older children
engaged in more spontaneous sharing than younger ones. One possible explanation for the 
lower levels of sharing among younger children is that, to display cooperative behaviour, the 
conditions must be structured to make them more sensitive to other people's needs as well as 
to make them more aware of proportional reasoning (Ng, Heyman, & Barner, 2011).
It seems that, when the situation facilitates unequal sharing, young children will tend
to focus on their own gains and not perceive a collaborative task as a reason for sharing with a
partner.  Moreover,  in  our  study,  the children who had the opportunity  to  monopolise  the
rewards were the ones at the end of the tube and who worked less in the game, since the
entrance in the middle section was the most difficult to handle – i.e. distribution was anti-
meritocratic.  Older  children,  however,  had  no  problems  in  sharing  their  rewards  equally
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across  the trials,  and also did not  differ  according to  their  position in  the tube,  therefore
seemingly not caring for merit in this particular task.
Another explanation for the differences observed between the two age groups is that 
four- and five-year-old children have less emotional regulation and less communication and 
conflict resolution skills than eight- and nine-year-old children, which makes it difficult for 
the former to negotiate and reach a solution in this type of game (see Ramani & Brownell, 
2013, for a review). Older children are more likely engaged in domestic chores and sharing 
with siblings, and they also have better understanding of social rules (Bauer et al., 2013; 
Whiting & Whiting, 1975). Young children may not have the necessary skills to understand 
and navigate the reward distribution of the task and potentially similar situations (Ng et al., 
2011). Hence, human’s early prosocial tendencies may develop earlier in contexts where the 
advantages of cooperation are clear and the costs and conflicts are downplayed, and later in 
costly interactions, in which more refined socio-cognitive skills are necessary as well 
(Warneken, 2018).
Our task is different from a number of others in the recent literature on collaboration 
because children had an odd number of resources to share in each trial, and these could be 
monopolised by one child in the pair. Moreover, children faced the risk of losing marbles 
before sharing them. We believe that the variation in the number of marbles that children 
could win in each trial, and the possibility of exchanging the marbles for a reward increased 
their value, thus also adding an element of individual competition in a collaborative setting, 
which is often not assessed (but see Charlesworth, 1996, for a similar approach). A potential 
limitation of this design is that it is not entirely possible to disentangle the effects of 
inequality and uncertainty on children’s sharing decisions in this task. Moreover, the task 
seemed to be more difficult for younger children, with 62% of them obtaining 2 or 3 marbles, 
125
in comparison to 92% percent of the older children. Nevertheless, our model shows that 
younger children shared less irregardless of the number of marbles the pair won. However, it 
might be that they were compelled to share less because of the higher difficulty in performing 
the task. Future studies may explore the relationship between collaboration, sharing and costly
decisions in terms of uncertainty and performance in similar tasks with children.
We also attempted to avoid priming children into collaborating with the partner by not 
using any terms during the practice trials that should indicate that they had to work together to
get the marbles (though this was the only possible way of being successful in the task). A 
potential limitation to this study was that the experimenter had to be present at all times 
during the task, and release the marbles for the children. Although the experimenter tried not 
to influence the children’s collaboration, children might have shared more due to her presence
(Dutra et al., 2018; Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2016). While this might have been 
true for the eight- and nine-year-old children, four- and five-year-old children seemed less 
affected.
For this study, schools were used as indirect measures of social class. But there was no
difference between children regardless of attending a public or private school. This was done 
because cultural differences can be confounded with the influence of other demographic and 
economic variables (Carlo et al., 2001; Lamba & Mace, 2011, 2013). Nevertheless, children 
did not show any differences regarding sharing across the types of schools or both cultures. To
our knowledge this is the first study to compare collaborative behaviours between Brazilian 
and English children.
The absence of cultural differences between Brazilian and English children regarding
whether they shared and the amount shared may indicate that children from these cultures are
similar  regarding  sharing  behaviour  in  a  collaborative  context  with  unequal  outcomes.
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However, the study took place within two urban samples, although from two cultures with
striking historical and socio-economic differences. Perhaps children from other regions and
rural areas from these countries would behave differently. Additionally, cultural norms and
practices do not necessarily overlap with nationality. Nevertheless, the sample size might also
be insufficient to detect any differences, should they exist.
Regarding  the  type  of  sharing  decisions  (active  versus  passive),  English  children
shared  more  actively  than  Brazilian  children,  regardless  of  age.  This  might  indicate  that
children  from  these  cultures  differ  in  how  they  make  decisions  on  sharing  in  a  social
interaction,  even  though  they  achieved  similar  outcomes  in  this  task.  Perhaps  Brazilian
children  are  more  inclined  to  enforce  equality  in  direct  social  interactions  than  English
children, who would expect the partner with the resources to make the decision. This would
be  in  tandem  with  the  evidence  that  Brazilians  rely  on  close  relationships  to  achieve
collaboration, rather than authorities or institutions. However, it seems surprising that such
difference would emerge as early as ages four and five years, given that the literature points
towards a stronger cultural influence from six or seven years (House et al., 2013; Warneken,
2018).
Our study shows that, although young children are willing to collaborate and share re-
sources, their actions are constrained by the situation, and their access to and manipulation of 
the rewards. Experiments that take this into account may contribute to a more realistic ap-
proach to human cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation is influenced by social and cultural 
group factors, while also stemming from universal patterns in human behaviour. We hope that 
these findings will lead to further explorations of the development of cooperation in more di-
verse contexts.
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Chapter VI The effect of unequal outcomes on sharing after collaboration
Supplementary Information
Table 1
Model estimates for children’ sharing behaviour within trials (whether they shared or not)
  Full model  Reduced model
  OR CI p  OR CI p
Fixed Parts
(Intercept)  0.00 0.00 – 0.03 <.001  0.00 0.00 – 0.02 <.001
Trial (2)  4.65 2.19 – 9.87 <.001  4.67 2.20 – 9.90 <.001
Trial (3)  3.29 1.54 – 7.04 .002  3.30 1.54 – 7.05 .002
Trial (4)  4.47 2.06 – 9.70 <.001  4.46 2.06 – 9.68 <.001
Pair won (2)  52.73 16.65 – 167.02 <.001  52.38 16.57 – 165.59 <.001
Pair won (3)  1165.23 236.62 – 5738.14 <.001  1160.92 236.85 – 5690.16 <.001
Position (M)  1.03 0.64 – 1.65 .901     
Age group (8-9)  68.40 5.89 – 794.48 <.001  71.54 6.19 – 827.38 <.001
Gender (M)  0.69 0.11 – 4.21 .690     
Country 
(England)  0.61 0.08 – 4.70 .632     
School type 
(public)  1.81 0.24 – 13.90 .567     
Random Parts
τ00, child id  0.000  
τ00, pair  27.571  27.821
τ00, school  0.000  
Nchild id  284  
Npair  142  142
Nschool  18   
ICCchild id  0.000  
ICCpair  0.893  0.894
ICCschool  0.000   
Observations  1082  1082
AIC  731.089  719.733
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Table 2 
Model estimates of the type of sharing within trials (active or passive)
  Full model  Reduced model
  OR CI p  OR CI p
Fixed Parts
(Intercept)  0.01 0.00 – 0.06 <.001  0.02 0.00 – 0.07 <.001
Trial (2)  1.20 0.56 – 2.57 .643     
Trial (3)  1.34 0.63 – 2.85 .447     
Trial (4)  1.22 0.56 – 2.64 .612     
Pair won (2)  6.50 2.12 – 19.94 .001  6.86 2.27 – 20.77 <.001
Pair won (3)  11.04 3.48 – 35.03 <.001  12.71 4.13 – 39.10 <.001
Age group (8-9)  1.89 0.58 – 6.11 .291     
Gender (M)  0.82 0.27 – 2.54 .733     
Country (England)  3.38 1.03 – 11.07 .044  3.78 1.16 – 12.31 .027
School type (public)  1.70 0.53 – 5.44 .369     
Random Parts
τ00, child id  1.919  2.108
τ00, pair  5.460  5.370
τ00, school  0.000   
Nchild id  159  159
Npair  142  142
Nschool  18   
ICCchild id  0.180  0.196
ICCpair  0.512  0.499
ICCschool  0.000   
Observations  540  540
AIC  550.212  539.031
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Table 3
Model estimates for the proportion of the total of marbles children won over the total of 
marbles the pair won
  Full model  Reduced model
  OR CI p  OR CI p
Fixed Parts
(Intercept)  0.38 0.32 – 0.45 <.001  0.29 0.24 – 0.35 <.001
Age group (8-9)  1.02 0.89 – 1.18 .749  1.55 1.23 – 1.95 <.001
Country (England)  1.00 0.87 – 1.15 .989     
Gender (M)  1.00 0.87 – 1.15 .996     
School type (public)  1.00 0.87 – 1.15 .968     
Position (End)  1.13 1.09 – 1.17 <.001  1.26 1.19 – 1.34 <.001
Age group (8-9) * 
Position (End)      0.84 0.78 – 0.90 <.001
Random Parts
τ00, pair  0.000  0.000
Npair  142  142
ICCpair  0.000  0.000
Observations  284  284
AIC  959.845  935.018
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Chapter VII
Dispositional and family variables do not influence children’s
sharing after collaboration
This chapter is an empirical study investigating the effects of moderating variables on 
children’s sharing after collaboration. This chapter will be submitted for publication. 
The authorship will be as follows: 
Natalia B. Dutra1, 
Roles: conceptualization, data curation, formal analysis, funding acquisition, investigation, 
methodology, project administration, validation, visualization, writing – original draft, writing
– review and editing
Lynda Boothroyd1,
Roles: supervision, writing – review and editing
 and Emma Flynn2.
Roles: conceptualization, funding acquisition, supervision, writing – review and editing
1Departmenty of Psychology, Durham University
2School of Education, Durham University
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Introduction
Sharing refers to any decisions regarding the division of resources between two or 
more individuals. Humans are considered to be highly cooperative, when compared to other 
species (Melis & Semmann, 2010), and have evolved a number of strategies to enforce 
collaboration and sharing, whose underlying psychological mechanisms develop early in life 
(Warneken, 2018). However, sharing decisions commonly involve the negotiation of different 
interests among partners, and the knowledge of rules of fairness and proportional distribution 
(Ng et al., 2011). The early development of such skills have only been unravelled in detail 
recently (McAuliffe, Blake, et al., 2017; Warneken, 2018), and questions regarding the effect 
of context and individual differences on sharing decisions in interactive situations remain 
relatively unexplored.
Interactions with peers are relevant to the development of children's cooperative skills,
other-regarding preferences, and moral values related to justice, fairness, and equality 
(Eckerman & Peterman, 2004; Piaget, 1932). These interactions occur within structured 
contexts established by their caregivers, and these contexts and interactions are embedded in 
sociocultural groups (Rogoff, 1990). Moreover, culture interacts with social factors, such as 
family structure, socialization processes, and social relationships, as well as with individual 
characteristics, such as social skills and temperament traits (Eisenberg et al., 2006). Therefore,
cooperative behaviours, sharing included, are a complex product of interactions between 
individual predispositions and life history, social influences, and their cultural background. 
In a previous study (thesis chapter VI), we investigated the effects of age, sex, social 
class (measured indirectly by type of school), and culture (measured indirectly by country) on 
children’s sharing behaviour after collaboration in a task with unequal outcomes. In this task 
(adapted from Göckeritz et al., 2014), children had to collaborate to retrieve a number of 
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rewards, which could also be lost in the process. Hence, children could win zero to three 
marbles, in each of a total of four trials. We found that older children (8- to 9-year-olds) 
shared more equally between themselves than younger children (4- to 5-year-olds), and that 
there was no effects of the other variables on the amount shared. Additionally, we found that 
English children shared their rewards more actively than Brazilian children. For the present 
study, we assessed the effects of children’s individual, dispositional characteristics 
(temperament and social skills), their mothers’ prosocial preferences, and the children’s socio-
economic status on children's sharing behaviour in the same task. Each of these variables will 
be discussed in the following sections.
Children's dispositional characteristics: temperament and social skills
Children who are more sociable, who approach people, things, and new activities, and 
who have low scores of shyness and social anxiety display more prosocial behaviour, 
especially when it involves social interaction (Diener & Kim, 2004; Eisenberg et al., 1996; 
Hart, Newell, & Olsen, 2003). Therefore, greater sociability predicts more prosocial 
behaviour involving social interactions. Moreover, research on the influence of the three 
dimensions of temperament (surgency, negative affect and effortful control) on prosocial 
behaviour showed that children with low scores of surgency and negative affect, and high 
scores of effortful control are more collaborative (Endedijk et al., 2015; Eisenberg et al., 
2006). However, research on this topic has rarely addressed the influence of such 
dispositional variables on children’s behaviour in social interactions beyond naturalistic 
observations of children with their parents and siblings, and even less in coordinated tasks 
(Eidendjik et al., 2015). We tested whether theses variables would predict greater prosociality 
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in children in a collaborative task with potential conflicts of interests, and with variable 
outcomes.
Mothers’ prosocial preferences and socio-economic status (SES)
The family income is a predictor of social development; for instance, families with 
higher incomes and better education tend to have children with better social development 
(Bauer et al., 2014; NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, 2003). Children from lower 
SES groups are expected to retain resources due to the scarce environment in which they live; 
conversely, they can be more cooperative because are expected to participate in domestic 
shores (Whiting & Whiting, 1975). However, research on this subject provided inconsistent 
evidence (Eisenberg et al., 2006), and much of the evidence supporting the arguments 
regarding the evolution of cooperation still “comes from individuals living in pacific and 
often affluent environments” (Li, Li, Decety, & Lee, 2013, p. 1686). 
Differences in SES are also linked to different socialization practices and it is an 
indirect measure of the influence of parents’ behaviour (Carlo et al., 2007; Evans, 2004). 
Parents influence their children's behaviour in complex ways, through socialization practices 
and by sharing similar genetic predispositions (Bugental & Grusec, 2007; Eisenberg et al., 
2006). It can also either reinforce or reduce culture's influence (Bugental & Grusec, 2007). 
Because of this, parents' prosocial values can correlate with their children's values (Hoffman, 
1975), but some studies, however, do not find any relationships or even found negative 
correlations (Bryant & Crockenberg, 1980). Therefore, evidence regarding the influence of 
the social values of parents on their children's behaviour is mixed (Bryan & London, 1970). 
Considering the variables discussed above, our hypotheses and predictions are 
summarised in the following. We measured: a) the children’s temperament, and social skills; 
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b) family socio-economic status (SES), and c) the prosocial preferences of the children’s 
mothers in hypothetical cooperative dilemmas. The children’s age, gender, and the culture 
were added as control variables. The main goal of this study was to investigate whether and 
how these factors affect children’s sharing behaviour in a collaborative task with unequal 
outcomes. By comparing different social and cultural groups across two different age groups 
we were able to assess the relations, if any, between children’s personality traits and their 
sociocultural environment.
Regarding each variable, our hypotheses and predictions were:
 Temperament: spontaneous sharing is influenced by high effortful control and low 
surgency and negative affect, but effortful control seems to be determinant (Endedijk 
et al., 2015). Thus, children with higher scores in effortful control will share more 
equally or will give more, while the other dimensions may not be particularly relevant 
in determining children’s decisions.
 Social skills: Children with good social skills are considered more prosocial than 
children with poor social skills. Therefore, children with higher scores in social skills 
will share more equally in the task.
 Mothers' social preferences: mothers' prosocial values may influence their children's 
behaviour towards being more prosocial, and this influence might be stronger as 
children get older. Thus, mothers with higher scores in social preferences will have 
children who will share more equally or a greater share of their rewards, and this 
effect may be only present for older children.
 Socio-economic status (mutually exclusive hypotheses): on one hand, family income 
and better education are predictors of prosocial behaviour. Children from lower classes
need more resources, so sharing is harder. Children from higher classes will share 
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more equally. Their mothers will have higher scores of social preferences. On the 
other hand, children from lower classes are recruited in domestic shores and there is 
evidence that they are more prosocial. Children from lower classes will share more 
equally. Their mothers will have higher scores of social preferences.
Method
Participants
Participants were 88 4- and 5-year-olds (M = 4.98, SD = .51; 59 from Brazil; 29 from 
England) and 89 8- to 9-year-olds (M = 8.71, SD = .68; 54 from Brazil, 35 from England), and
their respective mothers, from two countries (see Table 1 for sample details). Children came 
from different social backgrounds (lower, middle, and upper middle classes). English children
were mostly white, and Brazilian children had mixed ethnicity. The data was collected 
through questionnaires, which were sent to parents via the children’s school, across the period
of the experimental sharing data collection. The parents were asked to sign an informed 
consent form. All English children and the Brazilian younger children were asked informally 
about whether they would like to play a game, while the Brazilian older children were asked 
to sign a document where the research was explained to them in accessible language (in 
accordance with the ethics regulations from this country). The participants were selected from
the same sample recruited in chapter VI of this thesis (another 107 participants were excluded 
because their mothers did not return the questionnaires). 
This study was approved by the ethics committees from the University of Durham, 
England (project title: “Investigating the effects of unequal outcomes on collaboration and 
sharing with peers in different cultures, social classes and generations”; reference number: 
13/57), and the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil (project title: “Uma 
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investigação sobre a aprendizagem social da cooperação em crianças: diferenças individuais, 
sociais e culturais”; CAAE: 46203715.5.0000.5537).
Table 1 
Sample distribution across age group, sex, and country
Brazil England Total
4- to 5-year-olds
Girls 30 13 43
Boys 29 16 45
8- to 9-year-olds
Girls 33 16 49
Boys 21 19 40
Total 113 64 177
Procedure
Experimental procedure with the children 
The experimental procedure was described in detail in chapter VI. The children were
paired with same gender partners, with the exception of six pairs, who were mixed due to
children’s availability.  The pairs  were randomly selected,  but  the teachers were consulted
about whether these children would work well together and whether they were best friends.
This was required to avoid increasing the chances of children making decisions based on their
friendship and not on their collaboration in the task (Paulus & Moore, 2014). The sessions
happened in a separate room or hall within the nurseries/schools premises.
Task.  The  task  was  a  “marble  run”  (adapted  from  Göckeritz  et  al.,  2014),  and
consisted of interconnected PVC tubes, in which marbles could travel from an entrance hole
to an exit hole. There were two significant task locations: a hole in the middle and a hole in
the end of the tube, in which a child could insert the fingers. After the experimenter released
the marbles,  children should insert  their  fingers  in the holes to prevent the marbles from
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falling into inaccessible containers.  Thus,  children should perform complementary roles and
could win a number of marbles out of a total of three in each trial.
Experimental procedure. The experimenter introduced the task to the children, by
showing the relevant parts of the tube and explaining the goal of the task. The children were
told that the goal was to release up to three marbles each trial, and that these marbles would
be exchanged at the end by stickers. The experimenter was in charge of releasing the marbles
for each trial,  to prevent children from releasing more than three marbles each time. The
experimenter tried to intervene in the task as less as possible, giving only the instructions
about  the  manipulation  of  the  task,  and  asking  the  children  to  resolve  any  conflicts  by
themselves. 
Practice  trials.  The  pairs  had  three  to  five  practice  trials,  with  the  minimum
requirement of retrieving three marbles in a row, or in total, successfully across the trials. In
these practice trials they had the opportunity to learn their roles in the task and to attempt to
retrieved all the marbles,  but were not encouraged to collaborate or to share the rewards,
which were left inside the can at the exit of the tube. They were told that the practice trials did
not count to get the stickers at the end. All the tested pairs were able to perform at least three
correct attempts and moved on to the test trials.
Test trials. The pairs were tested in four trials, in which they were instructed to attempt
to retrieve the marbles, which could be exchanged by stickers at the end of the session. After
each test  trial,  they were instructed to  put their  rewards in  separate  vertical  tubes,  called
marble towers. In all  trials,  they could retrieve up to three marbles for each trial,  if  they
worked together in the task.
If children committed any mistakes leading to the loss of marbles within containers,
the experimenter  just  prompted children to  keep playing the game and to ignore the lost
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marbles. If the children waited for the release of more marbles before putting the ones they
have won inside the marble towers, the experimenter reminded children that they should play
with only three marbles at a time and that the tin can should be emptied after each trial.
Children could exchange four marbles for one sticker at the end of the experimental session. 
Questionnaires
After receiving the mothers’ written consent, a letter was sent with questionnaires 
attached, explaining the study and presenting the questionnaires and instructions for 
completing them. Mothers were asked to complete a questionnaire about their prosocial 
preferences (adapted from Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand, 2014, see Supplementary 
Information and below) and the following questionnaires about their children's temperament 
and social behaviour: a) the Social Skills Improvement System – Rating Scales (SRSS-RS, 
Gresham, Elliott, Cook, Vance, & Kettler, 2010); and b) the Children's Behaviour 
Questionnaire (CBQ; Putnam & Rothbart, 2006), for children aged three to five years, or the 
Temperament in Middle Childhood Questionnaire (TMCQ; Simonds & Rothbart, 2004), for 
children aged seven to ten years. Mothers were also asked to answer a socio-economic status 
questionnaire, as described below. We measured the mothers’ answers and compared them to 
their children's behaviour in the collaborative task. Translated versions of all measures were 
applied to Brazilian mothers.
Prosocial preferences in hypothetical social dilemmas. Mothers had to answer 
questions concerning three hypothetical social dilemmas: the dictator game, the ultimatum 
game, and the trust game. Each game required the participants to imagine an interaction with 
strangers, in which they would assume each of two roles, person A and person B. As person 
A, they had to decide how much money they would share with strangers; as person B, they 
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had to decide how much money they would accept from or return to strangers (see Table 2 for 
each person’s role and the games’ description; see the questionnaire in the Supplementary 
Information). Each game also had a check question, to assess whether the mothers understood
the rules of the game.
Table 2
Description of each game (social dilemma) and the roles played by the participants
Social 
dilemma
Description Person A 
(actor)
Person B 
(recipient)
Dictator 
game
1) Person A will choose how much of the 
£100 to transfer to person B.
2) Person B will get the money A transfers and
A will get to keep the rest.
How much 
will you 
transfer to 
person B?
 -
Ultimatum 
game
1) Person A will make an offer on how to split
the £100 with person B.
2) Person B will either accept or reject this 
offer. If person B accepts, then B will get the 
offered amount and A will keep the rest. If B 
rejects the offer then both individuals will get 
£0.
What amount 
will you offer 
to person B?
Please 
indicate your 
minimum 
acceptable 
offer (from 
person A). 
Trust game 1) Person A can choose to transfer their £50 or
not. If person A transfers £50 then it is 
TRIPLED and given to person B (so person B 
now has £200).
2) Person B can then choose how much of the 
Do you want 
to transfer 
your £50 to 
B?
How much 
money do you
want to 
transfer back 
to A?
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money they want to transfer back to person A 
(between £0 and £150).
Social skills and problem behaviours. The Social Skills Improvement System – 
Rating Scales (SSIS-RS, Gresham et al., 2010), version for parents, was used to measure the 
domains of social skills and problem behaviours. The scale measures the social skills 
dimension across seven subdomains and 46 items: communication, cooperation, assertion, 
responsibility, empathy, engagement, and self control; and the problem behaviour dimension 
across five dimensions and 33 items: externalizing, bullying, hyperactivity/inattention, 
internalizing, and autism spectrum. Each item is rated on a 4-point frequency scale (0 = 
Never, 1 = Seldom, 2 = Often, and 3 = Almost Always), based on the parents’ perception of 
the frequency of behaviour in their children.
Temperament dimensions. Two questionnaires were used to measure the three 
temperament dimensions: the very short version of the Children's Behaviour Questionnaire 
(CBQ; Putnam & Rothbart, 2006), for children aged three to five years, and the Temperament 
in Middle Childhood Questionnaire (TMCQ; Simonds & Rothbart, 2004), for children aged 
seven to ten years. The very short version of CBQ has 36 items, across three factors: 
surgency, effortful control, and negative affect. Each item is rated in a 7-point scale (1 = 
extremely untrue of your child, 7 = extremely true of your child). The TMCQ has 157 items 
across the same three factors, and each item is rated in a 5-point scale (1 = Not, 5 = A lot).
Measures of social economic status (SES). We compared measures of SES in both
countries, England and Brazil, by using social indicators provided by the Acorn score (CACI,
2014)  and  the  Brazilian  Association  of  Research  Companies  (Associação  Brasileira  de
Empresas de Pesquisa [ABEP], 2014). Both systems provide reliable information regarding
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families’ social status within each country. Based on this information, we drew comparisons
between people from similar levels of social class between countries. Therefore, although the
English middle class is not necessarily similar to the Brazilian middle class in absolute terms,
they can, nonetheless, be compared in terms of their relative social status within each country.
The final categories were decided based on the comparison between the information obtained
from the families’ household items, educational level, occupation, and postal code. Hence, we
divided the families in lower class, middle class, and upper middle class within each country
(see Supplementary Information for details).
Coding scheme and data preparation
Children’s performances were video recorded, and data was coded by the first author. 
The following information was coded from the footage, collapsed across the trials: the total of
marbles each child won, the total of marbles each pair won, the number of times the child was
at the end of the tube (as opposed to the middle), the number of times the child shared the 
marbles, and the number of times the child shared the marbles actively (as opposed to 
passively).
Each set of questionnaires for social skills and temperament was coded as instructed 
by their authors. For the analyses of social skills scores, which are divided in social skills and 
problem behaviours , we calculated and adopted the standard scores for each characteristic 
separately. For the analyses of temperament scores, which are divided into three dimensions 
(surgency, effortful control, and negative affect), we calculated the score for each one of them.
However, although the temperament questionnaires were similar, they had different scales of 
measurement for each age group. Thus, the temperament scores were transformed to z scores, 
for each dimension, so both age groups could be compared in the same analysis.
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For the mothers’ prosocial preferences questionnaires, there were five roles in which 
the mothers had to make decisions (one in the dictator game, two in the ultimatum game, and 
two in the trust game). The scores for all decisions were added up, and this sum was used as a 
measure of prosocial preference. 
Analysis
The analyses were performed with R software (version 3.4.0, R Development Core 
Team 2017), and the logistic binomial mixed models were fitted with lme4 package glmer 
function (Bates et al., 2015). Likelihood ratio tests provided by the analysis of variance 
method (stats package anova function, R Development Core Team, 2017) were used to 
compare models. Finally, Tukey HSD multiple comparisons test (multicomp package glht 
function, Hothorn et al., 2008) were used in post hoc analyses.
Children whose mothers did not return the questionnaires were excluded from the 
analysis. When both children within pairs had returned their mothers’ questionnaires, one 
child for each pair was randomly selected for inclusion in the analyses. This was done to 
avoid redundancy in the data, given that the dependent variables represent children’s sharing 
outcomes. Thus, we had a final dataset with 118 observations, with information about only 
one child for each pair. However, complementary analyses of children’s and their mothers’ 
scores as dependent variables included all participants, as in this case children’s scores were 
independent of their partners (n = 177). 
Since we used school type as a proxy for socio-economic status in our previous study, 
we compared school type and social class to test this relationship. A chi-square test revealed 
that there was a significant relationship between social class and school type (χ2 = 24.713, df =
2, p < .001), indicating that children from middle and upper classes (p = 1, Bonferroni 
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correction) attended private schools more often than children from lower classes (upper 
middle class versus lower class: p < 000, middle class versus lower class: p < .001, 
Bonferroni correction). Therefore, school type and social class seem to overlap as measures of
social class for both cities where the study took place.
Results
Binomial logistic regression models were fitted with the forward stepwise method. 
Hence, every variable or interaction was kept or removed based on their effect on the outcome
variable. The number of observations (i.e. sample size) varied across the analyses because of 
missing data across the prepared data (for example, children who had temperament scores, but
not social skills scores and so on).
The first model was fitted with the following independent variables as main effects 
and second order interactions: the number of times the child was in the end of the tube, the 
proportion of sharing within the pair, country, age group, gender, SES, type of school, the 
mothers’ social preferences, and the children’s social skills, problem behaviours, and 
temperament scores. The dependent variable was the proportion of marbles the child won 
over the proportion of marbles the pair won. The final model only included the proportion of 
sharing within the pair (Z = 5.598, p < .001, OR = 4.57, 95% CI [2.72, 7.89]), the number of 
times the child was at the end of the tube (E position; Z = 7.424, p < .001, OR = 1.73, 95% CI
[1.50 – 2.00]), and the interaction between both (Z = -6.327, p < .001, OR = 0.57, 95% CI 
[0.47, 0.67]).
The second model was fitted with the following independent variables as main effects 
and second order interactions: country, age group, gender, SES, type of school, the mothers’ 
social preferences, and the children’s social skills, problem behaviours, and temperament 
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scores. The dependent variable was the proportion of sharing the children performed over the 
number of times they were at the end of the tube. Only age had a significant effect in the final 
model (Z = 2.837, p = .005, OR = 1.94, 95% CI [1.23, 3.09]).
Finally, the third model was fitted with the same independent variables as the previous
model. The only difference was that the dependent variable was the proportion of active 
sharing the children performed over the number of times they had the opportunity to share. 
Only country had a significant effect in the final model (Z = 2.241, p = .025, OR = 2.15, 95% 
CI [1.10, 4.22]). Together, the three models specified above show that there were no effects of
family (i.e. the mothers’ social preferences scores) or dispositional variables on children’s 
sharing behaviour in the task (see Figure 1 and Supplementary Figures 1 and 2).
Figure 1. Scatter plots of the relationship between the proportion of marbles won by the 
children (over the total won by the pair) and the family and dispositional variables. The dots 
cluster around the middle area (representing equal sharing), and show no particular trend 
regarding the distribution of scores for each variable.
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Additionally, we tested the effects of the demographic variables on the mothers’ social 
preferences and the children’s dispositional variables. An ANOVA was fitted to test the effect 
of country and social class on the mothers’ social preferences. Only country had a significant 
effect on the mothers’ social preferences (F = 5.611, p = .019, d  =  -.39 see Figure 1), with 
English mothers having a significantly greater score than Brazilian mothers.
Figure 2. Scores of mothers’ prosocial preferences grouped by country.
Non-parametric tests were performed to assess the effects of age group, gender, 
country, and social class on the children’s dispositional scores (see Figure 3). Age had no 
effects on children’s scores. Country had a significant effect on problem behaviour scores (W 
= 4482.5, p < .001, Median of the differences = 14.000, 95% CI [9.000, 19.000]) and negative 
affect (W = 4849.5, p < .001, Median of the differences = .735, 95% CI [.489, 1.006]), while 
gender had a significant effect on social skills scores (W = 4066, p = .002, Median of the 
differences = 5.000, 95% CI [2.000, 9.000]) and effortful control (W = 4802.5, p < .001, 
Median of the differences = .490, 95% CI [.245, .739]). Social class had a significant effect on
children’s negative affect (χ2 = 20.459, p < .001). Post-hoc tests revealed that children from 
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upper middle class families had significantly less negative affect than children from both the 
middle (p < .001) and lower classes (p < .001).
Figure 3. Box plot of children’s characteristics grouped by age, sex, culture, and social class. 
Scores for temperament dimensions are standardised to allow comparisons across age groups. 
Raw scores were used for social skills and problem behaviours. L: lower class; M: middle 
class; UP: upper middle class. 
Correlation tests were performed to compare the dimensions of temperament, the 
social skills and the problem behaviour scores, and to compare these scores to the mothers’ 
social preferences scores (see Table 3). There was no correlation between the three 
dimensions of temperament (surgency versus effortful control: p = .426; effortful control 
versus negative affect: p = .363; negative affect versus surgency: p = .075), while the social 
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skills and problem behaviour scores were negatively correlated (p < .001). The social skills 
scores had a significant positive correlation with surgency (p = .034) and effortful control (p <
.001), and a negative correlation with negative affect (p = .026). While the problem behaviour
scores had a significant negative correlation with effortful control (p < .001) and a positive 
correlation with negative affect (p < .001), but no correlation with surgency (p = .526). 
Finally, there were no correlations between mothers’ social preferences and their children’s 
social skills (p = .738), problem behaviours (p = .058), and temperament scores (surgency: p 
= .882, effortful control: p = .084, negative affect: p = .593).
Table 3
Correlation coefficients for comparisons between temperament dimensions, social skills, and 
problem behaviours scores
1 2 3 4 5
1. Social Skills - - - - -
2. Problem Behaviours -.299 (159) - - - -
3. Surgency .169 (158) .051 (158) - - -
4. Effortful Control .377 (158) -.291 (158) .062 (170) - -
5. Negative Affect -.177 (158) .449 (158) .137 (170) .070 (170) -
6. Mothers’ preferences .029 (140) -.160 (140) -.012 (151) .141 (151) -.044 (151)
Note. Numbers in bold represent significant correlation (α < .05), and numbers in brackets 
refer to the sample sizes tested, which differ across measures due to non-responses.
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Discussion
This study found no evidence of the influence of children’s characteristics, their 
mothers’ prosocial preferences, or socio-economic status, on children’s sharing behaviour 
after a collaborative task with unequal outcomes. Additionally, we found that culture, gender, 
age group, and social class may affect different aspects of children’s and their mothers’ traits, 
albeit with generally small effect sizes or low correlation coefficients. We discuss the potential
reasons for these findings below.
First of all, with this smaller sample, we find the same effects as in Chapter VI: age 
was the strongest predictor of children’s decisions in this particular game; and children’s 
position in the task (at the middle or the end of the tube) and the number of marbles the pair 
won also predicted children’s sharing decisions. Children’s position was related to age, so that
younger children that were at the end of the tube won more marbles than those who were in 
the middle, while older children won similar amounts regardless of their position. Hence, 
children at any age were better at sharing when they have more resources, but older children 
shared more equally regardless of their opportunity to monopolise the rewards.
Regarding the effect of temperament and social skills, it was predicted that children 
with higher effortful control, lower scores of surgency and negative affect, and better social 
skills would share more equally or generously, since they tend to be more prosocial 
(Eisenberg et al., 2006). However, no effects whatsoever were found, for any dimension of 
temperament or the children’s social skills, on their sharing decisions for this task. A possible 
explanation for the absence of any influence of children’s temperament or social skills on 
their sharing decisions is that the children’s performance in the task has more to do with 
children’s understanding of social norms and skills in the game, than particular individual 
social traits. Another explanation is that the interactive context in this task provided other 
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challenges than the usual prosocial tasks adopted in research that combine observational and 
reported measures. Thus, to assess the effects of individual characteristics in an interactive 
task, it is necessary to account for the behaviour of both children, and individual 
characteristics might have a weaker influence because of that. Other variables might be of 
more influence, such as children’s dominance and popularity with their peers. For instance, 
there is evidence that more prosocial children influence peers positively (Eisenberg et al., 
2006); therefore, the more prosocial children in the task could have influenced the partner in 
sharing more equally, even though this child would not be inclined to do so in the first place.
The evidence in the literature for the relationship between children’s dispositional 
characteristics and prosocial behaviour primarily comes from observational studies of 
interactions between children and their mothers. In addition, experimental approaches that 
combine the investigation of individual differences and prosocial actions among peers are rare
(Eisenberg et al, 2016). The present study does not offer support to the predictions that 
children with better social skills and effortful control will share more equally after a 
collaborative task, and it opens interesting avenues for further research. For instance, future 
studies can manipulate the composition of dyads regarding children’s individual 
characteristics and test their interaction in similar collaborative tasks, which can help test 
further whether and how these characteristics can affect children’s actions in interactive tasks.
Regarding the mothers' social preferences, it was predicted that mothers with higher 
scores in social preferences would have children who shared more equally or more 
generously. Moreover, given that older children have had more opportunities to interact with 
and learn from their parents, it was predicted that there would be a stronger relation between 
children’s sharing behaviour and their mothers’ social preferences; thus children who shared 
more equally or more generously would have mothers’ with greater scores in social 
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preferences. These predictions were not confirmed; no relationship was found between 
children actions and their mothers’ answers, nor interaction of those and the children’s 
individual characteristics. Establishing a relationship between the parents’ social values and 
the children’s behaviour is particularly difficult. A limitation of our study was that the mothers
were asked to answer hypothetical questions, instead of performing in an experiment, due to 
time constraints on the project. Future studies might investigate this influence experimentally 
with one or both parents and their children, or in combination with different measurements.
There was two mutually exclusive hypotheses regarding the effect of socio-economic 
status on children’s sharing decisions. On one hand, it was predicted that children from lower 
classes would share less than children from higher classes, and the mothers from lower classes
would have lower scores of social preferences, given previous evidence that children from 
low socio-economic status tend to share less resources (Rochat et al., 2009). On the other 
hand, it was predicted that children from lower classes would share more equally instead, 
given the evidence that they most likely are recruited to help their parents at home (Bauer et 
al., 2014), and the recent evidence that people with less resources cooperate more with each 
together (Pepper & Nettle, 2018). However, no influence of socio-economic status on 
children’s sharing decisions was found. 
Finally, culture, but not social class, had an influence on the mothers’ social 
preferences: English mothers had greater scores than Brazilian mothers. There are at least 
three possible explanations. First, culture might affect specific prosocial decisions at a later 
age, and this would explain the absence of cultural differences for children in this task, but not
their mothers’ answers to social dilemmas. This is partially supported by the modest effect of 
culture on the type of sharing between children, with English children sharing more actively 
than Brazilian ones. Thus, English people might enforce sharing by actively giving to others, 
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while Brazilian people might enforce sharing by asking for or taking their share. Second, this 
difference between mothers from both cultures might be specific to hypothetical decisions, 
rather than actual ones. Hence, the mothers could have shown no differences in a similar task 
as the marble run. 
A caveat of this study is that, despite our efforts to diversify the sample according to 
their socio-economic status, the English sample was clustered around the upper-middle class 
bracket. Perhaps the differences between children’s active sharing decisions, and the mothers’ 
social preferences scores (albeit without a direct relationship between the former and the 
latter) might only reflect differences between the English upper class and other social classes. 
Nevertheless, the influence of culture on children’s active sharing, and the mothers’ prosocial 
scores had relatively small effect sizes, which might indicate that there are no influence of 
these cultures or social classes whatsoever.
The results discussed in the following provide a few interesting insights, although they
were not the main focus of the study. First, we found a number of relations between the 
mother-reported measures, that were in agreement with previous literature (Eisenberg et al., 
1996, 2001, 2006). Children’s social skills scores were negatively correlated with problem 
behaviours scores. Social skills were positively correlated with surgency and effortful control,
and negatively correlated with negative affect, while problem behaviours were negatively 
correlated with effortful control, and positively correlated with negative affect. Therefore, the 
mothers’ reports were consistent across and within measures, which gives validity to the data.
We found an influence of gender on children’s social skills and effortful control: girls 
had greater scores than boys in both characteristics. However, there was no effect of gender, 
neither there was any interaction between gender and temperament whatsoever on children’s 
sharing decisions in the task. A possible explanation is that parents tend to attribute different 
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characteristics to boy and girls, which might not reflect their children’s actual behaviour, 
given that girls and boys behaved roughly similarly in the task, even in the presence of the 
experimenter. This is at odds with previous research that have shown that girls have greater 
sensitivity to social evaluation, and that they tend to behave similarly to boys in anonymous, 
but not public, settings. Future studies could further explore the relationship between parents’ 
ratings, gender socialization and children’s prosocial behaviour in interactive contexts.
Both social class and culture had an influence on children’s negative affect scores, 
with children from upper middle classes and English children having lower scores for this 
dimension. In addition, English children also had lower scores for problem behaviours. The 
fact that the English sample had more participants from the upper-middle class, as explained 
above, might explain this difference between Brazilian and English children concerning their 
negative affect scores. Nevertheless, there was no effect of both temperament and culture on 
children’s sharing decisions.
Taken together, our findings point towards possible separate influences of culture, 
social class, and gender on children’s characteristics and their mothers’ prosocial behaviour 
that, for a number of reasons, were not correlated with children’s sharing behaviour for one 
particular task. However, our reported measures should be taken with caution, for two 
reasons. First, there is a chance that reported measures, such as parents’ ratings, are not 
completely accurate regarding the children’s actual behaviour in prosocial contexts, and that 
any relationship between the variables are an artefact of the questionnaires. Second, the 
relatively small sample size of the study, due to the number of questionnaires not returned. 
Nevertheless, our findings raise potential avenues for research regarding the influence of 
moderating variables on children’s sharing decisions in interactive contexts. 
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This study aimed to fill a gap in the experimental studies of collaboration between 
children, regarding the influence of dispositional and sociocultural variables, which are often 
not investigated together. The interaction between children must bring different prosocial 
outcomes than when these children have to make social decisions alone. Hence, any study that
focus on the investigation of children’s individual behaviour must be careful when 
extrapolating to interactive decisions. More data is necessary to assess the interplay between 
individual, social and cultural variables on the development of collaborative behaviour and 
sharing.
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Supplementary Information
Additional demographic information
Cultural and demographic factors are often confounded in studies of human behaviour 
(Pollet, Tybur, Frankenhuis, & Rickard, 2014), and particularly in studies of human 
cooperation (Lamba & Mace, 2011, 2013). In an attempt to disentangle those effects on the 
children’s sharing decisions after collaboration, we measured socio-economic status across a 
number of factors, and compared two economically similar cultures, but with different 
historical backgrounds. 
Children, and their respective mothers, from two different Western cultures were 
compared across three categories of socio-economic status. The characteristics of both 
countries were described in chapter VI.
Measures of socio-economic status
Socio-economic status (SES) or social class is a relevant variable on psychological 
literature and it affects human development (Amir, Jordan, & Rand, 2017; Pepper & Nettle, 
2017). SES can be defined as “a complex construct that aims to define a person’s ranking in a 
social and economic hierarchy. It is generally measured by such factors as education, 
occupation, income, or wealth.” (Pepper & Nettle, 2017, p. 2). 
We attempted to measure it by a number of factors, to be able to establish with more 
accuracy the social class of the participants. This was done mainly to allow a comparison 
between both countries and reduce the influence of confounding variables. We chose to 
collect data in different ways in an attempt to establish a more accurate categorisation of the 
participants’ social class. It is rather difficult to establish a level of comparison between 
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different societies. In experimental studies of cooperation, the socio-economic status of 
participants is either omitted or vaguely stated. Additionally, studies who have been recently 
compared samples from different societies or cultures rely on demographic variables of the 
population, but rarely report on the social class of the sample within their populations. This 
sort of information can be assessed by asking the participants directly through questionnaires 
or interviews; assessing their location; or through some proxy information such as the type of 
society or social group they come from, or whether and where their children attend school.
We collected the same demographic data for both samples, to allow comparison 
between groups. The social class of the participants were determined by: the type of school 
the children attended; a British index (ACORN), created by CACI Limited (CACI, 2014), and
a Brazilian index created by the Brazilian Association of Research Companies (Associação 
Brasileira de Empresas de Pesquisa, 2014). Both scores provided indicators based on official 
government records to assess background family incomes relative to each population. Then, 
we grouped the participants in three groups: higher, middle, and low socio-economic status, 
based on the usual interpretation of these indexes for each country. In the following sections 
we detail the measures we have used to determine and compare SES of Brazilian and English 
children.
Type of school. To achieve more variety in our sample, we sought to collect data from
children in different types of schools. Public schools bring in children from a variety of social 
classes, while private schools bring in mostly children from upper classes. Hence, we 
collected data from children in “public” schools (mainly funded by taxes, the state, or 
charities), and “private” schools (mainly funded by the parents or at least charge term fees to 
accept pupils), for both countries.
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ACORN score (CACI). ACORN is “a segmentation tool which categorises the UK’s 
population into demographic types” (CACI, 2014, p. 2). There are 6 categories, 18 groups, 
and 62 types. It is measured by asking the family’s postal code. We divided the categories in 
three types: upper middle class (categories A to E), middle class (F to J), and lower class (K to
R), as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
English children’s distribution by ACORN score
Social class (ACORN score) N
Upper middle-class (A-E) 36
Middle-class (G-J) 9
Lower-class (L-Q) 11
No answer 8
Total 64
CCEB score (ABEP). The CCEB is a Brazilian standard questionnaire (Associação 
Brasileira de Empresas de Pesquisa, 2014) with items that can be summed up and will give a 
score that represents the family’s socio-economic status in Brazil, according to a formula. 
families are grouped in seven categories, from the wealthiest to the poorest: A1, A2, B1, B2, 
C1, C2, and D-E, according: a) the number of items; b) the number of domestic workers; c) 
whether there is piped water, well or other source of water; d) whether the street is paved or 
not; and e) the highest educational level in the family. We divided these categories in upper 
class (A1, A2), middle-class (B1, B2), and lower class (C1, C2, D-E), as shown in Table 2. 
This questionnaire was translated to English and applied to the English mothers as well to 
provide an additional level of comparison between the two samples (see Table 3 for 
comparisons regarding educational level, and Table 4 for comparison between CCEB scores).
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Table 2
Brazilian children’s distribution by social class according to CCEB scores
Social class (CCEB score) N
Upper middle-class (A1, A2) 18
Middle-class (B1, B2) 35
Lower-class (C, D-E) 47
No answer 13
Total 113
Table 3
Comparison between English and Brazilian children’s by highest educational level within the 
families
Highest level of education Brazil England
Higher Education (University/HEI) 42 49
Secondary Education / Incomplete Higher Education 26 12
Primary Education/Incomplete Secondary Education (until Year 11) 11 1
Primary Education/Incomplete Secondary Education (until Year 9) 8 0
Incomplete Primary Education 17 0
No answer 9 2
Total 113 64
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Table 4
Comparison between English and Brazilian samples regarding social class according to 
CCEB scores
CCEB class Brazil England
A1 20 39
A2 16 15
B1 15 5
B2 19 4
C1 20 -
C2 7 -
D-E 10 -
No answer 6 1
Total 113 64
We also collected information regarding the parents’ occupation, but this information 
was not assessed, due to wide variation in the responses, and a large number of non-
responses.
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Supplementary Figures
Figure 1. Scatter plots of the relationship between the proportion of children’s sharing over 
the number of times they were at the end of the tube. and the family and dispositional 
variables.
Figure 2. Scatter plots of the relationship between the proportion of children’s active sharing 
over the number of times they had the opportunity to share, and the family and dispositional 
variables.
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Economic games
The children’s mothers were asked to answer to three social dilemmas. These 
dilemmas were all hypothetical, and were similar to the dictator game, the ultimatum game 
and the trust game, respectively. The mothers’ should answer by writing down their decisions. 
A template of the form delivered to the mothers is shown below.
Social Preferences Questionnaire
Your name 
_______________________________________________________________________
Sex:  (  ) Female (  ) Male
Relationship to Child:  (  ) Mother (  ) Father (  ) Guardian
(  ) Other ___________________________________________________
General Instructions
PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY.
Thank you for participating in our study.
We are interested in how the decisions people make affect how much they win. You will be
asked to imagine a series of interactions, each one matched with a different person. Answer as
if you were in a real interaction involving these decisions.
The rules for each interaction will be different, so please read the instructions carefully.
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Some interactions will have different "roles" for different participants. We will ask you what
you would like to do in each possible role. We're interested in your choices, and we're not
interested in "tricking" you in any way. 
If you have any questions, please contact me at the number [phone number] (Natalia) or send
me an email: nbdutra@  gmail.com.
The example below show how you should answer to the questions: 
Example of question 1 – Tick box
Which colour did person A prefer? Please choose the correct answer below:
■ Blue
□ Yellow
Example of question 2 – Write down the answer
If you are person A, which colour will you prefer? [Please write down your answer: blue or 
yellow]
Answer:  Blue
Situation 1
In this interaction you are matched with one other person. One of you will be person A, one of
you will be person B. Person A starts with £100 and person B starts with £0.
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This interaction has one single decision:
1) Person A will choose how much of the £100 to transfer to person B.
2) Person B will get the money A transfers and A will get to keep the rest.
The graphic below shows a summary of the interaction:
A  B  
A transfers to B
Question 1
What happens if person A transfers £20? Please choose the correct answer below:
□ A keeps £80 and B gets £20
□ Both get £20
Question 2
If you are person A in the interaction, how much will you transfer to person B? [Please write 
down your answer from £0 to £50]
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Answer: ____________________
Situation 2
In this interaction you are matched with one other brand new person. One of you will be 
person A, one of you will be person B. Person A starts with £100 and person B starts with £0. 
First person A makes a choice, then person B responds.
1) Person A will make an offer on how to split the £100 with person B.
2) Person B will either accept or reject this offer. If person B accepts, then B will get the 
offered amount and A will keep the rest. If B rejects the offer then both individuals will get 
£0.
The graphic below shows a summary of the interaction:
A  B  
A makes offer to B
Question 1
What happens if person B accepts an offer of £20? What happens if person B rejects this 
offer? Please choose the correct answer below:
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If rejected, both
get £0
B accepts offer
□ If B accepts this offer then A gets £80 and B gets £20, if B rejects then A gets £80 and B 
gets £0
□ If B accepts this offer than A gets £0 and B gets £0, if B rejects then A gets £0 and B gets £0
□ If B accepts this offer then A gets £80 and B gets £20, if B rejects then both get £0
Question 2
If you are person A, what amount will you offer to person B? [Please write down your answer 
from £0 to £50]
Answer: ____________________
Question 3
If you are person B, please indicate your minimum acceptable offer. That is, if the offer that A 
gives you is below this, you would reject and if the offer A gives you is above or equal to 
this, you would accept. [Please write down your answer from £0 to £50]
Answer: ____________________
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Situation 3
In this interaction you are matched with one other brand new person. One of you will be 
person A, one of you will be person B. Both of you start with £50. First person A makes a 
choice, then person B responds.
1) Person A can choose to transfer their £50 or not. If person A transfers £50 then it is 
TRIPLED and given to person B (so person B now has £200).
2) Person B can then choose how much of the money they want to transfer back to person A 
(between £0 and £150).
The graphic below shows a summary of the interaction:
A makes a choice
A  B  
If A transfers the money, the amount is tripled
A  B  
B makes a choice
A   B  
     Person B can transfer money back
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Question 1
What happens if Person A transfers £50 and Person B transfers back £25? Please choose the 
correct answer below:
□ Person A earns £25, person B earns £175
□ Person A earns £50, person B earns £50
□ Person A earns £100, person B earns £100
Question 2
If you are person A, do you want to transfer your £50 to B? Please choose the correct answer 
below:
□ No Transfer
□ Transfer £50
If you are person B and person A transfers you £50 (which is multiplied to £150), how much 
money do you want to transfer back to A? [Please write down your answer from £0 to £150]
Answer: ____________________
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Chapter VIII
General Discussion
The main goals of the work in this thesis were to investigate whether, and if so how, children
learn from others to collaborate and make sharing decisions in interactive settings, and how 
contextual variables affect their behaviour. A secondary goal was to attempt to integrate theoretical 
approaches to the development of human cooperation and culture into the explanation of children’s 
collaborative decisions. To achieve those goals, three different experimental approaches were 
adopted to investigate children across different age groups in early and middle childhood. 
In the previous chapters (chapter II to VII), this thesis addressed a number of questions: how
do children copy collaborative decisions? What roles do individual, social, and cultural factors play 
on children’s development of collaborative skills? What methods are best suited to investigate the 
influence of these multiple factors on children’s collaborative decisions? And, how does the 
evidence on children’s sensitivity to context in collaborative settings add to an evolutionary 
approach to the development of human cooperation? The following sections address each question 
separately, while discussing how the studies that comprise this thesis contributed to the 
understanding of the effects of contextual variables and individual differences on children’s social 
learning of cooperation.
How do children copy collaborative decisions from peers?
Chapter II reviewed the evidence on children’s social learning and cultural transmission of 
collaborative actions. Children participate in turn taking activities with their caretakers from their 
early months of life (Trevarthen, 2011). Toddlers spontaneously help and collaborate with adults in 
experimental tasks (Warneken et al., 2006; Warneken & Tomasello, 2007), and their early 
engagement in reciprocal interactions seem to influence their willingness to help adults in these 
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situations (Cortes Barragan & Dweck, 2014). Naturalistic observations of children and their 
families provided evidence that children are engaged in domestic chores from early in life 
(Pettygrove, Hammond, Karahuta, Waugh, & Brownell, 2013; Whiting & Whiting, 1975); and 
specifically in more collectivistic cultures, children learn by observing adults and pitching in with 
activities (Rogoff, 1990, 2003). Among peers, children express social roles, coordination and 
communication between themselves in social play (Corsaro, 2009; Corsaro & Eder, 1990). 
However, children struggle to coordinate with peers in complex tasks up until the age of five years 
(Ashley & Tomasello, 1998; Meyer et al., 2016), and it is not entirely clear how they learn from 
observing and copying joint actions from each other (Fawcett & Gredebäck, 2013; Fawcett & 
Liszkowski, 2012).
Chapter III described a study that investigated whether different types of roles and tasks 
would influence young children’s reproduction of collaborative actions across three “generations” 
of peers. This study addressed a simple question: what children would do in a standard imitation 
test involving the observation of two other children interacting in a collaborative task? This 
question addressed two aspects of imitation research: the first one was that most imitation tasks 
require individual work, with the interaction limited to the observer and the model (who usually are 
the experimenters themselves; see for example (Haun & Tomasello, 2011; van Leeuwen et al., 
2018; Want & Harris, 2002; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009); the second 
one was that previous attempts at testing imitation of collaboration relied on interactional settings 
rather than observational settings (Ashley & Tomasello, 1998; Dean et al., 2012; Göckeritz et al., 
2014; Slavin et al., 1985; Tudge & Rogoff, 1989). That is, there was no experimental testing of the 
effects of observing other peers interacting with each other on children’s subsequent social 
interaction (although, for children's observation of collaborative adult models, see: Matheson et al., 
2013; Milward & Sebanz, 2018).
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In the study described in chapter III, three- and four-year-old English children were tested in
four collaborative tasks, based only on third-party observation, that it, without interaction with the 
models. I investigated whether the observers would show different levels of fidelity in copying 
instrumental or social tasks, to test to which aspects of the task children would spontaneously 
attend. It was hypothesised that children would copy more faithfully the instrumental aspects, given 
that social games could provide more room for deviation from what had been observed for children 
interacting with their partners (Ross, 1982). However, part of the literature on social games point to 
children being highly conventional in their following of games rules (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). 
Therefore, it was also predicted that children could copy more or less faithfully in social games, 
depending on how they perceived the tasks’ demands. Regarding the fidelity of copying of tasks 
with similar versus complementary roles, it was hypothesised that it was more challenging to 
reproduce complementary, rather than similar, actions. It was assumed that the complementary 
actions required more sophisticated perspective taking skills, given that children had to interpret 
two different sequences of actions, and their own actions in relation to their partners. Conversely, 
similar actions were assumed to require less effort to interpret them, and therefore to be easier to 
copy.
Cooperation was found to be “infectious” between those children; that is, they copied all the 
actions demonstrated across the four tasks, with high fidelity most of the time. The collaborative 
actions demonstrated by peers were faithfully copied and transmitted to other peers, across tasks 
with different roles (similar versus complementary), and outcomes (problem-solving tasks versus 
social games). Although children copied the actions with similar fidelity across the four tasks, they 
did so with lesser fidelity in tasks with similar roles, which was contrary to my predictions. This 
could have happened because both tasks required simultaneous actions, which might have been 
harder to achieve than in tasks with complementary roles, where the actions occurred in sequence. 
While children were able to understand their roles in the tasks, they had some difficulty with 
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performing them, probably due to their motor skills. An interesting related exploratory finding, 
however, was that children in those tasks exhibited more variation, even when capable of 
reproducing the models’ actions. Moreover, they seemed to be having more fun, by laughing and 
interacting with each other, than in other tasks. It might be worth pursuing hypotheses regarding the
copying of collaborative tasks with different levels of difficulty, and framed as fun or play tasks in 
the future (Nielsen, Cucchiaro, et al., 2012; Ramani & Brownell, 2013).
Children, in presence of models, did not need extensive communication to coordinate their 
actions. Children in control conditions, without demonstrations from peers, had trouble identifying 
the goals of the task, and which roles they could perform. Thus, they had difficulty in coordinating 
in the tasks, which has two implications. The first is that children are better at coordinating in the 
presence of models, and that third-party observation might play a relevant role in promoting 
collaboration (Milward & Sebanz, 2018). The second is that children most likely need a structured 
environment (usually set up by adults) to be able to perform tasks (Rogoff, 2003). Children are very
attentive to cues of normativity (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). In the study, the experimenter 
attempted to reduce the influence of such cues on children’s collaborative behaviour by giving them
general instructions and avoiding coaxing children to collaborate. However, children’s imitative 
behaviour might have been reinforced by the experimenter’s presence and directions. Furthermore, 
the setting and the peers acting as models established the requirements for the children’s 
performance. Therefore, these act as social cues that preschool children are able to pick up and use 
to perform roles that they think are expected from them, even in tasks that require mutual 
coordination, and in which children usually struggle to perform by themselves. Future studies might
investigate further the role of such cues in the development of collaborative interactions.
Chapter IV describes a second study designed to further investigate the effects of contextual 
cues on children’s collaborative decisions, and the relationship between these cues and social 
learning mechanisms. It investigated children’s use of social information when there is potential 
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conflict of interest, and children cannot communicate between themselves or assess cues of 
reputation and reciprocity from their partners. The public goods game, which is a collective social 
dilemma, seemed a suitable paradigm to investigate the effects of social learning and contextual 
cues, allowing the control of different access to the information. It is also a paradigm that has been 
rarely, but successfully, adopted with children (Alencar et al., 2008; Dutra et al., 2018; Harbaugh & 
Krause, 2000; Silva et al., 2016; Vogelsang et al., 2014). Thus, six- and seven-year-old children had 
to play two rounds of a public goods game, in which they were given information regarding the 
decisions of both the highest earner and the majority (modal contribution) in the game between 
rounds. It was assessed whether the information affected children’s subsequent decisions in the 
game, and whether the results indicated pay-off, conformity or no bias towards copying the other 
players’ decisions. In addition to this, children were told their decisions were anonymous, and that 
they would play with different groups of children each time. Therefore, there was no opportunity for
them to communicate with the other players or use their decision as a cue for reputation.
Two types of conformity have been identified: informational and normative (Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955). Informational conformity is related to an individual’s attempt to obtain accurate 
information about their environment. Normative conformity is related to social interactions, peer 
pressure and group identity. In the absence of social control, Claidière & Whiten (2012) predict that 
people will tend to show a form of linear or weak conformity, in which the probability that they will
reproduce the most common trait in the population is equal to the frequency of this trait. Therefore, 
the study described in chapter IV attempted to remove any cues of normative conformity, while 
leaving information that could lead to informational conformity, that is, the decisions of the 
majority. In addition, children had access to a second type of information, which indicated the 
behaviour of those who achieved the greatest pay-off. One might argue that this information should 
be enough to drive children towards copying it and ignore the behaviour of the majority. In support 
to this hypothesis, previous research comparing conformity and pay-off biases among children 
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found that they prefer to copy those with the highest pay-offs, but only when the majority is clearly 
unsuccessful (Burdett et al., 2016).
When children had donated in line with the highest earners in the first round of the game, 
they were similarly inclined to copy either types of social information. This is interesting because 
one would expect that they would keep to their original decision; that is, they would continue to 
donate the same amount that gave them the highest return in the group. However, some of these 
children decided to increase their donation towards similar amounts to those donated by the 
majority. Children who donated in line with the majority, however, were equally likely to copy 
either social information or none of them. Moreover, children who had not shown any particular 
tendency in the first round, were not inclined to be biased towards any information. It seemed that 
some sort of social comparison might have influenced children’s decisions. Only children who were
aligned with one or other social information showed some inclination towards copying either one or
another, as discussed previously. Hence, children used the information as a cue to vary their 
behaviour, but were not particularly inclined to one of them.
This finding is even more interesting when it is considered that, in contrast to the study 
described in chapter III, the children tested in chapter IV were Brazilian. According to Hofstede et 
al.’s (2010) theory of cultural dimensions, Brazil has characteristics that put it in the middle 
between collectivism and individualism, being more collectivistic than England. Thus, Brazilian 
children could have been expected to have a strong propensity to conform to their peers’ behaviours
(Bond & Smith, 1996; van Leuween et al., 2018); however, this was not observed. No differences 
were observed across the groups’ studied as well; if differences had been found it could have 
indicated potential differences across social classes (children came from one private and one public 
school). Finally, this period, between six and seven years of age, is marked by an increased 
egocentrism, which can also explain the non-significant rates of conformity (Morgan, Laland, & 
Harris, 2015). More recently, a reduction in conformity and prosocial behaviour around the same 
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period has been observed across different cultures (van Leuween et al., 2018). However, it does not 
explain why some children chose to increase their donations instead. Thus, more studies are 
necessary to explore further the roles of social cues on children’s conformity, across different types 
of social interactions, and different sociocultural groups.
What roles do individual, social, and cultural factors play on children’s development of
collaborative skills?
Chapters V to VII reviewed and investigated the role of individual, social, and cultural 
variables on children’s sharing decisions after collaborating with each other. The original aim was 
to also test whether there were any differences in children’s collaboration prior to sharing decisions.
However, all children, except for one pair, chose to collaborate in the task up until the end, and 
sharing decisions did not seem to affect their compliance. This supports previous evidence that 
children show great coordination skills and commitment to partners from early on, but decisions 
regarding sharing of resources are a more nuanced skill (Warneken, 2018). Hence, I tested whether 
children would share more equally after collaborating with a partner, but in a task with unequal 
outcomes, alongside the influence of individual, social, and cultural variables on their behaviour 
(chapters VI and VII). 
Two samples from “Western” countries were compared: Brazil and England (geographically 
speaking, both countries are Western; culturally speaking, however, Brazil is seen as part of Latin 
America culture, while England is part of the Anglophone Western culture; see Henrich et al., 
2010). These countries are considered similar in economic terms, but different in social and 
historical terms (Hofstede et al., 2010). Cultural comparisons have been criticised for making 
assumptions and reaching conclusions without considering alternative hypothesis concerning the 
samples’ demography (Lamba & Mace, 2011) or the influence of other variables, such as individual 
differences (Pollet et al., 2014). Hence, though both studies had a limitation of using nationality as a
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cross-cultural measure (Pollet et al., 2014), they attempted to assess the influence of other potential 
confounding variables before making any conclusions regarding cultural similarities or differences.
In Chapter VI, Brazilian and English four- and five-year-old and eight- and nine-year-old 
children were asked to play four trials of a collaborative game, called the “marble run”, in which 
they should insert their fingers in separate entrances to make marbles run through a long tube and 
be released at the end of it. Older children were consistently better at sharing rewards more equally 
after collaborating, and that English children shared the rewards more actively than the Brazilian 
children. Older children have better socio-cognitive skills regarding self control, perspective taking,
communication, and understanding of social norms; therefore it was expected that they would 
perform better at the task. However, the interesting aspect of these findings is that young children 
tended to share much less than older ones, and only a small percentage of than shared equally. 
Moreover, their donations towards more or less marbles did not cluster around the equal share 
(meaning they were sharing only slightly unequal amounts); the children who won more marbles 
tended to keep all or almost all of them to themselves.
The findings described seem at odds with previous literature regarding increased sharing in 
young children after collaboration (Hamann et al., 2014; Hamann et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 
2011). It has been argued that collaboration stimulates young children perspective taking skills, and 
that they show early skills to share amounts equivalent to the input of each partner (Ng et al., 2011).
However, for this to happen, the situation must clearly signal the collaborative nature of the task, 
and it is possible that the experimental setup might induce children to share more equally. It is 
important to stress that, even if this is the case, it is still remarkable that young children are able to 
pick up on cues of collaboration and respond in kind. However, it is misleading to affirm that 
children show propensity to share in collaborative situations without addressing the role of the adult
influence and the task scaffolding in this.
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For all the experiments that comprise this thesis, but specially for this study, warm up 
sessions and language that could induce children to collaborate with each other were avoided. As it 
has been argued in the previous section, children are very sensitive to contextual cues. They learn 
from an early age to identify cues from adults regarding what actions are considered appropriate for 
a particular situation. Thus, it is likely that they are able to detect even subtle cues in an experiment 
regarding what is expected from them. Moreover, children are already instructed in their natural 
environments to follow certain rules of fairness. Thus, any cues that could indicate that children 
were expected to share the rewards equally were reduced. Moreover, the chosen task allowed 
children to have access to a variable number of rewards depending on their performance, and the 
maximum number of rewards they could win per trial was an odd number. This was done to make it
difficult for children to infer from the task and the instructions what they thought it was expected 
from them, and test whether they would spontaneously collaborate and share with each other.
Finally, this study demonstrates that the manner in which social interactions are framed 
matters. Most collaborative tasks with young children involve the performance of similar roles, 
sometimes in simultaneous coordination (e.g., two children pull a rope; Warneken et al., 2001) or in 
parallel (e.g., a child and a puppet “fish” buckets individually; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012). 
The children sit beside each other or beside the experimenter. The outcomes are generally speaking, 
easy to share. And finally, most children come from middle class families, in which the “loss” of 
such resources would not mean a great deal for them. More studies are necessary to disentangle 
what is involved in experiments that look into collaborative problem-solving tasks across 
development. A more nuanced approach, from this thesis’ perspective, involve the consideration of 
how children’s actions change or not across situations. It would be interesting to manipulate 
different degrees of access to rewards, social interactions, and levels of difficulty in collaborative 
tasks to better understand which process determine children’s decisions. In chapter V, a couple of 
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examples of studies that approached this problem were offered, in other fields of psychology. An 
evolutionary developmental approach might benefit of drawing from this literature.
In a complementary study to Chapter VI, the study in Chapter VII looked into the influence 
of other variables on children’s collaborative decisions in the same sample. The children’s mothers 
were asked to answer to a number of questionnaires regarding children’s individual characteristics 
(temperament and social skills), the mothers’ social preferences, and the families’ socio-economic 
status. The findings of chapter VI held for the analyses in chapter VII, in which about half of the 
sample was used, corresponding to the children whose mothers returned the questionnaires. For 
both age groups, there was no effect of individual characteristics on children’s decisions in the 
interactive task. One possible interpretation is that social interaction itself might be a relevant factor
in promoting more egalitarian sharing for older children in face-to-face interactions, while young 
children still need more scaffolding from adults to act on problem-solving that involve negotiation, 
regardless of particular individual traits. Moreover, the mothers’ social preferences, which were 
measured across three different social dilemmas, had also no statistical significant relationship to 
the children’s decisions. An interesting parallel, however, was found for the influence of culture on 
both mothers’ social preferences and children’s active donations. The English mothers had higher 
scores, meaning they had more generous choices across the games, than Brazilian mothers. The way
children negotiate or dispute rewards in a collaborative situation may be a product of cultural 
differences: English people might actively share resources in prosocial tasks, while Brazilian people
might share more only in situations where sharing is enforced by others of similar status. This is in 
line with the differences between both countries across cultural dimensions individualism versus 
collectivism (Hofstede et al., 2010) and recent evidence on less prosociality among Chinese 
children (China is a country with even higher levels of collectivism than Brazil; Chai & He, 2017).
Across the two studies (chapters VI and VII), and the study discussed in chapter IV, socio-
economic status did not affect children’s performance. Socio-economic status was measured in two 
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ways: by using school type as a proxy to social class (with children from upper classes being more 
common in private schools, and children from lower classes being more common in public 
schools); and by using individual reports based on standard measures of socio-economic status from
both countries. Once again, this might indicate that this particular task tapped into a general path of 
development towards better negotiation and perspective taking skills, as well as the ability to 
understand and enforce norms of fairness. The fact that both samples were from “Western” and 
urban samples might also point to more similarity among children that come from these 
environments. Moreover, given that children across all classes were recruited in schools might also 
explain these similarities; children that are not schooled might have behaved differently (López, 
Correa-Chávez, Rogoff, & Gutiérrez, 2010).
Evidence on the influence of dispositional variables, such as temperament and social skills, 
on prosocial behaviour rely greatly on self-reports or report from others, and observational studies. 
However, no relationship was found between the parents’ reports of children’s dispositional 
variables in five dimensions (three of temperament and two of social skills), and the children’s 
actual performance in sharing decisions after collaboration. In addition, no interactions were found 
between those dimensions and the other variables: the mothers’ social preferences, and the 
children’s socio-economic status and country. However, a number of relations were found between 
the reported measures for children’s dispositional characteristics (social skills and temperament), 
that were in agreement with previous literature. Therefore, the mothers seemed to be consistent 
across their reports of the children’s dispositional characteristics. Additionally, there was also 
indication of the separate influence of culture, social class, and gender on children’s characteristics 
and their mothers’ social preferences, as discussed in chapter VI.
The absence of effects of the variables reported above on children’s behaviour in the sharing
task might indicate that, in interactive contexts, such variables might not have the same strength as 
when one is making individual decisions. Even though one child could decide how to share the 
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rewards, the outcome was always the result of children’s interactions and discussions during the 
task. An implication is that perhaps children’s skills in this kind of task develop similarly across 
individual, social, and cultural characteristics (Warneken, 2018). In other words, the developmental 
path of collaborative and sharing skills and norm enforcement follows an ordered sequence that is 
common across children from urban settings and Western societies (although with variations across 
more diverse cultures; House et al., 2013). Nevertheless, more information from well powered 
studies is needed to achieve a more definite conclusion.
To conclude, psychology has been criticised recently for not reporting null findings and 
prioritising “positive” results, that is, results with a significant effect or difference given a threshold 
level of significance (usually α < .05). This has led to a false positive publication bias, given that 
statistics relies on the assumption that a percentage of studies on the same subject will reject true 
hypotheses when those are false, and accept false hypotheses when those are true. On top of the 
contributions already described in the previous chapters and in this discussion, it is important to 
emphasise the relevance of making null results public, which can inform decisions of whether to 
pursue or not a line of thought based on those findings.
Which methods are best suited to investigate the influence of individual, social, and cultural
factors on children’s collaborative decisions?
Three experimental approaches were adopted to investigate the social learning of 
cooperation between children. The first one consisted of a combination of a diffusion chain 
experiment and collaborative tasks. The second one consisted of the application of a collective 
social dilemma to the investigation of the use of social information by children. The third approach 
consisted of a cross-cultural comparison of children’s performance in a collaborative task with 
unequal outcomes, and use of questionnaires to assess individual, family, and social variables.
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A caveat of the studies described in this thesis was that some decisions had to be made 
concerning the time available to perform the experiments. Social learning experiments are more 
complex than individual experiments or experiments that look into behaviours at a particular point 
in time (e.g. pairs of children performing a joint task), due to the logistics of coordinating the pairs 
and timings in the tasks. Because of this, only one of the experiments was performed with multiple 
generations (the cultural transmission chain study, in chapter III), one with a closed group 
transmission paradigm (the public goods game study with two rounds and the same participants, in 
chapter IV), and the other remaining two studies focused on the indirect influence of the social or 
cultural group on children’s decisions (chapters VI and VII). Nevertheless, this limitation allowed 
us to test a variety of methods in the assessment of children’s collaboration and sharing. Each 
approach aimed to investigate a particular aspect of children’s social learning of collaboration and 
sharing with peers, and the influence of contextual variables on children’s decisions. I will discuss 
below in which ways each approach contributes to a better understanding of these phenomena.
Cultural transmission of collaboration between pairs
The majority of studies on children’s social learning focus on children’s individual decisions
and performance. This is understandable because it increases experimental control and facilitates 
the data analysis and interpretation. Moreover, many psychologists are concerned with the 
underlying psychological mechanisms of social learning, which are often assessed by isolating 
specific aspects of the child’s behaviour. Conversely, the studies in this thesis are concerned with 
how children behave in collaborative interactions, and how context influences children’s learning of
collaborative skills.
Evolutionary theories of human cooperation have argued that cooperation and culture are 
intertwined phenomena (Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Burkart et al., 2014; Tomasello & Gonzalez-
Cabrera, 2017). Nevertheless, the literature applied to child development that draw from these 
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theories usually investigate only one of these two phenomena, and draw inferences about the other. 
For instance, there seems to be no studies adopting the cultural transmission paradigm to the 
investigation of collaborative interactions between children, as proposed in this thesis. Therefore, 
this thesis contributes to an evolutionary developmental approach to peer cooperation by combining
two experimental paradigms, the cultural diffusion chains and collaborative tasks, to investigate 
whether cooperation between young children would spread across pairs.
Regarding the method used, it was found that it is possible to combine a cultural 
transmission paradigm with collaborative tasks to investigate the mechanisms of learning and 
transmission of cooperation between peers. These findings support the current evidence on 
children’s early cooperative tendencies, but also show how these tendencies and social learning 
processes might ensure that cooperation spread in groups of children. They also raise interesting 
questions to examine regarding how the task structure might affect children’s reproduction of their 
peers’ actions.
The potential uses for the cultural transmission paradigm, in combination with cooperative 
tasks, are various. There are different ways of observing cultural transmission in the laboratory 
(Mesoudi, 2007; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008), and a variety of questions that could be addressed 
regarding children’s social learning of cooperation. For example, one can examine how cooperation 
in certain tasks might lead to better or worse spread of outcomes in a group of children; or whether 
cooperation will remain the chosen strategy for the children, or children will switch to other 
strategies, and so on. Nevertheless, the greater complexity of these potential designs must lead to 
new challenges and innovative approaches in the analyses and interpretation of this data.
Social learning in a collective cooperative dilemma
A focus on collaboration as a strategy to obtain resources, as proposed here, must take into 
account how children make decisions when their interests are in conflict with others. How children 
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choose to copy information from others in a collaborative context may be strategic. The use of 
social dilemmas combined with methods to study social learning mechanisms and biases between 
children can contribute to a better understanding of children’s social learning of collaborative 
decisions. This has relevant implications for the understanding of how children make decisions in 
interactive settings, how social interaction impacts on children’s individual decisions, and whether, 
and if so how, they learn from peers in such situations.
Economic games, as explained in chapter II and IV, have been widely applied to the 
investigation of children’s decisions. They offer an interesting alternative to investigating 
interactive decisions in a controlled manner (by asking children to make decisions one at a time, for 
example, but in relation to the performance of others in the experiment). However, only a few 
studies have investigated children’s interactions in social dilemmas beyond dyadic interactions; and 
fewer have used social dilemmas to explicitly investigate the effect of social learning on children’s 
decisions. Nevertheless, one can argue that social dilemmas with repeated interactions might 
involve some degree of social learning; but research questions are usually focused on the 
development of reciprocity and reputation concerns, that is, how people react to others’ actions in 
social interactions, rather than, say, mechanisms of imitation or instruction. Therefore, there are 
interesting avenues for research on social learning and economic decisions among children.
Cross-cultural comparisons of sharing decisions after collaboration and the use of moderating
variables
There have been recent criticisms to the use of limited samples in psychology to support 
theories of universal traits (Henrich et al., 2010; Nielsen et al., 2017). Moreover, the manner in 
which psychologists approach other cultures in their theories have been criticised (Kline et al., 
2018). Other demographic variables must also be taken into account; thus socio-economic status 
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was chosen, given that it has been shown to play a role on prosocial development (Pepper & Nettle, 
2017; Rochat et al., 2009), while also controlling for age, sex, and individual differences.
This thesis aimed to compare children from two cities in different countries with similar 
market integration but diverse social indicators and history. The effect of culture was investigated in
two ways. First, the effect of culture was assessed in interaction with a measure of socio-economic 
status (type of schools, in chapter VI), and the immediate context (characteristics of the task), while 
controlling for age group and sex. This assessed whether culture would affect older children more 
than younger ones, and whether girls would behave differently than boys across cultures. Second, 
the effects of individual characteristics and mothers’ social preferences on children’s decisions were
assessed, while controlling for culture and another measure of socio-economic status, reported by 
the mothers (in chapter VII). By using a number of different measures that are predicted to 
influence children’s behaviour, it was found that there were no cultural differences regarding 
children’s performance, or if they do exist, their effects were not salient for this particular task. It is 
important, however, to emphasise that culture does not necessarily equal nationality; in addition 
there might be greater differences within the countries investigated than between the groups from 
the sample used. Thus, this method raises interesting questions regarding the use of culture as an 
independent variable.
How does children’s sensitivity to context in collaborative settings add to an evolutionary
approach to the development of human cooperation?
This thesis attempted to integrate evidence across a variety of fields in developmental 
psychology literature (educational, social, developmental and comparative psychology), and 
propose new experimental approaches to the investigation of current theories on the development of
human cooperation and culture. Drawing from these theories, there have been a number of 
experiments on children’s development of cooperative and cultural learning skills (Tomasello & 
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Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2017; Warneken, 2018; Whiten et al., 2009). Nevertheless, hypotheses 
concerning the relationship between cooperation and cultural learning are only beginning to be 
explored in experimental settings (Dean et al., 2012; Flynn & Whiten, 2010; Göckeritz et al., 2014; 
Hardecker, Schmidt, & Tomasello, 2017). This research contributes to the start of a conversation 
regarding the combination of different approaches to investigate these hypotheses.
It is common for recent theories to claim that humans possess early and indiscriminate 
cooperative skills, that is young children shows generalised helping, comforting, and collaborative 
skills. This is at odds with evidence which claims that children possess early conditional 
cooperation skills, that is, that they are selective in choosing their cooperative partners from early 
on (Wynn, Bloom, Jordan, Marshall, & Sheskin, 2018). However, both approaches need to account 
for the influence of environment and individual characteristics in modulating the development of 
cooperation. Thus, this research has implications to the understanding of the particularities of 
children’s behaviour in collaborative interactions. More specifically, to how children respond to 
social influence and their social and cultural environment when making collaborative decisions. 
Conclusion
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate how contextual variables and individual 
differences affect children’s social learning of collaborative actions. Recently, the role of conflict 
and inequality has been downplayed in experiments, probably because human’s collaborative skills 
are so impressive compared to that of other primates (Tomasello, 2018). However, the evidence on 
children’s collaborative skills might be misleading. While it is true that children are very 
cooperative, this is part of a set of skills that humans develop to achieve more, and better, resources.
Hence, when conflicts of interest arise, younger children have a hard time figuring out collaborative
solutions.
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This research contributes to a better understanding of children’s learning of collaborative 
strategies, across different social and cultural groups. Children are keen to reproduce cooperative 
actions. However, when the interactions involve some potential conflict of interest, and in the 
absence of social control (anonymity), children younger than eight years will prefer options that 
keep or increase their pay-off, even if at their partners’ expense, and that they will use social 
information available to do so. This pattern is consistent across individual characteristics, gender, 
socio-economic status, and the two cultures investigated. Conversely, older children are better at 
achieving fairer distribution of resources, which supports previous evidence on the development of 
distributive justice. To conclude, evolutionary developmental theories on human cooperation will 
benefit from integrating different methods, drawing from the experimental literature on cultural 
transmission, economic games, and cross-cultural psychology. This combination of approaches 
hopefully will bring a more nuanced perspective on the effect of context on the early development 
of collaborative skills between peers.
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General Appendix I
Table 1
CrediT Taxonomy categories.
# Role Definition
1 Conceptualization Ideas; formulation or evolution of overarching research goals and aims.
2 Data curation
Management activities to annotate (produce metadata), scrub data and
maintain research data (including software code, where it is necessary
for interpreting the data itself) for initial use and later re-use.
3 Formal analysis Application of statistical, mathematical, computational, or other formal techniques to analyse or synthesize study data.
4 Funding acquisition Acquisition of the financial support for the project leading to this publication.
5 Investigation Conducting a research and investigation process, specifically performing the experiments, or data/evidence collection.
6 Methodology Development or design of methodology; creation of models.
7 Project administration Management and coordination responsibility for the research activity planning and execution.
8 Resources
Provision of study materials, reagents, materials, patients, laboratory 
samples, animals, instrumentation, computing resources, or other 
analysis tools.
9 Software
Programming, software development; designing computer programs; 
implementation of the computer code and supporting algorithms; 
testing of existing code components.
10 Supervision
Oversight and leadership responsibility for the research activity 
planning and execution, including mentorship external to the core 
team.
11 Validation
Verification, whether as a part of the activity or separate, of the 
overall replication/reproducibility of results/experiments and other 
research outputs.
12 Visualization Preparation, creation and/or presentation of the published work, specifically visualization/data presentation.
13 Writing – original draft Preparation, creation and/or presentation of the published work, specifically writing the initial draft (including substantive translation).
14 Writing – review & editing
Preparation, creation and/or presentation of the published work by 
those from the original research group, specifically critical review, 
commentary or revision – including pre- or post-publication stages.
Note. Source: https://casrai.org/credit/.
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